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Quotations from Berkeley’s works are taken mainly from The Works of George Berkeley, 
Bishop of Cloyne, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, published by Thomas Nelson 
and Sons, Ltd, London, 1948-57. However, as this edition is not available in the Czech 
Republic where some of this dissertation was written, not all quotes could be made to 
conform to the graphic layout of the standard edition. In referring to passages from 
individual works, the following abbreviations were used:  
 
ALC  for Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher 
DHP  for Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous 
DM   for De Motu 
NTV  for An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision 
PC     for Philosophical Commentaries 
PHK  for A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge 
TVV  for The Theory of Vision or Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence and 
Providence of a Deity Vindicated and Explained 
 
The abbreviations are followed by the number of section or entry, except in DHP where 
the number refers to the page in Luce and Jessop’s edition. 
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 Berkeley’s system has the reputation of an implausible philosophy among modern 
commentators. They tend to look for a fatal flaw in his argument which brings down the 
whole structure. Muehlmann 1  thinks he finds it in Berkeley’s extreme nominalism, 
Grayling2 in his theism. There is, however, another commentary tradition, exemplified by 
Winkler3 and Atherton4, concentrating on elucidating Berkeley’s point without judging 
the whole project a failure. Such a ‘sympathetic’ approach is definitely less ambitious and 
perhaps also more alive to the danger of anachronism. For how are we to judge a failure 
of a philosophical system? If Berkeley is wrong, what about, for example, Plato? Or 
Heraclitus? Where do they go wrong? We consider these questions beyond our limited 
capabilities and accordingly will concentrate on the less ambitious, sympathetic goal of 
uncovering Berkeley’s thought with the question of its plausibility being left to more able 
minds. 
 Consequently, the task of classifying Berkeley assumes little importance – 
whether he was an idealist, subjective idealist, phenomenalist or solipsist. All these labels 
were applied ex post and some function more as a diagnosis – Berkeley is seen as a 
subjective idealist by Kant because the latter has a certain notion of the history of 
philosophy as seen from his own position, which includes, among other things, saying 
what is wrong with Berkeley’s system and identifying the flaw. Our task is best served by 
the term ‘immaterialism’ as a description of Berkeley’s thought, partly because it was 
used by Berkeley himself and partly because it applies uniquely to his system and no 
other. We feel our author should be indulged and allowed to name his own creation. It 
would be absurd to insist that for instance Husserl was not the founder of phenomenology, 
that his system is in fact something else. Yet this is apparently what has been happening 
to Berkeley from the very beginning of the philosophical reception of his thought. 
                                                 
1 Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, Indianapolis, 1992. 
2 Grayling, A.C.: Berkeley: Central Arguments, 1987. 
3 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, 1989. 
4 Atherton, Margaret: Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990. 
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 As an exercise in an historical interpretation, as opposed to systematic 
interpretation, close reading is our main method of analysis. And here we believe we 
bring new impulses to Berkeleian studies. One of these is our insistence on a function of 
the conjunction ‘or’ – this connective usually signals the relation of contextual synonymy 
in Berkeley’s baroque texts, thus drastically decreasing the number of philosophical 
entities we have to deal with in interpreting them. Another is our wariness of the terms 
‘material object’ and ‘physical object’, none of which are used by our author, and we 
contend that with good reason. 
 Finally, a few words about the perspective of the whole project. The starting point 
is a realization that Berkeley was firstly a brilliant scientist in his own right. His first 
publication, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, came out in 1709 and “was 
undeniably successful” 5 . Unlike his fellow empiricists Locke, Hume and Hobbes, 
Berkeley made important scientific discoveries6 and came to generalize his hard-earned 
knowledge in a metaphysical system. The frame of the following thesis was in fact first 
suggested by Atherton: “If the New Theory and the Principles are read as dedicated 
toward the same overall project, then the arguments of the New Theory, by means of 
which Berkeley brought about a revolution in the study of vision, can provide a useful 
tool for interpreting those claims of the Principles widely held to be incredible.”7 The 








                                                 
5 Atherton, Margaret: Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 3. 
6 We regard Downing’s claim that “Berkeley himself made no major scientific discoveries, nor formulated 
any novel theories” as dramatically mistaken. See Downing, Lisa: ‘Berkeley’s natural philosophy and 
philosophy of science’, in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, Ed. Kenneth P. Winkler, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, p. 230. 
7 Atherton, Margaret: Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 218. 
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1.1 Berkeley flying in the face of common sense 
 
 Berkeley’s frequent exhortations8  to the effect that in his system he defends 
common sense have met with incredulity on the part of most commentators9. Indeed, 
immaterialism is often considered the least commonsensical of all the philosophical 
views, though well-argued throughout 10 . So Warnock claims that “his purpose of 
vindicating Common Sense was in fact only half fulfilled.”11 Tipton notices “a striking 
discrepancy between the judgement most of us want to make on his general position and 
the judgement he seems to have expected us to make on it”12  and, most recently, Pappas 
has claimed that the famous Berkeley’s exclamation ‘I side in all things with the Mob’ 
(PC 405) “is definitely an overstatement on Berkeley’s part, of course.”13 
 So an exciting interpretative problem opens itself before us: our author says that 
he does not contradict common sense and most commentators disagree with him and end 
up with the uncharitable conclusion that he is in the wrong, often even relying on the 
precarious thesis that Berkeley changed his views in the course of his career.14 So an 
interpretation which managed to show that Berkeley is not wrong to claim he does not 
contradict common sense would have two advantages: being more charitable to our 
author and not having to suppose that his views changed in the course of his life. To 
provide such an interpretation is our task now. 
 
 
                                                 
8 PHK 35, 82, DHP 227-8, 234, 244. 
9 The notable exception being Luce, A. A.: Berkeley’s Immaterialism, 1945, p. vi: “I hold that Berkeley’s 
immaterialism is sound common-sense…” The way he arrives at this conclusion is, however, not without 
its problems, as will be apparent later. Luce’s analysis of this topic has not become a mainstream 
interpretation subsequently and so it will be, for the time being, ignored. 
10 Cf. Pitcher, George, Berkeley, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p.4 “Berkeley’s philosophy rises 
in the garden of British thought like some fantastic plant – beautiful and extravagant.” 
11 Warnock, G. J.: Berkeley, 1953, sec. ed.1982, p. 18. 
12 Tipton, I. C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, 1974, p. 15. 
13 Pappas, George S.: Berkeley’s Thought, Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 209. 
14 Pitcher, p. 96. 
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1.2 Common sense in Descartes and Locke 
 
Descartes in his metaphysical programme proposes a radical rethinking of our 
everyday assumptions, yet he has many qualms about its accessibility and relevance for 
common people. In his letters he mentions three times that he purposefully omitted the 
radical sceptical doubts from his Discourse on the Method, because it could “disturb 
weaker minds, especially as I was writing in the vernacular.”15 He even adds that in the 
Latin version of this book, which was being planned, he could have it included. Nor was 
this a sentiment he voiced in private only, in his Preface to the Meditations he is again 
quite explicit: “I thought it would not be helpful to give a full account of it in a book 
written in French and designed to be read by all and sundry, in case weaker intellects 
might believe that they ought to set out on the same path.”16 So the intended audience of 
the metaphysical doubting is not the literate minority of people, but a fraction still of 
these, those who read in Latin, in short scientists and divines. Quite an elitist programme, 
then, one whose aim is expected to be misunderstood by common people.17 
This foreseen misunderstanding is echoed in many places in Descartes, when he, 
no doubt as a part of an opponent’s part, describes the radical doubt as insane18 and, at 
                                                 
15 Descartes – Philosophical Letters, translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1970, p. 35, the other two instances being letters on pp. 31 and 46 (“…these thoughts did not seem to me 
suitable for inclusion in a book which I wished to be intelligible even to women…”). 
16 Meditations on First Philosophy in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, translated by 
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 6-7. 
17 “…I do not expect any popular approval, or indeed any wide audience.” Meditations on First Philosophy, 
p. 8. The impression of Descartes trying to communicate an epiphany of his own is strengthened by two 
facts: his having a ‘vision’ in a warm room in Germany, and the incomplete manuscript of Search after 
Truth found in his papers after his death. In this fraction of a dialogue, written probably around the time of 
composition of the Meditations, a character of Polyander, the Everyman, is supposed to be the common 
sense recipient of Descartes metaphysics.  Would it be going too far if we suggested that the work on the 
French speaking dialogue was abandoned after Descartes realized that his metaphysical doubts sounded too 
absurd in the living language, and Latin was adopted together with the literary form of a meditation, which 
requires a certain degree of submission and suspension of judgement on the part of the reader? Also, is it 
not easier to convey a vision through a meditation rather than through a dialogue? 
18 Meditations on First Philosophy, pp. 11, 13. 
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the end of the Meditations the celebrated dream argument as laughable19. Also, the reader 
is guarded against revelling in metaphysical doubt, Descartes himself says he undertook 
it “once in the course of my life”20, and he advises his correspondent Princess Elizabeth 
“never to spend more than a few hours a day in the thoughts which occupy the 
imagination and a few hours a year on those which occupy the pure intellect. I have given 
all the rest of my time to the relaxation of the senses and the repose of the mind.”21 The 
utility of “such extensive doubt is not apparent at first sight”22 and it is positively harmful 
“as far as ordinary life is concerned”23. 
The theme of the tension between ordinary language and science is also taken up 
many times, Descartes usually complaining about ordinary language being inadequate for 
scientific purposes: “…almost all our words have confused meanings, and men’s minds 
are so accustomed to them that there is hardly anything which they can perfectly 
understand.” 24  Not only knowledge is difficult and almost impossible to obtain for 
common people due to natural deficiencies in their language, the same holds also for 
certainty, which in practical affairs is inferior to certainty found in science: “It would 
indeed be desirable to have as much certainty in matters of conduct as is needed for the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge; but it is easily shown that in such matters so much is 
not be sought for nor hoped for.”25 Descartes is careful to distinguish between “prudence 
                                                 
19 Meditations on First Philosophy, p. 61. 
20 Meditations on First Philosophy, p. 12. 
21 Descartes – Philosophical Letters, translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1970, pp. 141-2, see also p. 143 “I think that it is very necessary to have understood, once in a lifetime, the 
principles of metaphysics, since it is by them that we come to the knowledge of God and of our soul. But I 
think also that it would be very harmful to occupy one’s intellect frequently in meditating upon them….” 
22 Meditations in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, translated by John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 9. 
23 Principles of Philosophy in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I, translated by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 193. 
24 Descartes – Philosophical Letters, translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1970, p. 6 
25 Descartes – Philosophical Letters, p. 110. 
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in our everyday affairs” and that “perfect knowledge of all things that mankind is capable 
of knowing”26, reserving certainty only for the latter. 
However, nowhere is the clash between ordinary life and science more apparent 
than in the key difficulty of Cartesianism that its author himself acknowledges27 (if we 
are to take him speaking in earnest and not flattering his noble correspondent) – that of 
the connection between body and soul. The notion of the union of body and soul comes 
from everyday non-philosophical life, the notions of the separate body and soul are 
philosophical abstractions28 and the problem of their connection is not philosophically or 
scientifically soluble. In fact, here the two different views of the matter exclude each 
other29. 
Descartes’ scientific programme aiming to supplant the defects and prejudices of 
our common-sense view of the world inherited from childhood is expressed in technical 
terms which, not surprisingly, depart from ordinary usage. For example the word ‘idea’ is 
much broader than was usual at that time (hence the perceived need to define it) and 
includes basically everything mental and conscious.30 Ideas we have in perception are 
                                                 
26 Principles of Philosophy in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I, translated by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 179. 
27 Descartes – Philosophical Letters, translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1970, p. 137, “I may truly say that the question you ask is the one which may most properly be put to me in 
view of my published writings.” 
28 “Metaphysical thoughts, which exercise pure intellect, help to familiarize us with the notion of the 
soul…But it is the ordinary course of life and conversation, and abstention from meditation and from the 
study of the things which exercise the imagination, that teaches us how to conceive the union of the soul 
and the body.” Descartes – Philosophical Letters, translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1970, p. 141. Notice the mention of ‘ordinary course of life’ together with ‘conversation’. 
29 “It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of conceiving at the same time the distinction 
and the union between body and soul, because for this it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and 
at the same time to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd.” Descartes – Philosophical Letters, 
translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970, p. 142. 
30 “…if you take the word ‘thought’ as I do, to cover all the operations of the soul, so that not only 
meditations and acts of the will, but the activities of seeing and hearing and deciding on one movement 
rather than another, so far as depends on the soul, are all thoughts.” Descartes – Philosophical Letters, 
translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970, p. 51. 
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caused by material or external things, even sensible and imaginable things (Principles I, 
4). Knowledge is defined as clear and distinct perception, certainty is greatest in 
mathematics. 
 Locke shares Descartes’ contempt for common sense with many of its complex 
features, sometimes even taking it to new, dizzying heights. Meanings of common words 
are muddled and not suitable for scientific purposes and should be redefined (Essay III, 
VI, 25 and III, XI, 12), however, the dream argument is not to be taken seriously (Essay 
IV, XI, 8), the testimony of our senses of the existence of things around us is not as 
certain as demonstration (Essay IV, II, 14 and IV, XI, 3), knowledge is reserved to 
scientists, common people know nothing (Essay IV, XX, 2), and the pinnacle of 
arrogance is reached in the statement that “there is a difference of degrees in men’s 
understandings, apprehensions, and reasonings, to so great a latitude, that one may, 
without doing injury to mankind, affirm that there is a greater distance between some 
men and others in this respect than between some men and some beasts.” (Essay IV, XX, 
5) Locke’s scorn for the common man immersed in practical affairs of his daily life is 
possible because the opposite of the theoretical scientist, the ‘pure’ mind, is for him 
usually a child or a savage, as is apparent from the first book and the arguments against 
innate ideas: “amongst children, idiots, savages and the grossly illiterate, what general 
maxims are to be found?” (Essay I, II, 27) In this list made in order of importance there is 
no ‘the vulgar’ to oppose the philosopher as later in Berkeley. 
 In his eagerness to make room for scientific progress, Locke comes dangerously 
close to what Berkeley will later call scepticism: “The meanest and most obvious things 
that come in our way have dark sides that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The 
clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking men find themselves puzzled and 
at a loss in every particle of matter.” (Essay IV, III, 22) Notice the careless conflation of 
‘the meanest and most obvious things’ with ‘particle of matter’ in a relation of contextual 
synonymy. Science is also behind Locke’s definition of ‘real’, which has two features. 
Real ideas are opposed to chimerical ideas and “have a conformity with the real being 
and existence of things, or with their archetypes.” (Essay II, XXX, 1) 
 The basic metaphysical building blocks of a theory of knowledge are, 
nevertheless, the same for Locke as they were for Descartes and will be for Berkeley. 
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They are ‘ideas’ and at the very beginning of his Essay Locke feels the need to define this 
term since its usage is rather technical: “…the word idea…serves best to stand for 
whatsoever is the object of human understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to 
express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind 
can be employed about in thinking…” (Essay I, I, 8) And once again they are caused by 
external, material and sensible things. 
 To sum up, Cartesian dualism as a representative realism claims that there are 
‘external’ things, which are material and the object of physics, and ‘internal’ things called 
ideas which are subjective and mental. Common sense within this system is the belief, not 
really certain on the scientific level, that these ‘external’ things exist and have the 
properties they seem to have, or even the confusion of the ‘ideas of perception’ with the 
‘external’ things. The whole framework rests on the metaphor outside/inside, which is 
essentially a spatial metaphor but one liable to be misunderstood, since it is difficult to 
keep in mind that ideas are ‘in’ the mind but the mind itself is in no place since it is not 
extended. The ‘outside’ part, however, is comfortable with its spatiality and thus ceases 
to be metaphorical.  
Within the Cartesian system, Berkeley’s reaction was to some extent anticipated 
and precluded by Descartes himself. An Englishman, Henry More, asked Descartes in a 
letter if it was not better to define body as a perceptible, tangible or impenetrable 
substance rather than an extended substance. Descartes’ argument against this view is to 
be found in his Principles II, 4. Hardness of bodies is indeed known through our sense of 
touch and whenever we touch a body our hand is stopped and excluded by its surface. 
Thus hardness would appear to be a defining characteristic of body. But then we can 
imagine a situation when every-time we approached a body, this body would recede and 
we could never touch it, still we would have no reason to suppose that the body lacks 
anything which makes it a body. Consequently, hardness, though admittedly a perceiver-
dependent quality, is not essential to bodies in the same way extension is.  
But is such an argument convincing? Can we really imagine the situation 
Descartes imagines to build his argument on? He seems to be fascinated with his hand 
reaching out and touching a body just to be repulsed. But what about his feet, can he also 
imagine that he is walking and the ground is eluding him? What about our other parts? 
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Actually, it seems to be quite clear that apart from the very rare moments of free fall and 
springing into the air we feel something hard all the time. Now when I am writing this I 
feel the chair I am sitting on pushing into my back and my posterior, when I lie down I 
feel the bed, when I walk I feel the ground. So it would seem that the situation Descartes 
describes to prove the perception-independence of bodies is quite unimaginable, bodies 
cannot be disassociated from our experiencing them and hardness really seems to be their 
defining feature for everybody. 
Descartes’ motivation is to separate science from our everyday affairs and make it 
pure and mathematical. For Berkeley, this was almost as bad as divorcing science from 
our sense of God, and Descartes’ Principles III, 3 seems to justify his worry. There 
Descartes discusses the proposition that everything was created for man. While this 
sentiment is pious, it is ‘utterly ridiculous and inept’ in physics, because “many things 
exist, or once existed, though they are now here no longer, which have never been seen or 
thought of by any man, and have never been of any use to anyone.”31 Here we witness 
another clash between an anthropocentric religious belief of the time and emerging 
depersonalized and ultimately atheistic science, a clash Berkeley, as one of the most 
Christian philosophers of the era, will try to avoid. And the battle will be fought on the 
field of metaphysics, common sense and science. 
 
 
1.3 Different approaches to common sense in Berkeley’s works 
 
 Before evaluating Berkeley’s response to this picture of common sense, it is 
necessary to treat of each work individually, for common sense plays a different role in 
each of them. And just as the target and aim of each work varies, so does the role of 
common sense in it32.  
                                                 
31 Principles of Philosophy in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I, translated by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 249. 
32 Cf. “(in PHK and NTV) diverse notions advanced in these Dialogues are farther pursued, or placed in 
different lights, and other points handled, which naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them.” (my italics), 
Works II, p. 169. 
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NTV is a scientific work whose conclusions are to be tested experimentally and 
so, rather unsurprisingly, there is not much talk of common sense. Even though Berkeley 
at the very beginning says “It is, I think, agreed by all, that distance, of itself and 
immediately, cannot be seen” (NTV 2), the ‘all’ does not mean all people, but rather all 
opticians, natural philosophers or specialists. And these people are the intended audience 
of the book, their problems are being discussed and at their assent Berkeley aims. Thus 
phrases like ‘received opinion’, ‘the ancient and received principle’, ‘the common 
supposition’, ‘it is well known that…’, ‘it has been shown’, and ‘a prevailing opinion’ all 
refer to a scientific consensus of Berkeley’s time. Even in “men are tempted to think that 
flat or plane figures are immediate objects of sight” (NTV 157) Berkeley is speaking not 
about all men, but about natural scientists and their beliefs33.  
What we would call common sense, Berkeley labels ‘prejudice’ here (NTV 51, 66, 
79, 92, 95, 120, 138, 146) and finds reasons for discarding it. The first reason is a matter 
of general scientific principle: men believe in many things which they have never 
questioned, and when these assumptions finally do get questioned, they are found 
wanting on scientific principles. This is the meaning of the word ‘prejudice’ in NTV 120, 
138. There is, however, a more specialised meaning of ‘prejudice’ at play in NTV 51, 66, 
79, 92, 95, and 146, this time referring to the assumptions built into our visual capacity. 
These are rejected through Berkeley’s specific optical programme and foremost of these 
is the assumption that we see and touch the same thing, which is challenged by 
Berkeley’s heterogeneity thesis34. 
Berkeley’s analysis of the factors giving rise to prejudice is instructive. For 
example, in NTV 51 he lists three of them: “a long tract of time…the use of language, 
and want of reflexion”. The first and the third one we would expect in almost any 
analysis of prejudice, the second one signals a theme prominent in the metaphysical 
works and also in the essay on vision itself (NTV 46, 49, 120).  Language is intimately 
connected with prejudice (and so with common sense), “being accommodated to the 
common notions and prejudices of men” (NTV 120), and in the revisionist aim of the 
                                                 
33 Atherton, M.: Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision, Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 13. 
34 Atherton, M.: Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision, Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 8 claims that this lies at 
the very heart of Berkeley’s optics. 
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scientist’s theory of vision it is his enemy. Truth is invoked as the opposite of prejudice 
and phrases like “in truth and strictness of speech” (NTV 45) signal a conscious effort on 
the part of the experimental scientist to get behind the wall of language and prejudice. 
“Strict inquiry” (NTV 42) is needed for this uneasy task, and Berkeley on such occasions 
finds himself “strictly speaking” (NTV 46, 154) or speaking “in a strict sense” (NTV 
130). For the scientist, language is thus ambivalent at best. On the one hand, it allows for 
‘strict speech’, on the other “common speech would incline one” to prejudice (NTV 46). 
Nevertheless, when Berkeley moves from his science to his metaphysics, 
‘prejudice’ will often be substituted by ‘common sense’ and language correspondingly 
enlisted as the immaterialist’s staunch ally. 
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge is Berkeley’s main 
philosophical statement35. The question of its intended audience can be settled without 
much doubt from the opening paragraph of the Introduction. There Berkeley talks of “the 
illiterate bulk of mankind” and we can trust him in this – in his time the majority of 
people could not read nor write36 and so addressing a book to them would have been 
futile. It is rather addressed to philosophers, theologians, students and perhaps even the 
general reading public. Once again, phrases like ‘it is agreed on all hands’ (PHK In 7), 
‘this prevailing notion’ (PHK In 18), ‘what everybody will allow’ (PHK 3), ‘an opinion 
strangely prevailing amongst men’ and ‘this principle …entertained in the world’ (PHK 
4), ‘the received opinion’ (PHK 16) and explicitly ‘the received principles of philosophy’ 
(PHK 46), all refer to the philosophical opinions of Berkeley’s predecessors and 
contemporaries and are contrasted with ‘the principles we have premised’ (PHK 48). 
The only exception comes in paragraphs 54-7, where he discusses an eighth 
objection to his philosophy, which claims that if the whole world believes in the 
existence of matter, then there must be something in it. Yet even here Berkeley’s first 
reaction is not to admit common sense into the debate, remarking instead: “I answer… 
that upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found, so many as is imagined do really 
                                                 
35 A. A. Luce: Berkeley’s Immaterialism, 1945, p. vi “Master the Principles, and you have mastered 
Berkeley’s immaterialism.” 
36 Berkeley stresses this again in paragraph 10 of the Introduction: “The generality of men …are simple and 
illiterate…” 
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believe the existence of matter or things without the mind.” (PHK 54) The issue is strictly 
between materialists and immaterialists as two competing philosophical theories. If 
ordinary people profess belief in matter, they only “impose upon themselves, by 
imagining they believe those propositions which they have often heard...” (PHK 54) 
Nevertheless, Berkeley continues to treat this objection at least half seriously, for 
in the next three paragraphs he shows that even if it were true and all the people believed 
in matter, it is no proof of the validity of such an assertion for people often believe in 
things which, scientifically speaking, are simply wrong. And in §56 he offers an 
interesting diagnosis of materialism: the doctrine he set out to refute in fact contains two 
elements, one is a perverted common sense belief that things we see exist without the 
mind (perverted because Berkeley is quick to point out that men arrived at this conclusion 
“without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words” (PHK 56) and 
so in fact claims that such a view on the part of common sense would be trespassing into 
the scientist’s field of enquiry) and the other being a philosophers’ representative theory 
of perception. The mistake of the vulgar is more of a theological nature37 (the failure to 
see the power of God in His uniform operation as opposed to the more spectacular 
miracles), as the next paragraph makes clear, and is shared even by the natural 
philosophers, and so is not inherently commonsensical. This is really the only time in the 
Principles Berkeley is willing almost to admit that there is a common sense element to 
materialism, but he immediately qualifies this and describes materialism as an impossible 
travesty and mix of the two hitherto sharply separated approaches. 
 The tightrope he is attempting to walk between common sense and science is at its 
most conspicuous in §§ 55 and 58. In the first mentioned section he says that a universal 
assent to a proposition does not make it true, citing the example of most people’s belief 
that the Earth is flat. If there are scientific reasons for discarding such a belief, it can be 
disproved. But in the second mentioned section he goes on to say, that even if 
Copernicanism is a useful scientific theory, it “amounts in reality to no more than ...if we 
were placed in such and such circumstances...we should see the (earth) to move among 
                                                 
37 “…ordinary language, Berkeley believes, has one defect more serious than any so far mentioned; it 
fatally conceals the place of God in the universe.” Warnock, G. J.: Berkeley, 1953, sec. ed.1982, p. 117. We 
will return to this theme in the third part of this thesis. 
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the choir of the planets” (PHK 58). So even though the theory of the movement of the 
earth is scientifically useful, it is in a sense irrelevant to the common sense view of the 
world. The two areas somehow do not overlap. 
 This message of the Principles, however, was not accepted by Berkeley’s readers, 
most of who simply ridiculed his tenets without trying to argue against them38. Painfully 
aware of the hostile reception, Berkeley decided to present the content of the book in a 
more engaging and easier manner of dialogue39, this time concentrating on the question 
which was probably not fully explained in the Principles – the compatibility of 
immaterialism with common sense. The emerging Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous are thus his most comprehensive statement on the problem. 
 While the emphasis of the book changes from that of the previous one, the theme 
and the intended audience do not40. This time, the audience are supposed to decide a 
contest between a materialist and an immaterialist. In an amusing volte-face, Berkeley 
begins to talk of “the prejudices of philosophers, which have so far prevailed against the 
common sense and natural notions of mankind.”41 It is going to be philosophers, meaning 
the materialists, corpuscularianists, occasionalists and other rivals of our author, who are 
prejudiced in this book and need to be shown the truth. On the other hand, ‘common 
sense and natural notions of mankind’ are to be defended and even to be the standard 
against which the two rival philosophies will be measured: “that opinion (is) true, which 
                                                 
38 “…I did but name the subject matter of your book (the Principles) to some ingenious friends of mine and 
they immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time refusing to read it…A physician of my 
acquaintance undertook to describe your person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought to 
take remedies. A Bishop pitied you that a desire and vanity of starting something new should put you on 
such an undertaking. ..Another told me an ingenious man ought not to be discouraged from exercising his 
wit, and said Erasmus was not the worse thought of for writing in praise of folly.” Rand, Benjamin: 
Berkeley and Percival, Cambridge University Press, 1914, p. 80. 
39 Berkeley’s friend Percival read both books and of the second he says: “The new method you took by way 
of dialogue, I am satisfied has made your meaning much easier understood…I declare I am much more of 
your opinion than I was before.” Above, pp. 120-1, which testifies to the new explanative strategy having 
some success. 
40 “…I thought it requisite to treat more clearly and fully of certain principles laid down in the (PHK), and 
to place them in a new light. Which is the business of the following Dialogues.” Works II, p. 167-8. 
41 Works II, p.168. 
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upon examination shall appear most agreeable to common sense, and remote from 
scepticism…” (DHP 172) On a scale of Berkeley’s works according to their attitude to 
common sense, the Dialogues would be on the opposite side from the New Theory of 
Vision with the Principles in the middle. The Philosophical Commentaries are also 
helpful in this respect, since they were intended for private use only and there was no 
‘strategy’ involved in their composition.  
 The aim of the Dialogues, which is advertised at the beginning and at the end, is 
to bring men back to common sense42 . But not all men, once again, the therapy is 
necessary only for “those men who have in all ages, through an affectation of being 
distinguished from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to 
believe nothing at all, or to believe the most extravagant things in the world.” (DHP 171) 
Later we learn it is the modern philosophy and its ‘innovations’, ‘novelties’ and 
‘paradoxes’ (DHP 244) that are repugnant to common sense. 
 The source of these paradoxes is often identified as the language philosophers use 
to express their doctrines. When Hylas in DHP 172 charges Philonous with the seemingly 
absurd opinion that matter does not exist, Berkeley’s speaker calmly replies: “That there 
is no such thing as what philosophers call material substance, I am seriously persuaded.” 
(my underlying) The discussion is to take into account the difference between the speech 
of the vulgar and the philosophers’ jargon, the latter’s justification and use being often 
questioned. For example, Berkeley points out that philosophers like to call their 
physicalistic model the ‘real’ sound and this leads them to admit that the ‘real’ sound 
cannot be heard but only seen or felt, just as real motion is seen and felt only. (DHP 182) 
Thus, the insistence on the physicalistic model leads to paradoxical repercussions which 
are, however, most conspicuous on the level of language again, for they destroy the 
traditional network of meanings between the words concerned, in this case ‘sound’, ‘real’, 
‘motion’ etc.  
                                                 
42 “men (should be) reduced from paradoxes to common sense.” Works II, p. 168, “…the same principles 
which, at first view, lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to common sense.” 
Works II, p. 263. 
“…I endeavour to vindicate common sense.” Works II, p. 244. 
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 Philonous repeatedly forces Hylas into such paradoxical utterances – a practice 
usually explained as Berkeley’s able resurrection of the elenchus disputation of the 
Platonic dialogues43, but still a practice underlined by Berkeley’s exceptional feeling for 
ordinary speech: “P: Tell me, Hylas, hath everyone a liberty to change the current proper 
signification annexed to a common name in any language? …H: Common custom is the 
standard of propriety in language.” (DHP 216) Far from being merely an imaginative 
exercise in the ancient hunt for the aporia, the Dialogues strive to defend the views of the 
vulgar together with the language that expresses them and, in their critical task, identify 
the philosophers’ departures from ordinary language as the cause of their errors44. At the 
same time, as far as the words ‘matter’ and ‘material substance’ (sic) are parts of ordinary 
language, they are to be retained. Only the philosophical theory behind them is to be 
rejected. Both words “are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the 
immediate objects of sense.” (DHP 261)45 Here Berkeley’s tentative ‘or, if ever’ betrays 
his effort to wrest the words from the philosophers and give it back to ‘common people’. 
The very same technique is at play also in many entries in the Philosophical 
Commentaries (111a, 537, 552, 703, 725, 832, 862, and 867) and the high number of 
these entries alone testifies to a genuine general tendency of much of Berkeley’s thinking. 
 The tension between the language of the vulgar and the philosophers’ is brought 
out, for instance, at the beginning of the third Dialogue, where Hylas claims that it is 
impossible to know “the real tree or stone”. (DHP 227) Here the qualifier ‘real’ enables 
Hylas to insinuate Locke’s doctrine of the difference between the real and nominal 
essences of things. Philonous, rather naively, objects that the tree he sees over there and 
the stone he stands on are real. Also, he can distinguish between iron and gold, and 
therefore he knows what each is. And, as a last attempt to convince Hylas that even he 
                                                 
43 Walmsley, Peter: The Rhetoric of Berkeley’s Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 69. 
44 Nor is this conviction of Berkeley’s reserved to the Dialogues, it was a constant of his thinking: “Allow a 
man the privilege to make his own definitions of common words, and it will be no hard matter for him to 
infer conclusions which in one sense shall be true and in another false, at once seeming paradoxes and 
manifest truisms.” Alciphron, Works III, p. 324. 
45 Cf. also PHK 35, 82, DHP 225, PC 391, 517, 724, 862. It is biographically interesting to note that in four 
of the very earliest entries on the subject Berkeley identifies the common people with the Irish (392, 393, 
394, 398).  
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himself knows some real things, or at least behaves as if he knew them, is his claim that 
when Hylas wants to write something down, he sends his servant to fetch him pen, ink 
and paper, and surely he at least knows what to expect when the servant returns. (DHP 
228) For Berkeley, the word ‘real’ is anchored in everyday situations like distinguishing 
between two things and sending someone to fetch something, it is also anchored in 
everyday behaviour since “men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of 
life as comfortably and conveniently, as if they really knew the things they are conversant 
about.” (DHP 228) He also explicitly claims the word ‘real’, and at the same time ‘know’, 
back to ordinary language from Cartesian theoretical attempt to ward off scepticism: 
“What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath 
it proved to him from the veracity of God…” (DHP 230) He refuses even to be drawn 
into the Cartesian doubt, seeing, like some other contemporaries of Descartes, that his 
attempt to solve the sceptical questions fails: “I might as well doubt of my own being, as 
of the being of those things I actually see and feel.” (DHP 230) The words ‘real’ and 
‘know’ must have application in our everyday life to stay meaningful and the vulgar are 
justified in their usage. 
 However, Berkeley is no hard-core ordinary language philosopher as the 
preceding analysis might have indicated, he does devise a technical meaning for the word 
‘real’, but his technical notion of reality is remarkably vulgar-friendly. It is explained in 
PHK 33-3646, where ‘real’ things are contrasted with Chimaeras, illusions of the fancy 
and the like. PHK 41 shows that Berkeley would want to include dreams in the ‘unreal’ 
category, as well. And it is difficult to object from the common sense point of view 
against such a dichotomy, which cannot be said of the opinion that we never see the ‘real 
things’. 
                                                 
46 This doctrine is in the making in PC 535 and 807, where it is also quite clear that the distinction between 
entia rationis and entia realia is not to be based metaphysically, both types of entities are of the same 
metaphysical type, which is another difference between immaterialism and representative realism, where 
the true ideas would be caused by another substance – the material substance. Here both types of ideas are 
caused by the same substance – the spirit. 
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 The subject of ‘certainty’ is semantically intertwined with that of ‘reality’ and 
‘knowledge’ and forms a certain corollary of the two philosophically nobler subjects47. 
Here Berkeley is unequivocal: “We must wth the Mob place certainty in the senses.” (PC 
740) And in other entries he is even implicitly critical of Descartes’ programme of 
introducing mathematics as the most certain science (PC 336, 368) going as far as 
degrading the supposedly undeserved high status mathematicians enjoyed at that time 
(for example PC 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 385, 386). Once again, it is more useful to read 
these remarks not as blind rage against competitors but as an effort to incorporate 
mathematics into immaterialist metaphysics with the aim of wrestling certainty back to 
the senses and common sense: “I see no reason why certainty should be confin’d to the 
Mathematicians” (PC 468) 
 What are some concrete examples of common sense for Berkeley? They include 
situations where I am certain of the existence of my glove because I see it, feel it and 
wear it (DHP 224), that the stone I stand on is real, the tree I see over there is real as well, 
I know what water and fire is and can distinguish between iron and gold (DHP 227), I 
know what pen, ink and paper are because I send my servant to get them (DHP 228), a 
servant knows where and when to meet you and how to get there (PHK 97) and generally 
people act as if they knew the things they meet in their everyday lives (DHP 228). All 
these examples are fairly tame and it is difficult to object to them. 
  
 
1.4 The Hidden Metaphor 
 
However, Berkeley never says that it is common sense to believe we see material, 
external things. He does allow the qualifier ‘sensible’ before ‘things’ when discussing the 
perceptual situation, but that is all. Let us have a look at why some qualifiers before 
‘things’ are acceptable to Berkeley and some not. 
 We shall start with the adjective ‘material’. It is derived from the noun ‘matter’ 
and so someone attempting to refute the very concept of matter is sure to avoid the 
                                                 
47  It asserted its independence comparatively late in the history of philosophy in Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty. 
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adjective as well. And also, there is simply no reason, apart from the materialists’ 
prejudice, to call the things around us ‘material’. Certainly ordinary people do not call 
them so and they do not divide the things they see into ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’. 
 The adjective ‘external’ needs its opposite ‘internal’ to mean anything, just like 
other opposites are defined against each other: left and right, right and wrong, stupid and 
clever. It is impossible to imagine a world where only the right side was actual and not 
the left side as well. And sure enough, in the materialist’s scheme of things the external 
things are contrasted with the internal ideas. But Berkeley rejects both sides of the 
metaphor, noting that this doubling of worlds leads to scepticism. For him there are just 
things, and these are neither ‘external’ nor ‘internal’. (DHP 214) 
 The rejected metaphor inside/outside manifests itself in another way as well, and 
this time it is not rejected by Berkeley as resolutely as the external/internal pair48. It is the 
pair of opposite adverbs within/without and here the game is much more subtle. It is 
Berkeley’s battle cry that there is nothing ‘without the mind’ and commentators have 
asked themselves: what does this mean? Curiously, the innumerable negative references 
to things ‘without’ the mind in the Principles are balanced by mere two mentioning of 
things ‘within’ the mind, and these two come in passages where the adverb ‘within’ 
means basically ‘produced by one’s own mind’ without any spatiality included. (PHK 56, 
90) So, far from employing the within/without pair as another mutation of the 
inside/outside metaphor, Berkeley is using ‘without’ always in negative contexts to reject 
that very metaphor inherent in the Cartesian dualism49. It is a negative programme, for by 
saying ‘there are no things without’ Berkeley does not want to be understood as saying 
‘everything is within’ but rather ‘there simply is no without/within’. 
 Another incarnation of the outside/inside metaphor is the opposite pair of 
absolute/relative. This couple comes very handy when one wants to contrast the changing 
and fleeting perceptions of our mind with the ‘real’ thing, which, by virtue of being ‘real’, 
stays the same all the time. Once again, this inseparable couple is brutally severed by 
                                                 
48 For the hidden metaphors in our talk see for example Lakoff, George; Johnson, Mark: Metaphors We 
Live By, University of Chicago Press, 1980. 
49 Cf. PHK 15: “But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that …there should be any 
such thing as an outward object.” (My italics) 
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Berkeley ‘Absolute’ existence is coupled with the existence ‘without’ the mind and is 
rejected accordingly (PHK 3, 12) or it is incomprehensible and thus rejected (PHK 24) or 
just wrong (PHK 133), whereas ‘relative’ is a positive thing since it describes a 
dependence on the mind (PHK 11, 12)50. 
 Finally, perhaps the last instance of the ever changing and ubiquitous metaphor is 
the curious piece of philosophical jargon, ‘the thing in itself’. It is used to describe the 
‘outside’, ‘absolute’ and ‘real’ half of the equation, as opposed to mere ‘appearance’51. 
(“…the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind.” PHK 
24) But Berkeley is on his guard even against this deceitful intruder masquerading as a 
technical term: “I know not wt they mean by things consider’d in themselves. This is 
nonsense, Jargon.” (PC 832) 
The only modifier Berkeley allows before ‘things’ is the word ‘sensible’, which 
he inherits from Locke. In it, we can perhaps see an optical-scientific grounding of his 
metaphysics, of which more later in the third part of this thesis. 
Berkeley’s comprehensive fight against the complex inside/outside metaphor is 
summed up and made explicit in PHK 87-8: “…all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders 
and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, 
vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and not amuse ourselves with the terms 
‘absolute,’ ‘external,’ ‘exist,’ and such-like, signifying we know not what.” and again in 
PHK 24: “…it is (not) possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute 
existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind. To me it is evident those 
words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. …It is on this 
therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words 
without a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, 
and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.”52 It is clear that our 
writer is aware of the complex nature of the underlying metaphor and of its mutations and, 
                                                 
50 Cf. DHP 256: “Then as to absolute existence; was there ever known a more jejune notion than that?” 
51 For ‘appear’, ‘seem’ and ‘look’ see Austin, J. L.: Sense and Sensibilia, OUP, 1962, pp. 33-43. 
52 Notice the added emphasis. The analogical place in the Dialogues: “But those and the like objections 
vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in 
ideas…” (DHP 258) 
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by refusing to employ one half of the pairs used in its construction, he effectively rejects 
it as an example of conceptual confusion together with its underlining Cartesian 
metaphysical dualism: “The supposition that things are distinct from Ideas takes away all 
real Truth, & consequently brings in a Universal Scepticism, since all our knowledge & 
contemplation is confin’d barely to our own Ideas.” (PC 606) 
Also, his usage of the words ‘know’, ‘certain’ and ‘real’ is metaphysically less 
demanding and does not contradict common usage53. A natural philosopher does not 
know more about a thing because he knows more of its hidden nature (this was how 
Locke made room for scientific knowledge, reducing the knowledge of ordinary people 
to near ignorance), but he can just place his knowledge into a wider web of analogies and 
reduce it to general laws. This seems to be the import of paragraph 105 of the Principles. 
A blacksmith knows everything there is to know about the hammer he uses every-day, a 
physicist can only point out certain analogies with other bodies in nature. Berkeley’s 
account of science as uncovering laws rather than essences or natures of things leaves 
room for non-scientists to know things as well.54 
 
 
1.5 ‘Explicit’ and ‘implicit’ common sense 
 
 By refusing to define a commonsensical position positively, Berkeley is 
espousing something we could call ‘implicit’ common sense. His consistent strategy is to 
exclude certain propositions as non-commonsensical but never to say things like 
‘common sense is to believe in the existence of external physical things’ or such. That 
would be an attempt to accommodate common sense to a philosophical scheme of things, 
or an attempt at an ‘explicit’ common sense. So his doctrine escapes such broad 
                                                 
53 Here we concentrate on the ‘surface’ semantic level of words. The philosophical arguments supporting it 
will be dealt with in later sections. 
54 Cf. Ardley, G. W. R: Berkeley’s Philosophy of Nature, University of Auckland, 1962, p. 47: “(Berkeley’s) 
happy analogy of exact science to grammar is immensely rewarding.” and Atherton, M.: Berkeley’s 
Revolution in Vision, Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 242: “Berkeley (tries) to replace a science based on 
the Cartesian model, which is essentialist in nature, with one, based on his own language model, which is 
law-like…more Newtonian view…” 
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characterisations as ‘realism’, ‘common sense realism’ or ‘idealism’.55 
 The temptation to make common sense explicit in their systems has been widely 
and wildly indulged by philosophers. Berkeley’s contemporaries, Claude Buffier and 
Thomas Reid “endeavoured to formulate axioms of incontrovertible common sense; such 
axioms, once isolated, are like Euclid’s first principles, to be beyond examination and 
argument. E.g. there are corporeal objects in the world, there are other people, etc.”56 The 
aim of these ‘common sense’ philosophers would invariably be to combat post-Cartesian 
scepticism by ‘common sense’ (G. E. Moore and his refutation of idealism fits naturally 
into this group). But Berkeley, though eager to do the same, would never attempt to lay 
down any explicit principles of common sense.57 
 Though perhaps the first exponent of the ‘implicit’ version, Berkeley is definitely 
not the only one. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia is a powerful statement of this 
philosophical programme (or, as some might say, rather the lack of it) and so is 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. And the tension between both versions is signalled by the 
fact that the target of Wittgenstein’s last book is Moore’s project in his ‘A Proof of the 
External World’ and ‘A Defence of Common Sense’. There, Moore seems to want to 
make a list of things he ‘really knows’, but Wittgenstein claims such a list is impossible 
and distorts the meaning of the word ‘know’ which requires particular circumstances for 
its use. 
 The friction between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ approach to common sense spills 
into Berkeleian scholarship, as well. Commentators who claim that it is common sense to 
believe in the existence of ‘material objects’ beg the question against Berkeley’s 
immaterialism and are bound to find his system solipsistic. Unfortunately, almost all 
commentators share this basic misunderstanding. Warnock’s influential Berkeley is full 
of statements like: “But to those who wish, as surely as we do all wish, to maintain that 
                                                 
55 Austin, J. L.: Sense and Sensibilia, OUP, 1962, pp. 2-4, though Austin later claims Berkeley uses the 
‘argument from illusion’; I think he is too hasty there. 
56 Ardley, G.W.R.: Berkeley’s Renovation of Philosophy, The Hague 1968, p. 98. 
57 Ardley, G.W.R.: Berkeley’s Renovation of Philosophy, p. 100 “Where Buffier speaks of common sense 
as an array of first truths, Berkeley speaks of common sense as our home.” – the metaphor of coming home 
after a long journey through the systems of philosophers is used by Berkeley in the Dialogues.  
 27 
there are about us physical objects at various distances from ourselves and each 
other…”58 Pitcher amusingly confuses a certain physical theory with common sense in 
his Berkeley: “We exist, according to common sense, in a four dimensional world of three 
spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.” 59  He also mentions “our 
commonsensical beliefs about physical objects”.60 
 In more recent times, Muehlmann claims Berkeley to be “the first self-conscious 
and systematic philosopher of common-sense”61 and it is the ‘systematic’ part that spoils 
this valuable observation, for Berkeley is seen as trying to defend “the possibility of 
common sense realism”62, an almost Herculean task in which he, almost inevitably, fails 
because common sense realism needs “some realistic ontology as an underpinning”63. But 
Berkeley appears to fail only because Muehlmann misconstrues his goals and ascribes the 
“strangely prevailing” opinion that houses exist unperceived (PHK 4) to the plain man 
instead of the learned elite.64 Also Pappas has Berkeley defend, together with the direct 
realists, “the thesis that physical objects are typically immediately perceived.”65  
Not surprisingly, these commentators see Berkeley as failing in his endeavour to 
reconcile immaterialism with common sense66 simply because they see common sense 
couched in terms of the Cartesian metaphysics to which Berkeley was reacting and so are 
begging the question against him. On this basic and metaphysically neutral level, 
immaterialism could be summed up as ‘reasons why philosophers should not call the 
things people perceive material’. 
Some commentators are more cautious. Winkler in his informed and well-
                                                 
58 Warnock, G. J.: Berkeley, London: Penguin, 1953, sec. ed.1982, p. 53. 
59 Pitcher, G: Berkeley, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 140. 
60 Pitcher, G: Berkeley, p. 162. 
61 Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, Indianapolis, 1992, p. 8. 
62 Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, p. 186. 
63 Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, p. 210. 
64 Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, p. 209. 
65 Pappas, George S.: Berkeley’s Thought, Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 190. 
66 Warnock, G. J.: Berkeley, London: Penguin, 1953, sec. ed.1982, p. 18, Pitcher, G: Berkeley, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 254, Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, Indianapolis, 1992, p. 
251, Pappas, George S.: Berkeley’s Thought, Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 209. 
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researched interpretation feels the urge to define immaterialism with the help of ‘ordinary 
objects’67. Tipton also avoids the trap of talking about ‘physical objects’ and since his 
interpretation proved influential in subsequent Berkeleian scholarship and an alternative 
to Luce’s sympathetic and common-sense-friendly views, it deserves a more detailed 
discussion here. Two of the book’s seven chapters deal directly with common sense (2 
Berkeley and Common Sense and 4 The Approach from Ordinary Usage), while 
numerous other allusions to the ‘plain man’ are scattered throughout the book. Tipton 
notices what he calls “Berkeley’s Janus-faced defence of common sense and ordinary 
language”68 but unfortunately ascribes this to Berkeley’s moods (!) and does not look for 
underlying reasons why our author disregards the mob’s account of causality or 
heterogeneity of ideas while embracing ‘the certainty of the senses’. His overall 
interpretative strategy is that Berkeley was right to attack certain inherently sceptical 
tendencies of the then reigning materialism, but that he did that from an equally 
implausible immaterialist standpoint. So the negative side of Berkeley’s programme is 
justified and really defends common sense while the positive one creates new problems 
and is just another philosophical affront to the ‘plain man’.69 To get Berkeley into this 
precarious position, Tipton pictures him as trying to do two things in the Principles: to 
convince the philosopher that there is no matter and at the same time to persuade the 
‘plain man’ that immaterialism does not go against his beliefs about the world.70 Such a 
strategy not only wrongly enlarges the audience of the Principles; it also distorts some of 
its passages. For example, “an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men” (PHK 4) is 
held by ordinary people as well as philosophers according to this reading, thus ignoring 
the fact that if an opinion is prevailing ‘strangely’, it cannot be a part of common sense. 
Also, when commenting on the first paragraph of the Principles, where Berkeley gives a 
list of ‘objects of knowledge’, Tipton rightly suggests: “Clearly this is a philosopher 
                                                 
67 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, 1989, pp. 191 and 193. 
68 Tipton, I. C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, Methuen & Co. Ltd, London, 1974, p. 17, the 
description is actually borrowed from Sullivan, C. J.: ‘Berkeley’s Attack on Matter’, in George Berkeley, 
ed. Aschenbrenner, K., Mates, Berkeley and Pepper, C. S., Berkeley, 1957. 
69 Tipton, I. C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 18. 
70 Tipton, I. C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 61 “…Berkeley has to fight on two fronts if 
he is to persuade the layman and the philosopher…”, see also pp. 21, 70. 
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writing for philosophers … our plain man will presumably feel rather lost at this 
stage…”71 Unfortunately, it is not a question of stages, our plain man (who in Berkeley’s 
time was illiterate) will sadly feel lost throughout the whole book because the book is not 
intended for him at all. The debate takes place solely between the materialists and 
Berkeley; the plain man is not even a spectator.  
 
 
1.6 Summary: Berkeley and common sense 
 
 We have tried to show why Berkeley felt so justified in claiming that 
immaterialism does not contradict common sense. The reasons being the much smaller 
role that common sense plays in the Principles and the New Theory of Vision, both of 
which are intended for natural philosophers. Berkeley as the first champion of ‘implicit 
common sense’ rejects the whole Cartesian inside/outside metaphor within which the 
traditional debate of direct vs. representative realism vs. idealism vs. phenomenalism 
takes place, and this rejection has unfortunately gone unnoticed by most of his 
commentators. His law-like theory of science does not distort the words ‘know’, ‘real’ 
and ‘certain’ and this lies at the heart of his claim that the reigning materialistic 
philosophy is paradoxical while immaterialism is not. 
To account for the description of Janus-faced defence of common sense by 
Berkeley we construed him as admitting that he departs from common sense in two areas: 
heterogeneity of visual and tactile ideas, and causality. The first departure is necessitated 
by his scientific theory of perception and justified by its success in explaining several of 
the optical paradoxes of his time; the second is, upon a close examination, a mistake of a 






                                                 
71 Tipton, I. C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 68. 
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2.1 ‘Idea’ and ‘thing’ in primary sources: NTV  
 
 What does Berkeley mean when he says ‘idea’? In his New Theory of Vision he 
uses it as “it is commonly used by the moderns” to signify “any immediate object of 
sense or understanding” (NTV 45). This, however, is too general, so it will help to have a 
look at how the word is actually used. In a work dealing with optics we would expect 
‘idea’ to stand for some kind of visual image. And indeed, §44 talks of ‘ideas or 
resemblances of things’ and this idea is ‘weak and obscure’. Later, ideas are described as 
‘light and colours’ (NTV 103) and §117 is unequivocal in stating that “certain variety and 
disposition of colours …constitute the visible man, or picture of a man”. Finally, 
‘confused appearance of the object’ (NTV 22) would be a borderline case of a possible 
visual image, whereas ‘faintness’ of the image (NTV 73) transcends the simple visual 
picture, even though a picture is an essential component of it, and it belongs to the 
following category, that of ‘sensation’. 
More often ‘idea’, surprisingly, does not mean ‘visual image’. It occurs often in 
collocations with ‘sensation’ and ‘perception’ (for instance NTV 16, 17, 18, 26, 28, 73, 
78), is connected to these words by the conjunction ‘or’ and is interchangeable with them. 
They are regarded by Berkeley as synonyms with the same meaning. The synonymy goes 
the other way, as well, i.e. where we would expect ‘sensation’ we often find ‘idea’. Thus 
the feeling that is connected with our turning our eyes is an ‘idea’ and the ‘idea of 
distance’ is a feeling we associate with seeing things at a distance (NTV 17) because we 
can have “the idea of great distance, or small distance, or no distance at all” (NTV 26) 
and these can vary in degree (NTV 77 ‘the idea of farther distance’). Also the ‘idea of 
approach’ (NTV 37) is probably to be construed as a sensation that can be made 
conscious on introspection, the same holding for ‘the ideas of greater or lesser’ (NTV 56), 
‘the idea of greater magnitude’ (NTV 70), ‘ideas of upper and lower’ (NTV 93) and ‘idea 
of the intermediate objects’ (sic) (NTV 77).  
One of the main themes of Berkeley’s optical project is the relationship between 
sight and touch, and the concept of ‘idea’ is equally at home in both senses – ‘idea of 
touch’ is a tactile sensation. That is why Berkeley can claim that there is no idea common 
to the senses of sight and touch – the famous heterogeneity thesis – because ‘idea’ here 
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means a visual or tactile sensation (“the ideas which constitute the tangible earth and man 
are entirely different from those which constitute the visible earth and man” NTV 102). 
The experience of the force of gravity seems to be somehow intimately connected with 
the tactile idea of ground: “by his touch (a person blind from birth) obtained an idea of 
earth or ground, towards which he perceives the parts of his body to have a natural 
tendency” (NTV 96). 
The mind, however, combines ideas of different senses, according to arbitrary 
laws and to suit convenience, and calls these combinations or collections of ideas by one 
name (NTV 79, 107). This is a prejudice that is unhelpful for Berkeley’s optical project. 
The collections of ideas of one sense are by Berkeley called ‘complex ideas’: “one 
complex idea (consists of) all those particular ideas which constitute the visible head or 
foot” (NTV 110). 
In his build up of a comprehensive psychology of vision as a part of his optical 
programme, Berkeley uses psychological entities only which were actually bequeathed to 
him by his predecessors in natural philosophy and so his usage does not deviate 
significantly from Locke’s or Descartes’ use, although his terminology is much more 
elaborate and worked out. If we were to look for an analogical concept in more recent 
philosophy, we would have to compare Berkeley’s ‘idea’ of NTV with what later was 
named ‘sense datum’. The comparison should, however, not be taken too literally as it 
risks being anachronistic – it should only point to the common features of privacy, 
subjectivity, incorrigibility and a connection to a theory of perception. 
 
 
2.2 ‘Idea’ and ‘thing’ in PHK and DHP 
 
At the beginning of the Principles, ideas are still sense data: “By sight I have the 
ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive 
hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either 
as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and 
hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition.” (PHK 1) 
The mind-dependent status of this idea/sense datum is immediately confirmed in the next 
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paragraph: “…the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.” (PHK 2) and again in 
paragraph 89 ideas are described as “inert, fleeting, dependent beings”, a description 
which was actually softened, for the first edition read “fleeting, perishable passions, or 
dependent beings.” Once again, ‘ideas’ collocate frequently with ‘sensations’ (for 
instance in PHK 25) and, once again, are defined as “the objects of sense (that) exist only 
in the mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive”. (PHK 39) In both books Berkeley 
treats ‘idea’ as a technical term in need of a definition. 
In DHP ‘idea’ again occurs in synonymic contexts with ‘sensation’ (for example 
DHP 177, 188, 203, 204, 206, 208, 215), and it is described as a “thing perpetually 
fleeting and variable” (DHP 205), it often collocates with ‘quality’ (DHP 217; in PHK as 




2.2.1 Identification of ‘idea’ with ‘thing’ – ‘changing ideas into things’ 
 
So far so good, idea is a sense datum and Berkeley can be called a solipsist. But 
this simple picture is complicated by his famous identification of ‘ideas’ with ‘things’ 
which occurs later in the Principles. (The transition is made easier by Berkeley’s using 
‘sensible thing’ in the opening sections, at first meaning ‘idea’ but later surreptitiously 
acquiring the meaning of ‘thing’, as well. The subtle dialectic is discernible for example 
in Paragraph 8, which contains the first objection to Berkeley’s proof that there is no 
other substance than spirit from the previous paragraph. The anticipated objection 
concedes that ideas exist only in the mind, but it posits ‘things’ which the ideas are 
supposed to resemble. Berkeley’s reply, however, talks not of ‘things’, but of ‘external 
things’, the added modifier signalling a philosophers’ term that is to be rejected as a part 
of the inside/outside metaphor, thus allowing Berkeley to retain ‘thing’ for his purposes.) 
On the purely textual level, the identification in the Principles does not occur yet, 
even though it is always in the background. Berkeley prefers to keep the two terms in an 
antagonistic relationship so that he can differentiate between real things and dreams, 
hallucinations and fantasies: “the difference betwixt things and ideas, realities and 
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chimeras” (PHK 82). And paragraph 89 is explicit in subsuming ‘idea’ under ‘thing’: 
“Thing or being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds 
entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name, to 
wit, spirits and ideas.” 
In the Dialogues, on the other hand, the identification is textually well 
documented. Both terms occur in clearly synonymic contexts connected by ‘or’ (DHP 
201, 214, 230), though ‘thing’ is usually accompanied by ‘perceived’. 
The metamorphosis of ‘ideas’ into ‘things’ takes place mainly in paragraphs 38-9 
of the Principles, where their intricate relationship is spelled out. The first important 
point to observe is that the two terms are not defined against each other, in fact, for 
Berkeley they are synonymous72: “we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas” 
and again “we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by 
our senses.” The second important thing to notice is Berkeley’s awareness that he is 
abusing language when he calls things ‘ideas’: “it is more proper or conformable to 
custom that they should be called things rather than ideas”, but Berkeley claims that this 
is only a cosmetic problem. His revolutionary ontology can be paraphrased into the 
neutral: “we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our 
senses.” By using the word ‘idea’ Berkeley merely wants to get rid of dangerous 
connotations of the word ‘thing’ which “is generally supposed to denote somewhat 
existing without the mind”. (Notice the crucial hedging in ‘is generally supposed’ – 
Berkeley’s whole project aims to show that this general, and we would like to suggest 
that it is general only among philosophers, supposition is wrong.) And to stress that this 
is only a verbal dispute not concerning the truth of the proposition, Berkeley is content to 
use the usual ‘thing’ rather than ‘idea’ provided we reject the misleading connotations, 
which, however, are explicit and possible to formulate only on the philosophical level of 
speech: “If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the 
                                                 
72 Berkeley is well aware that his opponents use ‘idea’ and ‘thing’ as mutually defining opposites. Thus in 
PHK 87 he adopts their voice and says: “Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or 
even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach 
to determine.” But from such analysis scepticism necessarily follows, and therefore the oppositeness of 
idea/thing is rejected as an instance of the absolute/relative transmutation of the inside/outside metaphor. 
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immediate objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall 
readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things 
rather than ideas.” (PHK 38) 
The identification of ideas and things is further enlarged on in PHK 87-89. 
Berkeley even explicitly states that “our supposing a difference between things and 
ideas” leads to scepticism (PHK 87)73 and one possible interpretation of the scope of his 
famous maxim ‘esse is percipi’ could be to see it as connecting the specialists’ term 
‘idea’ with the common ‘thing’.  
The Principles account of the identification of ‘ideas’ with ‘things’ was probably 
felt by Berkeley to have failed to persuade his readers and in the Dialogues more space is 
devoted to this theme. The whole debate revolves around the nature of ‘sensible things’ 
(DHP 173-4), which ambiguous term is shortly narrowed down to sense data: “by sight 
(we do not immediately perceive) anything beside light, and colours, and figures: or by 
hearing, anything but sounds: by the palate, anything beside tastes: by the smell, beside 
odours: or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.” (DHP 175) After two dialogues, 
the mind-dependent status of these entities is sufficiently established, but Hylas still feels 
there is something missing in the picture. He feels that the visions of a dream and 
Chimaeras are also ideas and so how can Berkeley account for ‘real’ things? (DHP 235) 
These, however, are more orderly and vivid, and this almost Cartesian distinction 
between dreams and reality is thus available in immaterialism, as well. But a lingering 
suspicion remains, for then ‘idea’ is used in very much the same way as ‘thing’. This 
Berkeley concedes and claims that the advantage of ‘idea’ over ‘thing’ is its 
philosophical connotations of mind-dependence, the same point he had made in the 
Principles. Hylas is still not satisfied, he requires a more robust sense of reality, and 
accuses the immaterialist: “you are for changing all things into ideas” (DHP 244). Here 
Berkeley shrewdly turns the objection and through Philonous asserts: “You mistake me. I 
                                                 
73 The identification of ‘idea’ with ‘thing’ is seen as Berkeley’s unique way of avoiding skepticism by most 
commentators. Tipton, p. 53: “Berkeley’s solution to the problem is staggeringly simple.” Pitcher, p. 137: 
“...he executes a masterstroke that allows him, as he thinks, to triumph on all fronts. I refer to his brilliant 
move of simply identifying what we call real physical objects (events, processes, or whatever) with ideas of 
sense.” 
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am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things” and offers an analysis 
of Hylas’ persistent feeling of a lack of robustness of immaterialism: “What you call the 
empty forms and outside of things seems to me the very things themselves. Nor are they 
empty or incomplete otherwise, than upon your supposition, that matter is an essential 
part of all corporeal things.” (DHP 244-5) Only as long as ‘ideas’ remain defined against 
‘material things’ are they felt to be inadequate to constitute the reality of things. Only on 
the materialists’ supposition are they ‘empty appearances’. 
In identifying ‘thing’ with ‘idea’, the departure from ordinary usage of the word 
‘thing’ is admitted: “The difference is only about a name. And whether that name be 
retained or rejected, the sense, the truth and reality of things continues the same.” (DHP 
251) but Berkeley is willing to pay the price since his philosophical arguments recoup his 
losses. 
It is crucial for the defence of immaterialism against objections from common 
sense that its sentences translate into ordinary language without paradoxes. The 
identification of ‘idea’ with ‘thing’ goes a long way towards achieving that smooth 
translation. The aim is to eliminate, together with the metaphysical dualism underpinning 
the difference between the two terms, also the possibility of scepticism74. At what cost 
this is achieved, however, remains to be seen. 
 
 
2.2.2 Is the Argument from Illusion used by Berkeley for the separation of ‘idea’ 
and ‘thing’? 
 
The first objection against the identification of ‘ideas’ with ‘things’ would go like 
this: The technical term ‘idea’ was introduced to account for cases of abnormal 
perception, cases listed by the ancient Argument from Illusion (sometimes called the 
Argument from Perceptual Relativity). To explain why we sometimes perceive ‘things’ 
as they are not philosophers came up with the concept of ‘idea’, which is defined against 
                                                 
74 Both in PHK 87-9 and DHP 244-5, the identification of ‘idea’ with ‘thing’ is interwoven with Berkeley’s 
analysis of the roots of scepticism. The remedy is prescribed and the diagnosis follows. 
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the concept of ‘thing’. But Berkeley, though he uses the Argument from Illusion, uses 
both terms synonymously, which seems contradictory. 
Now, Berkeley does use the Argument several times, for instance in the 
Principles 14-15 and in the Dialogues 178-9, 185-6, 258. The first occurrence is 
especially significant, for it is followed by Berkeley’s own evaluation of the Argument: 
“Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is 
no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the 
true extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be 
impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, 
should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth, that there should be 
any such thing as an outward object.” (PHK 15) The Argument is thus used only 
secondarily after the a priori arguments of the first seven paragraphs and together with 
them to show that what we perceive are ideas only75.  
The occurrence in the Dialogues 178-9 is an ad hominem argument against Hylas’ 
naïve realism while that in 185-6 to force the conclusion that perceived qualities ‘are all 
equally apparent’. Nowhere is it used to introduce the term ‘idea’, let alone to define it 
against the term ‘thing’. 
The limited efficacy of the Argument is also attested in the Dialogues 258: “Upon 
this supposition indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon’s neck, or 
the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. But these 
and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external 
originals, but place the reality of things in ideas…” The sceptical corollaries follow from 
the Argument only if it is applied to the materialists’ doctrine, immaterialism is immune. 
                                                 
75 For a similar view, see Pitcher, p. 260n. Warnock, pp. 146-53 also emphasizes the didactic role of the 
Argument from Illusion: “In the Principles, Berkeley had taken it as agreed in the learned world that what 
Locke had called ‘secondary qualities’ are ‘only in the mind’…But in the Dialogues, not assuming prior 
acceptance of Locke’s arguments, he undertakes to prove that secondary qualities are ‘in the mind’ 
(Warnock, p. 146), Tipton, p. 239, and Lambert, Richard T.: “Berkeley’s Commitment to Relativism”, in 
Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative Essays, ed. by Turbayne, Colin, Manchester University Press, 1982, p. 
26: “Why did the Dialogues’ magnified assessment and use of relativity differ so from the role given that 
concept in the Principles? I contend that the major reason for this change was a rhetorical one.” For a 
slightly different and sophisticated discussion of the scope of the Argument, see Grayling, pp. 71-4. 
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Notice also the seemingly contradictory conclusion to the one drawn in the preceding 
example, for now it seems that all the qualities are ‘equally real’ because we ‘place the 
reality of things in ideas’. But the problem of identifying the ‘real’ qualities arises only in 
the dualist scheme, in immaterialism the distinction apparent/real collapses when applied 
to sensible things; it is retained for the dream and fantasy vs. reality debate.  
Berkeley did not feel the need to define ‘idea’ with the help of the Argument from 
Illusion, for that would involve defining it against ‘thing’ and an open road to scepticism. 
He simply took the term from his philosophical predecessors and, seeing its usefulness in 
his optical project and the place of pride of the optical investigations in his system, used 
it in his metaphysics, as well. 
 
 
2.3 Can two people see the same thing? – The privacy of the idea 
 
Another objection to the identification of ‘idea’ with ‘thing’ points out the fact 
that ideas as sense data are subjective and private while ‘thing’ implies existence in a 
public space, it is objective. So, given the privacy of our ideas and the identification of 
ideas with things, it seems to follow that two persons cannot see the same thing. Now, 
Berkeley does assign both contradictory features to ‘idea’ (the public character of bodies 
is insisted on in PHK 48: “For though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing 
else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have 
no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other 
spirit that perceives them, though we do not.” and the privacy implied in PHK 140: “we 
conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we 
suppose to be resemblances of them.”) and so the objection seems to be a fair one. 
Berkeley, through Hylas, poses this objection to himself in DHP 247-8 and some 
commentators see his treatment of it as inadequate76  while others have attempted to 
                                                 
76 Grave, S. A.: ‘The Mind and Its Ideas: Some Problems in the Interpretation of Berkeley’, in Locke and 
Berkeley, ed. Martin, C. B. and Armstrong, D. M., London, 1968, pp. 300-1, Marc-Wogau, K.: ‘The 
Argument from Illusion and Berkeley’s Idealism’, in Locke and Berkeley, ed. Martin, C. B. and Armstrong, 
D. M., London, 1968, pp. 349-50. 
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defend it. Let us quote the passage in full, for close reading will be necessary in order to 
decide whether Philonous succeeds in meeting the objection or not: 
     HYLAS But the same idea which is in my mind, cannot be in yours, or in 
any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow from your principles, that no two 
can see the same thing? And is not this highly absurd? 
     PHILONOUS If the term same be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is 
certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different 
persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different 
minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and since men are used to apply the 
word same where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to 
alter their perceptions, it follows, that as men have said before, several saw the 
same thing, so they may upon like occasions, still continue to use the same 
phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of 
things. But if the term same be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who 
pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry 
definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic 
identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive 
the same thing. But whether philosophers shall think fit to call a thing the same 
or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let us suppose several men together, 
all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by 
their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they would 
without question, agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came 
to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, 
might call it the same thing: others especially regarding the diversity of persons 
who perceived, might choose the denomination of different things. But who sees 
not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether what is perceived by 
different persons, may yet have the term same applied to it? Or suppose a house, 
whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled 
down, and new ones built in their place; and that you should call this the same, 
and I should say it was not the same house: would we not for all this perfectly 
agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself? and would not all the 
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difference consist in a sound? If you should say we differed in our notions; for 
that you super-added to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of 
identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you mean by that 
abstracted idea of identity; and should desire you to look into your own 
thoughts, and be sure you understood your self. -- Why so silent, Hylas? Are 
you not yet satisfied, men may dispute about identity and diversity, without any 
real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this 
farther reflexion with you: that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the 
case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the materialists themselves 
acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses, to be our own ideas. 
Your difficulty therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally against 
the materialists and me.  
     HYLAS But they suppose an external archetype, to which referring their 
several ideas, they may truly be said to perceive the same thing. 
     PHILONOUS And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) 
so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles; external, I mean, to 
your own mind; though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that mind which 
comprehends all things; but then this serves all the ends of identity, as well as if 
it existed out of a mind. And I am sure you yourself will not say, it is less 
intelligible. 
 
The status of the objection is being decided in the latter part of the quote. Berkeley is 
generally very sensible to whether an objection can be made against him at a particular 
stage or not and whether it is an objection against immaterialism from materialistic 
positions or not. If an objection is felt to cut against materialism as well, it is usually 
dismissed, for Berkeley’s contention is against the prevailing materialistic philosophy of 
his time: “that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions, can be a proof 
against neither.” (DHP 248) The same principle, which we will call the Relevancy 
principle, is invoked in the discussion of Creation (DHP 250-5) and Berkeley even 
proposes it as a general interpretative approach to immaterialism in his correspondence 
with Johnson, advising him to consider “(w)hether the difficulties proposed in objection 
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to my scheme can be solved by the contrary; for if they cannot, it is plain they can be no 
objection to mine.”77 
Is Berkeley then right to claim that the objection arises for the materialists as well? 
The materialists agree with Berkeley that the ideas two different persons perceive are not 
the same because they are subjective to each perceiving mind78, but the ideas themselves 
referring to one external object, two perceivers may be said to perceive the same thing. 
And this is exactly what Berkeley proposes in his own system to meet the objection. The 
external archetype in this case is in the Infinite mind and serves the double function of 
guaranteeing the use of the word ‘same’ on the everyday level and being not peculiar to 
one finite mind, unlike its ideas. So there is a parity between the competing doctrines, 
both solve the problem in the same way, the balance is tipped in favour of immaterialism 
by the nature of the crucial ‘external archetype’, not by the objection itself, since the 
immaterial ‘external archetype’ is an idea as well, one whose relationship with the 
perceiving mind is not compromised by an unexplained (or even unexplainable) causal 
relationship between two types of substances or the redundant metaphysical dualism of 
Cartesianism. 
We might, perhaps, still feel that the materialists fare better vis-à-vis the objection. 
After all, they at least attempt to explain how we perceive the same thing, whereas 
Berkeley’s solution is simply parasitic on theirs. (The whole problem is presented as a 
possible paradoxical corollary of immaterialism, but the inference is denied in the end. It 
                                                 
77 Works II, p. 283. In the same letter we find a nice illustration of the use of the Relevancy principle in a 
discussion which is perhaps easier to follow. If immaterialism makes God the cause of all movements, then 
it makes him the cause of murder, for example. But Berkeley replies that this objection makes God guilty 
of murder also on the occasionalists’ and materialists’ scheme, and concludes: “This theological 
consideration, therefore, may be waved, as leading beside the question; for such I hold all points to be 
which bear equally hard on both sides of it.” Ibid. p. 281, italics mine. This mirrors a discussion of the same 
objection in DHP 236, where the Relevancy principle is not mentioned explicitly, but is still implicit to 
Berkeley’s reply. Cf. also PHK 61. 
78 Winkler, p. 304, agrees with me, though very tentatively, on this controversial point. It is, however, the 
only way of making sense of the passage, the materialists must be in the same difficulty according to 
Berkeley, and so the subjective status of ideas is common to materialism and immaterialism. Below I argue 
in a more detailed way against a rival interpretation that assumes publicity of ideas. 
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is a purely negative treatment, there is not even a hint of a positive doctrine of how two 
people can be said to see the same thing.) And such an analysis would, in a way, be right. 
Berkeley simply assumes something materialism tries to account for: “Let us suppose 
several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in 
like sort by their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they would 
without question agree in their perceptions.” (DHP 247, my italics) And slightly earlier 
Berkeley has Hylas say and Philonous not correct him: “Pray are not the objects 
perceived by the senses of one, likewise perceivable to others present? If there were an 
hundred more here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them.” 
(DHP 246-7) 
The refusal to even question how we perceive the same thing equals to casting the 
whole problem out of scientific enquiry. (Berkeley is on slippery ground here, too, for 
how are we to construe this ‘agreeing of perceptions’? Surely he cannot mean that the 
several men have the same ideas, for ideas are individuated by each perceiving mind. The 
verb ‘agree’ here signals that the correspondence of perceptions is not identity in any 
sense, but rather some presupposed pragmatic correspondence. Also, the ‘as I see them’ 
from the second quote should not be read as ‘in exactly the same way as I do’ but rather 
‘as well as I do’.) 
In this light we should read the much-misunderstood parable of the gutted house that 
Berkeley starts with. The talk of empty words is meant to highlight the uselessness of 
abstract philosophical notions of identity79, to dismiss the question whether the identity of 
house consists in its ‘shell’ or in its internal constitution. (A clue not picked up by his 
modern commentators who try to solve the riddle with heavy concepts like ‘numerical 
identity’ or ‘qualitative identity’.80) Still, we are not left hanging in the air, for the 
                                                 
79 Cf. PHK 95: “…the supposition that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that 
which is perceived by sense, but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take 
away this material substance, about the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every 
plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a 
combination of sensible qualities, or ideas: and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.” 
(my italics) 
80 See Pitcher, p. 147: “...if we accept Berkeley’s account of what ordinary language allows, that you and I 
have ideas that are numerically distinct....but that are qualitatively the same.” Baxter goes even further and 
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problem dissolves itself, the practical everyday level of language not being affected by 
materialism, immaterialism or any other philosophical doctrine: “whether philosophers 
shall think fit to call a thing the same or no, is, I conceive, of small importance.” (DHP 
247, Berkeley’s italics) The problem is not a metaphysical problem, Berkeley’s 
metaphysics being in general much slimmer and razor-conscious than any of his 
predecessors’ or contemporaries’. (“My end is not to deliver Metaphysiques altogether in 
a General Scholastique way but in some measure to accommodate them to the Sciences, 
& shew how they may be useful in Optiques, Geometry &c.” PC 207)  
Berkeley’s peculiar blindness in this direction stems from a different role the concept 
of substance plays in his system. Aristotle used substance (the Greek original of the 
concept is usia), among other things, to designate that which stays the same when a thing 
changes. Subsequent tradition made a great deal of what exactly this substance is, 
wherein the persisting identity of an entity lies and the scholastic analysis of change 
reached dizzying heights in such concepts as ‘substantial form’ or ‘quiddity’. Berkeley 
denies the status of substance to things (not minds, though) and for him the question of 
the exact location of identity of a thing makes no sense81. Notice also that the identity 
discussion is immediately followed by the debate of what constitutes the real cherry. It 
begins with Philonous’ exclamation: “And how are we concerned any farther?” (DHP 
249) indicating the spuriousness of the whole problem, and then the ‘real cherry’ is 
identified with a collection of sense data, eschewing any ‘substantive’ analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                 
says: “...I take Berkeley when he distinguishes two acceptations of ‘same‘, to be distinguishing two uses 
of ’numerically same‘. Things numerically distinct according to the usage of philosophers may be 
numerically identical according to the usage of the vulgar...things that are really distinct are considered 
identical for practical reasons.” in Baxter, Donald L. M.: “Berkeley, Perception and Identity“, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), p. 91. Both authors are led into their 
employment of these terms by the contentious assumption that Berkeley distinguishes between two equally 
justified usages of ‘same’. 
81 Cf. Hight, Marc and Ott, Walter: “The New Berkeley”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 34, 
Number 1, March 2004, p. 3: “Philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries operated within a 
substance/mode ontology largely inherited from Aristotle via the Scholastics…Substances for the moderns 
are best characterized by two principal features. Something is a substance if it is both persistent and exists 
independently.” Both substantial features are by Berkeley denied to things, which are repeatedly 
characterized as ‘fleeting’ and ‘dependent’, but they are obviously retained for minds.  
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It would be interesting to ask a modern-day optician or psychologist the question ‘in 
what does the identity consists of a thing perceived by two different observers?’ If they 
do have an answer to this question at all, I believe it would go along Berkeley’s lines, of 
the sameness being presupposed from outside the science. 
What the discussion of the problem shows, however, is the fact that Berkeley is aware 
of the semantic tension between the words ‘idea’ and ‘thing’ and actively tries to 
minimise it, unlike his ‘fellow immaterialist’ Collier.82  The worry about the tension 
manifests itself already in the Philosophical Commentaries, where Berkeley spends some 
time deliberating whether to use ‘idea’ or ‘thing’. (PC 757, 775, 807, 872) There, the 
identification of the two terms is affirmed (PC 775) and also the need to explain and 
justify the identification is expressed (PC 757, 807). 
 
 
2.3.1 The Identity Problem and commentators – the ‘Two Language’ solution 
 
The difficult passage quoted above has been interpreted differently by some 
commentators. The tension between the private character of ideas and the publicity of 
objects is seen as a transposition of the ‘strict philosophical’ language of the ideas and the 
‘loose language’ of everyday concerns. Strictly speaking, two people cannot perceive the 
same thing, for the ideas are peculiar to each perceiver, but it is pragmatically sanctioned 
to speak of the ‘same thing’ in the popular usage. The whole tension between the 
relativity of ideas and publicity of objects is merely a linguistic one; it can be alleviated 
by specifying which language we are using at the moment. Berkeley is thus seen as 
engaging in the same manoeuvre as, for example, in DHP 245-6, where he explains that 
strictly speaking we do not see and touch the same thing, the connection between the 
visible and tactile ideas being merely customary and pragmatically advantageous – a 
variation on his Heterogeneity Thesis from the New Theory of Vision. 
                                                 
82 “…in his 1713 Clavis Universalis, Berkeley’s fellow immaterialist, Arthur Collier (1680-1732) accepted 
(the uncommonsensical position that two people cannot see the same [numerical] object.)” Berman, D.: 
George Berkeley Idealism and the Man, Oxford 1994, p. 40. 
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But this would mean that the loose sense of ‘same’ is justified by practice only and is, 
consequently and unfortunately, philosophically wrong. Berkeley, supposedly trying to 
avoid this conclusion, is seen in DHP 247-8 as ‘dissolving’ the whole problem by 
claiming that, given sufficiently loose criteria, the vulgar usage of ‘same’ is true as well. 
It all comes down to what we are trying to say, the facts are identical in both cases, and it 
is a dispute merely about a word. For “speaking loosely need not be speaking falsely; 
under criteria that are both generous and reasonable, perceptions really are public and 
continuous.”83 
At first sight the case for the Two Language Solution looks impressively well argued. 
Berkeley explicitly mentions the contrast between ‘the vulgar acceptation’ and ‘the 
acceptation of philosophers’ in his discussion of ‘same’ in DHP 247. Also, he appears to 
use the very same move and the slogan ‘to speak with vulgar and think with the learned’ 
on two other occasions – when dealing with the seemingly absurd consequences of his 
Heterogeneity Thesis (NTV 46, 55) and his theory of causality for ordinary language 
(PHK 51). However, we intend to show a real dissimilitude between the Identity problem 
on the one hand and the other two cases on the other, and so we will have to reject the 
Two Language solution in favour of, and in contrast with, our own interpretation 
sketched above. 
The corollary of the Heterogeneity thesis is that even though “common speech would 
incline one to think I heard, saw, and touched the same thing” (NTV 46), this long-
riveted tendency is to be resisted because it is false. We may speak of one thing only “to 
avoid tediousness and singularity of speech”. (NTV 55) 84  The connection, though 
                                                 
83 Lambert, Richard T.: “Berkeley’s Commitment to Relativism”, in Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative 
Essays, ed. by Turbayne, Colin, Manchester University Press, 1982, p. 31, other writers subscribing to the 
‘Two Language’ analysis are Baxter, Donald L. M.: “Berkeley, Perception and Identity“, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), 85-98, Bennett, pp. 153, S. A. Grave in Martin 
and Armstrong, pp. 301, 306, Marc-Wogau, Konrad: “The Argument from Illusion and Berkeley’s 
Idealism”, in George Berkeley Critical Assessments II, edited by Walter E. Creery, Routledge, 1991, pp. 
333-37, Pitcher, George: Berkeley, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 149 and “Berkeley on the 
Perception of Objects”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. XXIV (1)1986, pp. 99-105. 
84 ‘The same thing’ here, incidentally, refers to several ideas which have been experienced to occur together 
and so come to be ‘reputed’ one thing, not to a thing common to several observers. 
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perfectly arbitrary (one can imagine here putting on inverted glasses and having to 
reconnect the usual tactile ideas with the up-side down visual ideas over several days), 
nevertheless somehow justifies our talk of sameness. What we have on the part of 
everyday speech is a type of pragmatic shortcut. There are no two full-fledged languages 
with different criteria for truth standing against each other. The case is similar with 
Berkeley’s account of causality, where the phrase ‘think with the learned and speak with 
the vulgar’ actually occurs (PHK 51).  
But we find no mention of ‘strictness of speech’ in Berkeley’s discussion of identity, 
nor do we encounter any eye-catching slogan here with a nice didactic simile of the sun’s 
rising and Copernicus, as we do in PHK 51. Surely Berkeley would not have missed such 
a golden pedagogical opportunity in the easier accessible Dialogues! Unless, that is, there 
was not a problem with the relationship between the loose vulgar and the strict 
philosophical language, but with how to account for the talk of ‘same’ within the 
immaterialist’s as well as materialists’ scheme.  
Another feature of the Identity debate which points to its difference from the 
Heterogeneity and Causality debates is Berkeley’s explicit mentioning of the truth of the 
vulgar loose language in the present case: “they may, upon like occasions, still continue 
to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the 
truth of things”, whereas in the other debates Berkeley clearly implies the opposite: “The 
true consequence is that the objects of sight and touch are two distinct things.” (NTV 49) 
and “In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained…how false soever they 
may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety 
being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which are not 
always the truest.” (PHK 52, in all three quotes the italics are mine) Notice that in the 
quote from the Principles propriety of the expression is reached at the expense of truth, 
which is not the case in the Identity debate quote from the Dialogues. 
The unequivocal nature of truth seems to prevent any relativist interpretation of the 
Identity discussion, for Berkeley the loose language of everyday life and the strict 
philosophical language are not ‘alternatives’ in any sense, the one being true and the 
other, on the two occasions, simply false, even if useful. The house simile is not meant to 
convey the equal usefulness of the two languages; it is rather employed to ridicule the 
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quest for the location of identity within one – the philosophical – language. The vulgar 
know what the ‘same’ means, whereas philosophers “dispute about identity and diversity, 
without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names” – they 
dispute whether the identity of a house consists in its outer walls or in its interior lay-out, 
while looking at the same house as before! 
The distinction between the Heterogeneity and Causality debates on the one hand and 
the Identity problem on the other could scarcely be greater: in the former the 
philosophical language is right if awkward, while the usual way of talking is wrong but 
useful or accepted, while in the latter the vulgar are right to say what they say and it is the 
philosophers who are confused and try to define a needless distinction. Their ‘language’ 
does not work at all. 
The Two Language solution posed an additional problem which we are now quite 
happy to get rid of. It purported to assign the word ‘idea’ to the strict philosophical 
language while keeping the word ‘thing’ for the vulgar. While at first sight an attractive 
proposal, one that even corresponds to the way the two words are expected to be used, it 
leaves the identification of the two concepts, which is crucial to our interpretation, quite 
unexplained or even unexplainable. Their relation would be the same as that between the 
German ‘der Hund’ and the English ‘dog’, ignoring Berkeley’s explicit efforts to identify 
the two concepts, even at the beginning of the precarious Identity debate: “…different 
persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds.” 
(DHP 247, my italics) 
Berkeley does not ‘dissolve’ the whole Identity problem in relativistic acid, he rather 
acknowledges it as a problem for any philosophical account of perception and so not an 
objection against immaterialism as such: “Your difficulty therefore, that no two see the 
same thing, makes equally against the materialists and me.” (DHP 248, my italics) 
Almost at the very end of the discussion the ‘difficulty’ is still there and has not been 
satisfactorily met. It is also ‘your’, meaning Hylas’s, difficulty, made from outside 
philosophy, for Hylas has evolved from an ardent supporter of materialism through a 
more tentative phase to the position where the credentials of immaterialism only should 
be questioned and where objections against the whole of philosophy are not entertained, 
as Hylas himself admits in their discussion of Creation: “I must acknowledge, the 
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difficulties you are concerned to clear, are such only as arise from the non-existence of 
matter, and are peculiar to that notion.” (DHP 254) 
Some commentators, who read Berkeley as solving the Identity problem through a 
relativistic dissolution where there are two parallel languages involved, nevertheless find 
this solution unattractive while others are quite happy with it. Lambert would be an 
example of the latter, and Bennett belongs to the former category: “…the residual 
‘verbal’ dispute, far from being trivial, may be a serious conceptual disagreement with 
philosophical consequences depending on it.”85 And Pitcher agrees with this estimate: 
“...it has been my contention that in the present dispute between Berkeley and common 
sense there certainly is a ‘real difference in their thoughts and opinions’.”86 We agree that 
the relativistic reading would be disastrous for Berkeley’s system, but it is one that is 
neither necessary to explain the Identity discussion nor warranted by the close reading 
presented. Nor is it, accidentally, Berkeley’s position in the two other difficulties 
mentioned, the Heterogeneity Thesis and the Causality Discussion. In both of these the 
common way of speaking is just wrong, though sanctioned by convention, and is not to 
be entertained in serious philosophical thinking, so the two ‘languages’ are not 
‘alternatives’ at all.  
Now, Pitcher manages to portray Berkeley as a relativist only because he mistakes 
him as describing a conflict between the philosophical and vulgar language in the gutted 
house simile and the immediately preceding discussion instead of reading them as an 
illustration of the inconclusiveness and uselessness of the contemporary philosophical 
theories of identity (“for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists” 
DHP 247, my italics). His estimate of the solution that Berkeley eventually presents is 
more on the mark: “At the end of his treatment of Hylas’ objection, Berkeley reveals 
certain uneasiness about his own position, so it seems to me, by appealing to the 
archetype in God’s mind of each object in the world. This does, indeed, provide some 
kind of unity for the objects…”87 The ‘uneasiness’ is there, we agree, and moreover can 
explain it on our interpretation, unlike Pitcher, for whom Berkeley has attempted to 
                                                 
85 Bennett, Jonathan: Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 155-6. 
86 Pitcher, George, Berkeley, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 149. 
87 Pitcher, George, Berkeley, p. 149. 
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provide a positive solution to the difficulty, because Berkeley feels that the objection is a 
problem for the whole of philosophy and so the Archetype solution is not a wholehearted 
solution from him. Berkeley uses the term ‘archetype’ only in response to his opponents 
and as a part of their vocabulary, it plays no positive role in immaterialism. The Identity 
discussion is a nice illustration of this for it is Hylas who introduces the term into the 
debate and Philonous hesitantly repeats it and immediately qualifies its ‘externality’: “so 
may you suppose an external archetype on my principles; external, I mean, to your own 
mind: though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that mind which comprehends all 
things” (DHP 248, Berkeley’s italics), which is understandable, for earlier in the 
Dialogues the notion of ‘external archetype’ was used synonymously with ‘material 
substance’ and rejected accordingly. 88  Berkeley is fully aware that both his and the 
materialists’ solution of the difficulty are not satisfactory. 
 
 
2.3.2 The Realist Solution – ideas need not be private 
 
A competing interpretation of the Identity problem claims that Berkeley’s ideas are in 
some way public and so the objects composed of the ideas are also public. Luce is often 
mentioned as a precursor of this view, but the movement gained momentum in the 1980s 
and 90s 89 . The advantage of the Realist interpretation is that it purports to explain 
                                                 
88 I am indebted here to the excellent analysis of the notion of archetype in Berkeley’s writings in Brykman, 
Genevieve: “Berkeley on ‘Archetype’” in Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley, Ed. By Ernest 
Sosa, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1987. Another case, where the ‘Divine 
Archetype’ is forced onto Berkeley is in his correspondence with Johnson, especially Johnson’s second 
letter, where the American zealot has ‘archetype’ fulfil two crucial functions, which are anathema in 
orthodox immaterialism: it guarantees the identity of one thing in two perceivers and the continuity of 
unperceived objects. Berkeley is also in this case characteristically cautious: “I have no objection against 
calling the ideas in the mind of God archetypes of ours” (Works II, p. 292), but he conspicuously fails to 
sanction such a remedy for the two problems. 
89 Ayers, M. R.: “Introduction” to George Berkeley, Philosophical Works including the Works on Vision, M. 
R. Ayers, ed., David Campbell Publishers, 1998; Berman, David: “Berkeley’s Quad: The Question of 
Numerical Identity”, Idealistic Studies, vol. 16, (1986), pp. 41-45; Pappas, George: “Berkeley, Perception, 
and Common Sense” in Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative Essays, ed. by Turbayne, Colin, Manchester 
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Berkeley’s frequent appeals to common sense and avoids the trap of solipsism for 
immaterialism. 
The first step in the Realist interpretation is the claim that Berkeley never explicitly 
states that ideas are private or peculiar to one mind only: “…there is no place in 
Berkeley’s writings where he actually says that each idea is private…”90 To arrive at this 
conclusion, Pappas acknowledges that the whole problem is brought up by Hylas in his 
objection that no two persons can see the same thing and he even correctly interprets the 
gutted house simile as showing that the philosophical theory of identity is muddled, but 
from this he further concludes that Berkeley himself does not know whether ideas are 
private or not! But surely the whole objection makes sense (and is moreover still seen by 
Berkeley as ‘difficulty’ after he has supposedly dealt with it) only if it assumes that ideas 
are private. And this assumption is significantly not questioned by Philonous after Hylas 
formulates the objection: 
“HYLAS But the same idea which is in my mind, cannot be in yours, or in any 
other mind. Doth it not therefore follow from your principles, that no two can 
see the same thing? And is not this highly, absurd?” (DHP 247, my underlining) 
Also, the subtle change from ‘idea’ in the mind to ‘thing’ perceived by two minds is 
essential to the objection91. It can get off the ground only if it is assumes that ‘ideas’ are 
private and ‘things’ public, the two properties being contradictory, only then it is 
dangerous to Berkeley’s identification of the two terms. Now we also see why Hylas 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1982, pp. 3-21; “Berkeley and Immediate Perception” in E. Sosa, ed., Essays on the 
Philosophy of George Berkeley, Dordrecht, 1987, pp. 195-213; and “Berkeley and Common Sense 
Realism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 8, (1991), pp. 27-42; and Yolton, John: Perceptual 
Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, pp. 132-7. 
90 Pappas, George: “Berkeley, Perception and Common Sense”, in Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative 
Essays, ed. by Turbayne, Colin, Manchester University Press, 1982, p. 9. 
91 I owe this observation to Winkler, p. 304: “It was Hylas’s objection … not that no two can see the same 
idea, but that no two can see the same thing… The question whether different people can perceive the same 
idea is never addressed...because all philosophers agree that they cannot, a point to some extent confirmed 
by the remarks about the materialists at the end of Philonous’ reply.” For a similar view see Yandell, David: 
“Berkeley on Common Sense and the Privacy of Ideas“, History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4, 
Oct.1995, pp. 411-423, especially his short discussion of Winkler in note 4 on p. 422. 
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thinks it is an objection against immaterialism, while materialism seems immune – since 
materialism keeps the distinction between ‘ideas’ and ‘things’, the former can be private 
while the latter guarantee publicity of perceived things. And Philonous scores a major 
victory when he manages to persuade Hylas (and us, too, for that matter) that the 
objection works equally against materialism as well as immaterialism. His ‘archetype 
external to my own mind but not to the Mind’ “serves all the ends of identity, as well as if 
it existed out of a mind.” (DHP 248) Again, the parity is conceivable because the 
materialists themselves believe that ideas are private: “…the materialists themselves 
acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses, to be our own ideas.” (DHP 
248, my italics) The verb ‘acknowledge’ signals that it is a common assumption between 
the two rival theories. None of them succeeds in meeting the objection, though, and if 
Hylas does not see it as a problem for materialism, he should not level it against 
immaterialism either. 
We might still want to reject the parity of the cases, but then Berkeley would surely 
employ the traditional ‘veil of perception’ arguments and the well-known and 
acknowledged causal impotence of matter vis-à-vis spirit to remind us that it is only a 
metaphysical prejudice that there are ‘material things’ ‘out there’ to guarantee the 
publicity of perceived things. And all these arguments have already been established a 
priori before the Identity discussion. 
There are other reasons for the privacy of ideas in immaterialism, regardless of the 
Identity discussion. See above, Chapter 2.1.1 in particular. It is impossible to take the 
‘idea of faintness’ or ‘the idea of distance’ as anything but a sense datum. Also, the 
privacy of ideas is clearly implied in PHK 140: “we conceive the ideas that are in the 
minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of 
them” and it is essential to Berkeley’s claim that we infer the existence of other spirits 
and ultimately that of God from our own ideas. 
We conclude that though Berkeley himself does not call ideas ‘private’, we should 
not expect him to be doing that for none of his contemporaries used this word, but he, as 




2.3.3 The Realist Interpretation and Berman 
 
Berman offers another reading with the aim of establishing the publicity of ideas.92 
For him, the publicity of ideas is expressed in PHK 49:  
“…it may perhaps be objected, that if extension and figure exist only in the 
mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode 
or attribute, which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of the subject in 
which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are 
perceived by it, that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way of idea; 
and it no more follows, that soul or mind is extended because extension exists in 
it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands 
acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else.” 
Out of this long and fruitful section Berman uses only the statement ‘(ideas) are in the 
mind only as they are perceived by it’ which he reads as entailing that, since ideas are 
creatures entirely distinct from minds and not literally in it, “we can, I think, perceive the 
same idea without somehow impinging on each other’s mind.”93 For Berman, then, the 
idea is in my mind only as I perceive it, but it itself is in God’s mind, for God is the 
omnipotent cause of our ideas of sense, and so his Divine ideas are the permanent idea-
things which are public and accessible to many finite perceivers at the same time. 
The key phrase ‘(ideas) are in the mind only as they are perceived by it’ is, however, 
taken out of its context and misread to furnish the base for Berman’s Realistic 
Interpretation. He reads it as ‘ideas are in the mind only as far as they are perceived by it’ 
whereas the context provides a more natural reading ‘ideas are in the mind in the way of 
ideas and not in the way of a mode in a substance’ as the explanatory clause after the 
dash makes clear: “that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way of idea” 
(PHK 49). True, on our reading Berkeley repeats himself, but he signals this by the 
punctuation mark and the words ‘that is’ introducing a synonymic expression. His 
explanation is also quite opaque and idiosyncratic, since the ‘way of idea’ is not further 
                                                 
92 Berman, David: “Berkeley’s Quad: The Question of Numerical Identity”, Idealistic Studies, vol. XVI, 
no.1, January 1986, pp. 41-45. 
93 Berman, David: “Berkeley’s Quad: The Question of Numerical Identity”, p. 44. 
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explained, it is just asserted, whereas the theory of modes and attributes and their 
relationship with substance was quite detailed. Nevertheless, this is perhaps a point in our 
favour, for Berkeley proceeds to scorn this very complicated and worked out system in 
his next sentence after the quote94: “As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, 
that seems very groundless and unintelligible.” (PHK 49) 
The whole context gives a different reading which does not clash with ‘esse is 
percipi’ as Berman’s does – for on his reading ‘ideas are in the mind as they are 
perceived by it’ and, presumably, they are somewhere else as well, as they are not 
perceived by the mind. But ideas cannot exist without the mind. Berman might want to 
object that they are without my mind but not without God’s mind and that that is 
precisely what guarantees their publicity. We wish to object to that that ‘the mind’ 
includes God’s mind as well, for the question dealt with here is whether ‘idea being in the 
mind’ can be modelled on the relationship of substance and mode of the Cartesian 
tradition, which would imply the substance sharing the characteristics of the mode, and 
so in the present discussion the mind would be extended. Such a solution is 
understandably rejected, and the idiosyncratic solution of the ‘idea being in the mind by 
way of idea’ is offered instead. Admittedly, such a solution is suspicious and questions 
should be asked whether this innovation of the traditional substance-accident relationship 
is viable and not just ad hoc, but, however tempting and justified these questions might 
seem, we will not go into them and content ourselves instead with the observation that 
they should be the proper result of commenting on PHK 49. We should not look for 
answer to the question of publicity of objects here and our contention has been that 
Berman’s doing so rests on his misreading of the phrase ‘as they are perceived by the 
mind’.95 
  
                                                 
94 Luce agrees with my estimate of the main target of PHK 49 and adds that the way of ‘mode or attribute’ 
would make the idea’s features in the mind “as Spinoza’s space is in Spinoza’s god”, Luce, A. A.: 
Berkeley’s Immaterialism, 1945, p. 126. 
95 In a private conversation, Prof Berman informed the author that he no longer wishes to maintain the 
position described in his 1986 article. Nevertheless, we found it sufficiently representative of an 
interpretative tendency to be warranted a discussion here.  
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2.3.4 The Realist Interpretation and Pappas 
 
 But perhaps we are being a little bit unfair to those who defend the Realist 
interpretation. After all, their contention is not that all ideas are public but rather that the 
privacy of ideas, even if alleged, does not preclude the publicity of ‘things’96. They also 
notice a decidedly uncharitable result of the Two Language Solution and try to avoid it: 
“Pitcher’s position…would push one to the view that strictly speaking Berkeley does not 
really defend common sense at all. He only seems to be doing this when he is speaking 
loosely. His real view…is actually opposed to common sense.”97 While we agree with 
this diagnosis, we do not think it is necessary to treat the condition with the Realistic 
Interpretation, for that in turn is not healthy itself. 
 What then are its shortcomings? When faced with the problem of how to squeeze 
the publicity of ‘physical objects’ from the privacy of ideas, Pappas offers the following 
example: “…two generals on different sections of the reviewing stand, may see different 
members of the troop, but still each would see the troop. Two people can see the same 
object even though they do not see the same parts or constituent elements of the object.”98 
Such an argument is open to the sceptic’s charge – granted that the generals see different 
men, what grounds do you have for claiming that the different men belong to the same 
troop? Is it not the case that you have just assumed the truth of this, whereas it is the bone 
of contention between us? In other words, what guarantees that the different soldiers 
belong to the same troop? 
 Perhaps we should not dismiss Pappas’s analogies so quickly. He is surely right 
when he says that when we perceive a constituent member of a collection we may be said 
to perceive the collection as such. It seems almost a truism that in our three-dimensional 
                                                 
96 Pappas, George: “Berkeley, Perception and Common Sense”, in Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative 
Essays, ed. by Turbayne, Colin, Manchester University Press, 1982, p. 9. 
97 Pappas, George: Berkeley’s Thought, Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 181. 
98 Pappas, George: Berkeley’s Thought, pp. 200-1, the same example was used by Pappas earlier in his 
“Berkeley, Perception and Common Sense”, in Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative Essays, ed. by 
Turbayne, Colin, Manchester University Press, 1982, pp. 7-8, together with another example: “Just as one 
need not see all the attached parts of a car in order to see a car, so one need not immediately perceive all the 
constituents of a physical object in order immediately to perceive that object.”, ibid, p. 7. 
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space we always see only one side of things (if we do not employ elaborate mirrors) yet 
speak of seeing the thing and not a part of the thing. So the whole Realist solution seems 




2.4 ‘Thing’ as a ‘collection of ideas’, the negative reading and phenomenalism 
 
So Berkeley identifies ‘things’ with ‘ideas’. In the same breath, however, 
Berkeley speaks of things being “the several combinations of sensible qualities”. As the 
relationship between ‘idea’ and a ‘collection of ideas’ is instrumental for the Realist 
interpretation, let us start with looking at the actual occurrences of ‘collection’ and 
‘combination’ in Berkeley’s writings. 
 Both terms occur synonymously without any perceivable difference in meaning, 
though ‘combination’ greatly outnumbers ‘collection’ – the latter appearing only once in 
each major work (NTV, PHK, DHP), the former appearing on average six times as often. 
In the NTV ‘combination’ of ideas first occurs as another description for ‘visible object’ 
or ‘tangible object’ in the Heterogeneity discussion (NTV 49), the same function is 
recorded in NTV 96 where the complex idea of a tangible head is described as a 
combination of certain tangible ideas: “one combination of a certain tangible figure, bulk, 
and consistency of parts is called the head” and again in NTV 103, 109, 110 and 117. All 
the occurrences denote a certain arbitrary construct by the mind, which pertains to one 
particular sense, and thus portray the mind as constructing something out of its ideas.  
The situation changes in the PHK, though. The first occurrence of ‘collection’ in 
the very first paragraph denotes a construct across the various senses, and this meaning is 
echoed also in the use of ‘combination’ in PHK 37(?), 38, 64, while in PHK 4, 26, 91 and 
95 (and in all the 4 occurrences in DHP, for that matter) quite another thing is stressed  – 
                                                 
99 Pitcher also, incidentally, uses this model, but he calls the collection of ideas ‘natural object’, see Pitcher, 
p. 151: “...a natural object, for him, is a huge collection of ideas of sense, and although (to consider just the 
case of vision) one can see individual members of the collection, one cannot see the whole huge collection 
itself – and so one cannot see the natural object itself.” 
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namely that the ‘combination’ has the same status as a separate ‘idea’: “is it not plainly 
repugnant that any one of these (ideas or sensations) or any combination of them should 
exist unperceived?” (PHK 4) and “the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be 
nothing but combinations of those qualities” (PHK 91). Here there is no hint of any 
constructive role of the mind; on the contrary, ‘combination’ of ideas is on exactly the 
same level as ‘idea’ itself as far as its capability to exist without the mind is concerned. 
The unique occurrence of ‘congeries’ in place of the more common ‘combination’ is 
attested at DHP 249 with the same meaning. 
The two meanings of the ‘combination or collection’ of ideas have also two 
corresponding functions in immaterialism, one positive and one negative. The first one 
describes the way the mind puts together ideas and forgetting (or rather not noticing) the 
arbitrariness of the connection considers the ‘combination’ one thing. But such a 
‘combination’ is still peculiar to one mind only – for example the visual idea of an object 
belonging to a purblind person will be connected to the corresponding tangible idea, but 
it will be different from the ‘combination of visible ideas’ that make up the image for a 
normally seeing person. Similarly, as the discussion of the Molyneaux case shows, a 
blind person’s idea of a cube is combination of tactile ideas only, whereas for other 
people this combination includes visible ideas, as well. Significantly, both combinations 
must be limited to individual minds for the Molyneaux question to arise at all.  
Also, it is significant that it is the individual mind that does the combining of its 
ideas and it can connect only those ideas that it perceives. Such a connection cannot be 
created by the mind between an idea it perceives and an idea it does not perceive, or an 
idea that is only perceived by another mind. A combination of ideas stretching through 
several minds is a concept unknown to Berkeley’s immaterialism.  
The negative role is a rejection of the substantial analysis of sensible things, 
‘combination’ of ideas having the same ontological status as ‘idea’. This role occurs, not 
surprisingly, only in the metaphysical works – the Principles and the Dialogues. 
Our analysis thus casts doubt on the careless dichotomy between ‘ideas’ and 
‘collections of ideas’ that is essential for the Realist interpretation – if the former are 
repeatedly emphasized to be no different from the latter, what justifies the ascription of 
privacy to the one and publicity to the other? Neither of the two roles warrants ascription 
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of publicity to ‘combinations’ of ideas while rejecting it for the ideas themselves. 
Pappas’s example of two generals viewing the parade has no basis in the texts, it even 
goes against them. 
 
 
2.4.1 ‘Collection of ideas’ and some repercussions for phenomenalism 
 
Berkeley was not the first to use the term ‘collections of ideas’. As Luce notes, 
the phrase is probably borrowed from Locke’s Essay100. There, however, Locke talks of a 
‘collection of simple ideas’, and so probably envisages a different ontological status for 
the collection as opposed to the simple ideas. Berkeley borrowed the phrase without this 
particular feature, as we have noted in the previous chapter, a discontinuity supported by 
Winkler’s analysis of the simple/complex idea dichotomy in his book on Berkeley101. 
While Berkeley had originally toyed with the concept of ‘simple idea’ extensively in his 
Philosophical Commentaries, he ultimately abandoned it and it scarcely features in his 
published writings. Consequently, Winkler concludes that “…it is wrong to classify 
Berkeley as an atomic sensationalist.”102 Does such a finding have any repercussions for 
seeing Berkeley as a phenomenalist? 
Apparently not, for Winkler himself proposes a phenomenalist interpretation of 
immaterialism. The relationship between ideas and things is one of reduction, 
construction or supervenience and the explicit identification by Berkeley of single ideas 
with things (PHK 4, 33, 38-9) is explained away as an aberration: “…neither idealism nor 
phenomenalism takes Berkeley at his word when he identifies things with single ideas … 
I will assume they are right in this; Berkeley’s tendency to shift from formulations 
referring to single ideas to formulations referring to collections of ideas is not, I think, a 
sign of uncertainty, but evidence of his willingness to treat a collection or congeries as a 
single idea.”103 But surely this ‘willingness’ does not square up with Berkeley being 
                                                 
100 Luce, p. 41, “The phrase occurs in Locke’s Essay (II xxvi i)”. 
101 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, 1989, pp. 53-75. 
102 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, p. 73. 
103 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, p. 194. 
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serious on any ‘reduction, construction or supervenience’? Furthermore, Winkler notices 
that Berkeley is not very explicit on this ‘construction stuff’: “In Berkeley’s texts the 
sense in which objects are ‘collections’ or ‘combinations’ is left entirely 
unexplicated….there is no defect in Berkeley’s statements of phenomenalism as glaring 
as his failure to say what it is to be a collection or combination of ideas.”104 Is it not, then, 
simpler not to read Berkeley as a phenomenalist, instead of attributing some early version 
of proto-phenomenalism to him?  
What prompted Winkler on this dangerous journey? His analysis of Berkeley’s 
immaterialism as phenomenalism starts with the legitimate question “…what does it 
mean to say that houses, mountains, and rivers are ideas, or combinations of ideas?”105 
He then provides two answers, the idealist answer and the phenomenalist answer. Both 
contain phrases such as ‘a different set of co-referential expressions’, ‘truth-value 
preserving translations’, ‘subjunctive or counterfactual conditions’ and similar, which 
naturally have no basis nor counterparts in Berkeley’s texts. They are best seen as a 
modern philosopher’s attempt to make sense of an old and exotic doctrine, with a certain 
danger of anachronism and distortion looming in the wings. The difference between the 
two versions lies in the fact that the idealist answer provides translations between 
ordinary and philosophical statements term-by-term while the phenomenalist answers 
resorts to counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. The latter entails that “objects 
supervene on ideas, instead of standing in the relation of identity to distinct collections of 
them”106 and is ultimately preferred by Winkler. 
But perhaps we do not need to undertake such extensive reconstruction and 
interpretation on Berkeley’s behalf, perhaps we can gather from his published writings 
the relationship he envisaged as holding between ideas and collections. Such an 
achievement would no doubt have the advantage of being a more friendly reading of the 
philosopher as well as a more concise one. Let us start with taking seriously Berkeley’s 
repeated claims that idea, combination of ideas and thing are identical (PHK 4, 33, 38-9). 
The positive, ‘constructive’ side of this identification is evident in his New Theory of 
                                                 
104 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, p. 201. 
105 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, p. 192. 
106 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, pp. 198-9. 
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Vision, where it helps to explain how we perceive by sight and touch and is at the heart of 
the Heterogeneity thesis. If we wanted to illustrate the dynamism between idea and 
collection of ideas, we could liken it to the movement of directing lights we see before 
road works when driving along a motorway at night. If we were to analyse our perceptual 
situation, we would have to admit that there are in fact only several lights next to each 
other that flash and dim in certain intervals and that it is our mind that connects these 
lights into one continuous sideway movement and understands it as a direction to change 
lanes. In a similar way our mind connects multiple visual ideas, not only patches of light 
and colours but also ideas of confused appearance, distance etc. and ‘forgetting’ the 
several components, treats the resulting combination as one thing. For scientific reasons it 
is nevertheless useful to be able to ‘deconstruct’ the combination and look at the 
individual members separately. 
The scientific and constructive nature of the idea-combination model is 
complemented by the negative role it is assigned on the metaphysical level, mainly in the 
Principles and Dialogues. There it purely highlights the fact that the ‘combination of 
ideas’ is on the same ontological level as individual ‘ideas’ as a part of Berkeley’s 
campaign against scepticism and the Inside/outside metaphor. This fact is often 
overlooked by commentators, some of whom use the distorted ‘idea – collection of ideas’ 
relationship to account for publicity in immaterialism (as we tried to show in Pappas’s 
case above, and so is the case with Winkler, see below) or to account for perceivable but 
not actually perceived objects, as we will try to show in the next section. Their 
interpretation is on stronger grounds here, not least because of PHK 3, and a more 
detailed discussion of the esse is percipi principle will be required. 
 Seeing Berkeley as a phenomenalist is a many-faceted weapon, for in relying 
(quite erroneously, as we have tried to show) on the ontological difference between idea 
and collection of ideas it seems to be able to solve also the Identity problem that is the 
present topic of discussion. So Winkler proposes this solution to the problem: “If we are 
permitted to say that the ideas entering into combinations exist in many minds at once, 
we are free to say that an apple is a combination of ‘a certain colour, taste, smell, figure 
and consistence’.” 107  Such a solution, apart from misrepresenting the concept of 
                                                 
107 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, p. 197. 
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‘combination of ideas’, relies on an individual idea’s existing in many minds at once, 
which we have tried to show is not supported by the texts.  
 Similar mechanism is employed by Pitcher, who has Berkeley develop a theory of 
a natural object, which is “a huge collection of ideas of sense”108. Such a construct fulfils 
several tasks in Pitcher’s analysis while failing in others in a nuanced discussion which 
we cannot go into here. Of more relevance to our objection is his insistence on the 
different status of ideas and combinations of ideas: “…his (Berkeley’s) very conception 
of a family of ideas of sense requires …theoretical phenomenalism.”109 (Pitcher’s italics) 
 Most recently Muehlmann110 identifies real objects with congeries of sensible 
qualities. Here we would like to point out that for Berkeley ‘real object’ is defined as the 
opposite of an ‘object of fancy or dream’, while also these ‘objects of imagination’ are 
composed from ideas, as the cases of Pegasus or Chimaera show. 
  
 
2.5 Continuity of unperceived objects 
 
 We have witnessed how the conceptual tension between ‘idea’ and ‘thing’ posed a 
serious challenge to Berkeley’s identification of the two terms that was crucial for his 
claim that immaterialism does not lead to scepticism and accords with common sense. 
The problem was in the supposed privacy of ideas and resulting impossibility of public 
things. Berkeley acknowledges the difficulty and tries to deal with it in the Third 
Dialogue. Another, and even more fundamental difficulty, is present already in the 
Principles as a possible objection to immaterialism and was also noted and frequently 
levelled against immaterialism by its earliest critics. If ideas exist only when perceived, 
and things are the same as ideas or combinations of ideas, does it not follow that when I 
cease to perceive a thing, the thing ceases to exist? In other words, what guarantees the 
continuous existence of things which are not perceived? Is not intermittency of things the 
natural corollary of immaterialism? 
                                                 
108 Pitcher, G.: Berkeley, 1977, p. 151. 
109 Pitcher, G.: Berkeley, p. 162. 
110 Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, Indianapolis, 1992, p. 219. 
 60 
 Berkeley anticipates the objection in PHK 45 and his wording makes clear that he 
does not try to detract anything from its force: 
“Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows, things 
are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only 
when they are perceived: the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the 
parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon 
shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely 
upon opening them it is again created.” 
Curiously, Berkeley does not seem to answer the objection straight away as in the 
previous three objections. His strategy is quite complicated and we shall start with 
isolating as many as three embryonic and different answers to the objection over the 
stretch of four paragraphs devoted to answering the Intermittency objection (PHK 45-8).  
At first, Berkeley refers the reader back to paragraphs 3 and 4 which, however, 
contain nothing on intermittency, only a rejection of existence ‘without the mind’ and the 
introduction of the esse is percipi principle: 
“In answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said in Sect. 3, 4, &c. 
and desire he will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of 
an idea, distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I 
could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words. 
And I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer 
himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his 
ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause: 
but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in 
defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity, the not 
assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them.” 
It is difficult to see how this can help us in the present predicament. To the challenge 
that the esse is percipi principle entails that things exist only as long as they are 
perceived Berkeley seems to be answering: ‘Indeed, and that is a good thing, for ideas 
cannot exist unperceived!’ thus making the Intermittency objection even sharper. But 
perhaps another role can be found for Berkeley’s falling back on sections 3 and 4 at this 
stage, one that would make it more relevant to the issue at hand and to the overall 
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strategy. Berkeley is probably making sure here that we do not raise the Intermittency 
objection from the materialist position, for he does not want to employ an answer to it 
which would utilise the already compromised material substance. So in affirming his 
immaterialist position he could in fact be preparing his ground to meet the objection on 
strictly immaterialist grounds, and for that aim the incidental sharpening of the objection 
would appear irrelevant. The first proposed answer, it has been argued, is only the first 
step in a more comprehensive argumentative build up. 
The second move, which takes up the whole of section 46 and the first part of 47, 
reminds us of the Relevancy principle mentioned in the last section, for here even the 
materialists’ position is alleged to be open to the Intermittency objection. Its three 
components, the charge that things are annihilated when we close our eyes, re-created 
when we open them and do not exist in between, are found to be present in the 
materialist scheme of perception, as well, since the visible objects are only light and 
colours, in short sensations, and these do not exist when our eyes are closed (here we get 
another confirmation that Berkeley agrees with his opponents on the nature of ideas, 
which for both sides are private and subjective sense data) and so are annihilated with 
our every wink. The re-creative part is discerned in the doctrine of divine conservation 
through continual creation and the beginning of section 47 is taken up with the charge 
that also the materialists’ bodies do not exist between our perceiving them. Here the 
argument is that particular bodies can be distinguished only by perceivable particular 
qualities, and since these qualities do not exist when we do not perceive them, the 
individual bodies as distinct entities cannot exist either. 
The rest of the section is devoted to drawing absurd consequences from the doctrine 
of the infinite divisibility of matter, with the result that also the materialists’ bodies exist 
only in the mind, a result that would probably be hotly contested. We find it here because 
Berkeley attempts to squeeze the most out of the ‘those pretended absurdities’ when 
applied to materialism, setting with considerable rhetorical skills the scene for his own 
answer to the objection which he probably feared would not be entirely convincing if it 
stood on its own. 
Even though Berkeley is saying that the Intermittency objection applies to some 
versions of materialism as well, he does not draw the consequence we saw him drawing 
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in our last section and does not dismiss the objection as irrelevant since it applies equally 
to both sides of the debate. He in fact stops short of invoking the Relevancy principle 
here and the whole two sections of 46 and 47 are mere rhetorical devices of softening the 
reader’s mind and engulfing him with absurdities flowing from materialism. The 
immaterialist answer to the Intermittency objection comes only in section 48 after this 
tactical rhetorical massage: 
“If we consider it, the objection proposed in Sect. 45 will not be found reasonably 
charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at 
all against our notions. For though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be 
nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence 
conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since 
there may be some other spirit that perceives them, though we do not. Wherever 
bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood 
to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore 
follow from the foregoing principles, that bodies are annihilated and created every 
moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them.” 
 The actual solution seems to be staggeringly simple. It involves a shift in the 
burden of proof of the argument: when I see a tree in my garden, the tree exists because I 
see it, and when I close my eyes, the tree ceases to be perceived by me, but, since my 
eyes are closed, I cannot see or make sure that somebody else is not there perceiving the 
tree, I am in no position to say that the tree is not perceived at all. So the conclusion that 
the tree ceases to exist when I cease to perceive it is a non sequitur111. I would have to 
see that nobody sees it, which is impossible. 
 But why all this hedging before the final answer? Is the original reference back to 
previous sections really only a scene-setting device? The whole passage in PHK 45-8 
seems to be too conscious of the expository strategy it adopts and the final result has 
been felt unsatisfactory by commentators since its publication. Fortunately for us, there 
have been preserved for us the authentic thoughts of the young Berkeley on Continuity 
without his careful manoeuvring in his Commentaries which we will now turn to in order 
                                                 
111 Winkler, p. 219, correctly identifies the non sequitur and also hints at a broader strategy of Argument 
economy. 
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either to confirm our reading of the PHK 45-8, supplant it in important aspects or even to 
reject it as a camouflage. 
 
 
2.5.1 The evolution of the Continuity Problem in the Philosophical Commentaries 
 
 A number of entries show Berkeley grappling with the problem from very early 
on in the development of his system112. Of particular interest to us will be Nos. 71, 98, 
185, 185a, 194, 282, 293a, 408, 424a, 429, 429a, 472, 473, 477a, and 802. Berkeley’s 
own thinking on Continuity takes place against his critique of the traditional (mostly 
Cartesian) conception of body and by the end a new and original conception emerges, 
one that no longer utilizes the term ‘body’, but substitutes it by the more vulgar-friendly 
word ‘thing’. 
 The first relevant entry is the following: “71 By immateriality is solv’d the 
cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases” whereby the problem noticed but not 
solved by Locke is dissolved113 . The absence of matter in immaterialism results in 
different problems for the notion of body, and these are frankly admitted in 194: “+ On 
account of my doctrine the identity of finite substances must consist in something else 
than continued existence, or relation to determin’d time and place of beginning to exist. 
the existence of our thoughts (wch being combin’d make all substances) being frequently 
interrupted, & they having divers beginnings & endings.” The admittance that tying 
bodies to ideas leads to the danger of bodies being discontinuous amounts to recognizing 
the Intermittency objection. Here the problem is still posed as a question of ‘where the 
identity of bodies consists in’, a question we pointed out Berkeley felt he (and other 
philosophers) had not managed to solve as late as the Identity discussion in the Third 
Dialogue. Efforts to locate ‘identity of bodies’ disappear from subsequent entries on 
Continuity, as does the talk of thoughts making up ‘substances’, and the ‘+’ sign 
generally appended by Berkeley to entries he later rejected or considered irrelevant 
                                                 
112 I assume the traditional view of the order of the two books. 
113 Locke, Essay, II, XXIII, 22-27. 
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suggests that he came to see a solution to the Continuity problem couched in these terms 
a dead end. 
 No sooner is the Intermittency objection admitted than Berkeley hints at a 
solution to it, as earlier entries 98 and 185a testify: “The trees are in the Park, that is, 
whether I will or no whether I imagine any thing about them or no, let me but go thither 
& open my Eyes by day & I shall not avoid seeing them.” And “Colours in ye dark do 
exist really i.e. were there light or as soon as light comes we shall see them provided we 
open our eyes. & that whether we will or no.” Both entries reassure us of the continuous 
existence of things and stress their independence from the perceiving mind, but are scarce 
on detail. The emphasis seems to be on the contrafactual in our second quote, but even 
there it is coupled with the future act of seeing the thing, which is not enough to counter 
the charge that the thing does not exist precisely when we do not see it. We do not need 
to be told that the thing will exist or would exist; we want to know whether it does exist 
now that we do not perceive it. 
 Our worries will probably be only compounded by the immediately preceding 
entry 185: “Mem: to allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking &c but 
not an absolute actual existence. ‘Tis prudent to correct mens mistakes without altering 
their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly.” It is clearly a note for 
Berkeley himself on his expositional strategy which he intended to employ in writing his 
system down. Two levels of existence are proposed here, the first ‘absolute actual’ one 
should probably be read as conforming strictly to the principle esse is percipi, while the 
other is weaker and belongs to ‘colours in the dark’. We can only guess that Berkeley 
probably did not intend to disclose or at least not fully elaborate on the distinction 
between the two levels of existence, hence the talk of truth gliding insensibly into the 
souls of his unaware readers. But this is only a speculation. The use of the word ‘mistake’ 
for the (probably vulgar) opinion and its opposite ‘truth’ (and this word also incidentally 
reveals that there was to be employed no trick in the solution to the Continuity problem 
and that a full philosophical account was intended) for the strict and philosophical level 
makes the entry a primary candidate for inclusion in the ‘think with the learned and talk 
with the vulgar’ principle, as does the remark about correcting the language of the people. 
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Even if intended at this stage, the contrast is not exploited in the subsequent analysis of 
the problem or in the final solution. 
 Next we find two discarded entries: “282 + Bodies etc do exist whether we think 
of ’em or no, they being taken in a twofold sense. Collections of thoughts & collections 
of powers to cause those thoughts. these later exist, tho perhaps a parte dei it may be one 
simple perfect power.” And “293a + Bodies taken for Powers do exist wn not perceiv’d 
but this existence is not actual. wn I say a power exists no more is meant than that if in ye 
light I open my eyes & look that way I shall see it i.e. the body etc” 
Both of them purport to provide a more viable theory of body, they toy again with 
the idea of a double existence – actual and possible (?), but the proposal is later discarded 
by the author himself114. Total opposition to the Cartesian theory of body is repeatedly 
affirmed in 424a: “I agree in Nothing wth the Cartesians as to ye existence of Bodies & 
qualities” but the attempts to construct an immaterialist positive theory of body reach a 
dead-end here and the word ‘body’ is quietly substituted by the more common ‘thing’ in 
Berkeley’s subsequent struggle with Intermittency. This substitution is explicitly 
commented on in a late entry 802: “Not to mention the Combinations of Powers but to 
say the things the effects themselves to really exist even wn not actually perceiv’d but 
still with relation to perception.” 
However, the term ‘power’ and the emphasis on what it means to say a power 
exists in entry 293a anticipate the final solution Berkeley reaches in 408: “I must be very 
particular in explaining wt is meant by things existing in Houses, chambers, fields, caves 
etc wn not perceiv’d as well as perceiv’d. & shew how the Vulgar notion agrees with 
mine when we narrowly inspect into the meaning & definition of the word Existence wch 
is no simple idea distinct from perceiving & being perceiv’d.” The shorter and more 
succinct entry 429 expresses the same discovery: “Existence is percipi or percipere. the 
horse is in the stable, the Books are in the study as before.” 
So what does the solution consist in? The hitherto unwarranted assurance that we 
will see the thing we are seeing now is finally accompanied by a reason and is no longer 
                                                 
114 The rejection of the two levels of existence is noticed by McKim, Robert: ‘Berkeley’s notebooks’, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 87. 
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hanging in the air unsupported. The reason is the semantics of the verb ‘to exist’ where a 
happy collusion between the technical immaterialist meaning expressed in the esse is 
percipi principle and the common usage is noticed by Berkeley. This is the central and 
most important part of the whole system claimed to be in total agreement with common 
sense, and there is ample evidence in the Commentaries that Berkeley saw it this way: 
“589 There was a smell i.e. there was a smell perceiv’d. Thus we see that common 
speech confirms my Doctrine” 
 
 
2.5.1.1 Esse is Percipi, common speech and Continuity 
 
The importance of this point is far-reaching115. For example entry 604: “I am 
persuaded would Men but examine wt they mean by the Word Existence they wou’d 
agree with me.” In quite general terms, Berkeley is talking here about ‘agreeing with me’ 
and it is not too far reaching to infer that he means here what he says – the agreement 
with the whole of immaterialism. And this ambitious goal is to be achieved when people 
realize what they mean by the verb ‘to exist’, i.e. by what that word means in ordinary 
talk. In a similar vein 593 claims: “Let it not be said that I take away Existence. I onely 
declare the meaning of the Word as far as I can comprehend it.” When noting that many 
ancient philosophers ended up sceptics he berates them in 491: “…this sprung from their 
not knowing wt existence was and wherein it consisted this the source of all their 
Folly, ’tis on the Discovering of the nature & meaning & import of Existence that I 
chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the Sceptics & me. This I think wholly 
new. I am sure ’tis new to me” The triumphant Berkeley cannot suppress his glee at his 
‘discovery’ and its importance for combating scepticism, one of his chief goals. And 
what is the discovery? His philosophical theory of ‘Existence’, and its universal and 
                                                 
115  Winkler has a slightly less enthusiastic evaluation of the correspondence between philosophy and 
ordinary language: “Of the arguments for immaterialism reviewed …the argument of (to exist means in 
language to be perceived) is the only one which does not rest explicitly on Berkeley’s views about 
intentionality, necessity, and intelligibility. But it is also…the least argumentative. Berkeley simply 
assumes a general view about the meaning of sentences or statements…”(Winkler, p. 178) 
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humble origin is affirmed in 279: “I wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious 
tho’ amazing truth, I rather wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out 
before. ’tis no witchcraft to see” 
The actual mechanism of Berkeley’s solution to the Continuity problem and the 
application of his belief that the ordinary meaning of ‘exist’ matches his technical notion 
are fully spelled out already in PHK 3. This could come as a surprise for there is nothing 
said on Intermittency in that early section, but our surprise will disappear once we realize 
that when the objection is raised in PHK 45, Berkeley refers us back to PHK 3&4 as 
containing the solution. What we initially and tentatively treated as a first step in a 
complicated strategy of responding turns out to be precociously the main answer after all, 
just like Berkeley himself says. So in the key section Berkeley answers the question 
“what is meant by the term exists, when applied to sensible things” by giving examples of 
the word ‘exist’ as it is used: “The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; 
and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my 
study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an 
odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and 
it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like 
expressions.” 
In an age of television, the Internet, modern media and science operating at both 
micro- and macro-levels it is perhaps more difficult to appreciate the subtle point 
Berkeley is here making. He is commenting on the vital role verbs of perception play in 
the language game of Existence. When there is a doubt whether a thing that is perceivable 
by senses exists or existed, we are reassured when there is recourse to verbs of perception: 
“Your wife was in town yesterday.” When suspicious about the report we claim: “She 
can’t have been, she told me she stayed at home the whole day.” The answer “Well, I saw 
her there myself.” is usually enough to at least cast doubt on her veracity if not 
persuading us straight away. Basically a thing, which is capable of being seen, must be 
seen or must have been seen in order to exist. The relationship goes the other way, as 
well. If somebody claims to be seeing ghosts, we, knowing or at least supposing that 
ghosts do not exist, treat his ‘seeing’ as a hallucination or a sign of mental illness. That 
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which does not exist cannot be seen116. The relationship is not confined to the present, 
Julius Caesar is not seen by anyone now, but he existed because he was seen in his time 
by his contemporaries. Similarly, the prediction ‘there will be a snow storm tomorrow’ 
means ‘when you go out tomorrow, you will see/feel snow falling’. 
Similar emphasis on the connection between perception and existence is to be 
found for example in PHK 24, 81, and 89. When we apply this lesson to the Intermittency 
objection, then the thing I do not perceive now still exists, for ‘exist’ here means that 
were I in a position to perceive it, I would perceive it: “The table I write on, I say. exists, 
that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning 
thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does 
perceive it.” (PHK 3, my italics, the part after ‘or’ seems to be suggesting another 
solution, which we will discuss in a later section) In order for the table not to exist, it 
would have to cease to be perceivable. Existence is defined in terms of perception actual 
and possible117. And as for every other orthodox Christian thinker, for Berkeley the 
distinction between actual and possible collapses in God. So what from human 
perspective is only a possible perception (i.e. the table in my study when I am not there) 
is actual perception for God due to his omniscience. 
 
 
2.5.1.2 The theological side of the problem 
 
The collapse of the two categories is not made explicit in the Principles; it is 
conspicuous only in the Dialogues, where the whole problem is rehearsed. At DHP 234, 
Hylas at first challenges Berkeley’s new semantics of the word ‘exist’ and its ordinary 
                                                 
116 The intimate relationship between seeing and existing was exemplified by my fiercely atheistic and 
communist teacher in the 1980’s. Confronted by an overwhelmingly Catholic class of eleven-year-olds she 
one day exploded: “How can you boorish peasants believe in this God?! The Soviet astronauts flew in their 
rocket into the Space above the clouds and they did not see any God there!” Her logic was impeccable, 
except for the assumption that God is visible and resides in the Space. 
117 That, however, does not make an object a collection of past, present and future, even possible ideas, as 
Pitcher would have it: “...a so-called ‘object’ is nothing but a family of ideas of sense spread out over 
time...” (Pitcher, p. 165). 
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language credentials: “Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, to be perceived 
is one thing, and to exist is another.” The reply again stresses the plain man’s agreement 
with the immaterialist principle: “Ask the gardener, why he thinks yonder cherry-tree 
exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because 
he perceives it by his senses. Ask him, why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and 
he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he 
terms a real, being, and saith it is or exists; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, 
he saith, hath no being.” Next, the identification of the actually perceived and the merely 
perceivable is challenged: “Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing 
consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.” To which Philonous, 
rather unconvincingly, replies: “And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea 
exist without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us.” 
Fortunately, the very next exchange makes his argument clearer, when the still 
unconvinced Hylas objects in DHP 235: “Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an 
existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?” The danger of things 
existing in one mind only, the solipsistic objection, is raised here, for Hylas takes it to 
follow from immaterialism that when things exist only when actually perceived, they 
exist only in the individual mind perceiving them. Berkeley in his reply effects the 
collapse of the perceivable and the actually perceived: “The same that I should myself, to 
wit, that it doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking 
to say, the real tree existing without his mind is truly known and comprehended by (that 
is exists in) the infinite mind of God.” The theological dimension of the point is stressed 
once more: “The question between the materialists and me is not, whether things have a 
real existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an absolute 
existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds. This indeed 
some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the 
Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures, will be of another opinion.” The emphasis on the 
intersubjective existence echoes PC 477a: “…bodies & their qualitys I do allow to exist 
independently of Our mind.” where ‘Our mind’ should most easily be read as ‘any one 
individual mind’, as well as PHK 48, where ‘all minds’ are mentioned without bringing 
God in to rescue the unperceived. And surely, even here (DHP 235) where God enters the 
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explanation as a new element is His omniscient perception conjoined with the perception 
by all minds in an effort to prove the conceptual point about minds and the exclusive 
existence of things in them, essentially a repeat of the esse is percipi principle. God 
comes in as simply another mind perceiving its ideas. The great question of Berkeleian 
studies is, of course, if God enters the picture only in the DHP, which are only a re-telling 
of the PHK, can immaterialism function without Him? Or is He perhaps secretly present 
already in §§ 45-8 as the solution to the Intermittency objection? However tempting and 
important these questions may be, we will postpone answering them till the next sections. 
Another point is worth of comment in DHP 235, as well, and that is Berkeley’s 
re-stating of the dispute. Materialism and immaterialism both agree that the existence of 
things is not confined to an individual finite perceiving mind, so neither is solipsistic. The 
opposing doctrines disagree, however, about the existence of things unperceived even by 
God – these are forbidden by the orthodox-friendly immaterialism while being 
presupposed by materialism which in doing so diminishes God’s omnipotence and is thus 
an ideal springboard for atheism. Again, we shall deal with these theological corollaries 
more fully in later sections. 
 
 
2.5.1.3 Argument Economy and Continuity 
 
 But to get back to those entries in the Commentaries that we singled out as being 
relevant to the Continuity debate. We have seen how some of them helped us appreciate 
the answer to it in §45, which consisted in stressing the dependence of Existence on the 
verbs of perception and the correspondence of this philosophical principle with common 
speech. In one sense, it sharpened the Intermittency objection by saying that there are no 
unperceived objects; in another it met it by implying that we do not need them. 
Considerable rhetorical effort was exerted in §§46-8 in order to sweeten the seemingly 
bitter corollary of the esse is percipi principle, some of which also has its predecessors in 
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the Commentaries and also ties in a surprising way with what came to be called the 
Master Argument by commentators118. 
 Let us quote then the interesting entry 472: “You ask me whether the books are in 
the study now wn no one is there to see them. I answer yes. you ask me are we not in the 
wrong for imagining things to exist wn they are not actually perceiv’d by the senses. I 
answer no. the existence of our ideas consists in being perceiv’d, imagin’d thought on 
whenever they are imagin’d or thought on they do exist. Whenever they are mention’d or 
discours’d of they are imagin’d & thought on therefore you can at no time ask me 
whether they exist or no, but by reason of ye very question they must necessarily exist.” 
The discussion here is carried out solely from the finite perspective, as we have noted of 
all discussions of Continuity prior to DHP, that is in PC and PHK. There is no recourse to 
the omniscient perceiver to save the day, and Berkeley even goes as far as saying that 
things exist when not actually perceived! He would explicitly contradict this later in DHP 
234: “And can an idea exist without being actually perceived?” But we should not be too 
hasty here, perhaps there is no contradiction after all, for in PC 472 B speaks of ‘actually 
perceived by the senses’ implying that there are other ways of perceiving apart from 
‘sensing’. He duly proceeds to name them: imagining things, thinking about them, 
mentioning them meaningfully in a discourse. There are multiple occurrences in 
Berkeley’s writings where ‘to perceive’ is conjoined by the conjunction ‘or’ in a clearly 
synonymic context with, for example, ‘to know’ (DHP 202, 212), ‘to comprehend’ (DHP 
250), while other occurrences treat ‘to know’ and ‘to understand’ as synonymous (DHP 
240). We may thus safely conclude that when it comes to the metaphysical status of 
intentional verbs, Berkeley treats them indifferently. 
                                                 
118 See for example Gallois, Andre: ‘Berkeley’s Master Argument’, Philosophical Review 83 (1974), pp. 
55-69, or Winkler, p. 183. 
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This broad concept of perception119 including all intentional activity as well as 
perception by the senses is by no means unique to Berkeley. Descartes’ clear and distinct 
perception does not need to involve senses and is closer to the certainty of knowing 
something. Locke claims that having ideas and perception is the same thing (Essay, II, I, 
9) and includes thinking in perception: “What perception is, every one will know better 
by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c., or thinks, than by 
any discourse of mine.” (Essay, II, IX, 2, italics mine)120 
The inherited broader notion of perception enables Berkeley to meet the 
Intermittency objection in a new way: we simply cannot say that something is not 
perceived for when we say it, we think of it and it is therefore perceived. This marvellous 
shift in the argument is perhaps echoed in a truncated form in PHK 48 where Berkeley 
says that as we stop perceiving something we also lose the chance of making sure that 
nobody else perceives it. 
Utilization of Argument economy occurs several times in Berkeley’s writings (for 
example in PHK 42) and may seem inappropriate or even as philosophical cheating121 at 
                                                 
119
 The wider meaning of ‘perception’ in Berkeley is also noticed by Grayling, p. 99, and Flage, Daniel E.: 
“Berkeley’s Epistemic Ontology: The Principles”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 34, Number 1, 
March 2004, pp. 33-4: Some of the occurrences, where the verb ‘to perceive’ is treated coextensively with 
other intentional verbs in Berkeley’s own writings, are also listed in Flage’s article. For the opposite view 
see, for example, Pappas, p. 109: “God’s merely knowing or knowing about … objects is not perceiving 
them.” 
120 Flage’s articles alerted me to the broader notion of perception in Descartes and Locke. 
121 So Muehlmann, p. 253: “…the conclusion that his (Berkeley’s) principles do not entail intermittency is, 
though technically correct, not a satisfactory response to the intermittency problem.” On the same page, 
Muehlmann talks of ‘Berkeley’s lackadaisical attitude towards the problem.’ Such a label is a misnomer 
given the extent of attention Continuity receives in the Philosophical Commentaries and hints rather at 
Muehlmann’s underestimating the rhetorical layout of the presentation of the Continuity debate in PHK 45-
8: “In the Principles Berkeley fails to appreciate the importance of continuity for the common sense 
conception of bodies. Indeed, he seems to think that this part of that conception is simply a vulgar 
prejudice.” (p. 255) ‘Body’ is a term Berkeley does not use after the early stages of the Continuity 
discussion in the PC, and he does not label the belief that the perceived thing will be there again after we 
open our eyes ‘a prejudice’ – a term he reserves for useful fancies that are strictly speaking wrong, for 
example our belief that we see and touch the same thing. He rather attempts to analyse this belief 
philosophically and purports to show that at no stage do we need the supposition that things exist 
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first glance, but it is a sign of Berkeley’s accurate awareness of the structure of the 
argument, the interdependent and not arbitrary order of presuppositions and objections. 
We have tried to point out this awareness in discussing the Relevancy principle in the 
previous section. And when Argument economy occurs, it does not usually constitute the 
main line of defence, it is only the first trench, as it were. Even in PHK 42 in discussing 
the third objection to immaterialism which says that we see things at a distance from us 
and therefore the things cannot exist in our mind, Berkeley retorts that in dreams things 
also seem to be at a distance from us and yet we cannot claim that they exist outside of 
our mind. This almost sceptical counter-objection is followed by a lengthy explication of 
what it means that things are seen at a distance from us, §§43-4 in fact summarizing 
Berkeley’s findings in NTV, the arbitrary connection between the visible and tactile ideas 
and the way we perceive distance. 
If Berkeley has this positive explanation of seeing things at a distance at hand, 
why does he bother with mentioning dreams before it at all? And which of these two 
answers is actually the answer to the worry at hand? They both seem to be working at 
different levels and complementing each other. The negative one invoking Argument 
economy could with some tentativeness be ascribed to the metaphysical/logical level 
while the positive optical account may belong to the epistemological/scientific level. The 
same strategy as in PHK 42-4 is to be found in the immediately following PHK 45-8, 
albeit in a reversed order. There we first get the cryptic reference to PHK 3&4 containing 
the epistemological, admittedly mostly but not exclusively phenomenalistic account of 
the perceivable, while the negative point comes only later as a reassurance after finding 
the ‘pretended absurdities’ even in materialism. 
 The entry 472 is interesting not only for the embryonic use of Argument economy, 
it also reveals the connection between the immaterialist conceptions of Existence and 
Reality, for the very next entry 473 seems to draw some disturbing consequences of the 
broadened concept of perception and diffuse them at the same time: “But say you then a 
Chimaera does exist. I answer it doth in one sense. i.e. it is imagin’d. but it must be well 
                                                                                                                                                 
unperceived in the strong, absolute and metaphysical sense. For him, the belief in the continuous existence 
of things is pragmatically useful and it is metaphysically underpinned by God’s willingness to excite our 
ideas in an orderly fashion so as not to confuse us. 
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noted that existence is vulgarly restrain’d to actuall perception. & that I use the word 
Existence in a larger sense than ordinary.” While Berkeley enlists the support of the 
vulgar for his esse is percipi principle, he does not do so for his philosophical notion of 
Existence, since for him everything we imagine exists, although not everything is real: 
such an enlarged scope of existence comes handy when explaining such intricate matters 
as perception of distance through visual clues and other problems in his optical 
programme. All the individual constituents of our visual (and perceptible generally) 
world exist and have a scientific explanatory value, but our everyday conception of 
reality is concerned only with the final ‘picture’ put together by the mind for pragmatic 
reasons. 
 In the final exposition of immaterialism in the Principles, the topic of Reality is 
divorced from that of Continuity122 and assumes the place of pride as the first objection 
(actually subdivided into two) Berkeley puts to himself in PHK 34-41. Such arrangement 
is perhaps detrimental to clarity of meaning, especially when compounded by the fact that 
the actual solution to the Intermittency objection, the new meaning of existence, was 
disclosed earlier in PHK 3-4 and the discussion of the objection merely refers back to it, 
instead of elaborating more fully. Also, the use of Argument economy in PHK 48 gave 




2.5.1.4 The Master Argument and Continuity 
 
First, however, the connection between Continuity and the Master Argument 
needs to be investigated. What is the Master Argument and where does it occur? Most 
commentators agree that it occurs in two places in Berkeley’s writings: PHK 22-3 and 
DHP 200. We would like to add two other important occurrences, which tie it with the 
subject of Continuity, namely PC 472 – the embryonic version of all the other 
occurrences, and PHK 45 – the most important section on Continuity in the Principles. In 
the latter case, we should speak rather of an allusion to the Master Argument, which had 
                                                 
122 For a different view see Grayling, p. 120. 
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already been fully laid out in PHK 22-3, but also this allusion takes the form of a 
challenge: “If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist 
without being perceived, then I give up the cause…” and is intimately intertwined with 
the subject of Continuity, just like the earliest mention of the Argument in PC 472. The 
other two entries are, however, much more explicit than these vestiges and also divorced 
from any mention of Continuity and so they have, unfortunately, been taken as the 
standard expositions of the Master Argument. Let us quote them in full: 
“22…that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or 
two, to any one that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into 
your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a 
sound, or figure, or motion, or colour, to exist without the mind, or 
unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see, that what you 
contend for, is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put 
the whole upon this issue; if you can but conceive it possible for one 
extended movable substance, or in general, for any one idea or anything 
like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily 
give up the cause…. 
23 But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for 
instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive 
them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but what is all this, I 
beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call 
books and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one 
that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them 
all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you 
have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not 
shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may 
exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive 
them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. 
When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we 
are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no 
notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing 
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unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are 
apprehended by or exist in itself…” 
 The name The Master Argument is justified by its position in the structure of the 
Principles; it follows the a priori arguments for immaterialism and is by Berkeley 
himself heralded as expressing the preceding paragraphs “in a line or two”. In DHP 200 
Philonous is no less ambitious: 
“…I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it 
possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object 
whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so. 
HYLAS. If it comes to that, the point will soon be decided. What more 
easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and 
unperceived by any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive 
them existing after that manner. 
 PHILONOUS. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the 
same time unseen? 
 HYLAS. No, that were a contradiction. 
 PHILONOUS. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a 
thing which is unconceived? 
 HYLAS. It is. 
PHILONOUS. The tree or house therefore which you think of, is conceived 
by you? 
HYLAS. How should it be otherwise? 
PHILONOUS. And what is conceived, is surely in the mind? 
HYLAS. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind. 
PHILONOUS. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree 
existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever? 
HYLAS. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led 
me into it. –  It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in 
a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to 
conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of, not considering 
that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see, that all I can 
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do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own 
thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And 
this is far from proving that I can conceive them existing out of the minds of 
all spirits.” 
 Our previous analysis of the entry PC 472 will stand us in a good stead here and, 
assuming we are dealing with the same argument123, the enlarged but still traditional 
conception of perception as involving all the intentional verbs, including conceive will 
help us unravel the difficulty at hand. The Master Argument really just challenges the 
reader to conceive something unconceived, ‘which is a manifest repugnancy’ and it tries 
to make him realize that whenever he comes up with something that is not perceived (i.e. 
conceived) at the moment, he perceives (i.e. conceives) it in the very act of mentioning it. 
 To such an argument the standard reply is that there is a difference between my 
conjuring something in my mind and its real existence. True, but that is not the issue here, 
the Master Argument does not claim that when I conceive something, it must also really 
exist. 
 Our interpretation of the Master Argument and the essential role of PC 472-3 in it 
will perhaps get clearer if we contrast it with interpretations of other commentators. 
 
 
2.5.1.5 The Master Argument and commentators 
 
 Philosophers have been mesmerised and baffled by the Master Argument. Their 
fascination, however, has been purely negative, they agree that the Argument is a bad 
argument, disagree on where the mistake lies, and try to account, with varying success, 
for the curious fact that Berkeley himself found the Argument convincing. Bennett’s 
reaction is typical: “One can hardly credit that Berkeley was satisfied with this argument, 
                                                 
123 This assumption is shared by Bennett, p. 194, but he mentions the connection only in passing and does 
not use PC 472-3 to shed light on the Master Argument, his aim is the Continuity debate only. Other 
commentators do not make the connection at all, thus missing the opportunity to unravel the Argument in 
its explicit embryonic version. 
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and yet apparently he was, for he published it twice.”124 Tipton joins in: “With reason 
commentators have tended to treat this argument with scant respect. …Warnock just 
ignores it. Berkeley, though, set great store by it.”125 More recently, Muehlmann even 
calls Berkeley’s satisfaction with the Master Argument the “most troubling problem of 
Berkeleian scholarship” and after asking “why does (Berkeley) even use such a flawed 
argument?”126 he duly proceeds to diagnose the almost psychologically deviant feature of 
Berkeley’s mind. We contend, on the other hand, that the Master Argument is not flawed 
when viewed in its proper place in the structure of immaterialism, and consequently we 
feel no need to explain why Berkeley himself felt content with it. 
 Let us start with Muehlmann. His whole project is driven by the assumption that 
he has uncovered the fundamental flaw of immaterialism, and this flaw is “Berkeley’s 
central doctrine, his nominalism”127. While the effort to link the semantic arguments in 
the Introduction of the Principles to the main argument for immaterialism in Part I of the 
book is laudable, the undue emphasis Muehlmann places on Berkeley’s linguistic exploits 
distorts much of his subsequent analysis, especially his critique of the Master Argument. 
For Muehlmann sees a great difference between the way the challenge preceding the 
Master Argument is worded in PHK 22: “I am content to put the whole upon this issue” 
and in DHP 200: “But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for 
nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue.” The 
difference is, of course, the added parenthesis in the Dialogues version. This could not 
have occurred in the Principles version, reasons Muehlmann, for there it would have 
wiped out also the ‘antiabstractionist’, to wit, nominalist, argument of the Introduction, 
which logically and chronologically precedes all the arguments in Part I. And indeed, the 
impossibility of conceiving things existing unperceived is due to the fact that, on 
Berkeley’s terms, “one cannot peel off the sensing from the quality sensed, the seeing 
from the sensible thing seen, or the conceiving from the object conceived.” 128  But, 
                                                 
124 Bennett, Jonathan: Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 194. 
125 Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 160. 
126 Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, Indianapolis, 1992, p. 148. 
127 Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, p. 4. 
128 Muehlmann, Robert G.: Berkeley’s Ontology, p. 148. 
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Muehlmann being a realist, he claims that because the nominalist argument itself is 
flawed, the Master Argument is flawed as well, and we can, presumably, cut off the 
sensing from the quality sensed. Thus, we have explained what is wrong with the Master 
Argument and also why Berkeley put so much faith in it – the mistake had been 
committed earlier and not noticed by him. 
 We would like to object to Muehlmann’s analysis in its key joint – the 
explanation of the difference between the two versions of the challenge before the Master 
Argument. The difference is due to the different genre of the two works; in the Principles 
it is a fitting restatement of the main argument with the emphasis on the reader 
performing the experiment for himself. In the Dialogues the same is compounded with a 
reminder to Hylas that he is once again contradicting what he already approved of, a 
reminder that occurs often as Hylas tries out different versions of the materialist position. 
His difficulties in formulating his position exactly provide a feeling of a record of an 
actual discussion and are thus an integral part of the philosophical genre of dialogue. 
Muehlmann is simply reading too much into the difference and treating the two books as 
written in the same style. 
Pitcher129 sees the Master Argument as a first part of a two-sided attack on the 
two main functions of ‘Lockean Matter’ – material objects existing unperceived and their 
resemblance of our sensory ideas. We have tried to show that the structure of the 
Principles as well as the Dialogues is more consistent with the Argument’s being a 
summary and climax of immaterialism rather than an a priori argument, while its 
predecessor in PC 472-3 ties it intrinsically with the Continuity debate. But let us 
postpone the discussion of the structure of immaterialism till later and concentrate on 
Pitcher’s reading of the Master Argument itself. 
 In Pitcher’s view, it fails, because Berkeley does not consider the distinction 
between “what an idea is an idea of, and the idea itself…between what is represented and 
what represents.”130 While that which represents (an idea) cannot exist without the mind, 
the thing itself, which the idea represents, can exist unperceived. So Berkeley seems to 
forget that ideas represent. But what do they represent? That is precisely the disputed 
                                                 
129 Pitcher, George: Berkeley, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 111-5. 
130 Pitcher, George: Berkeley, p. 113. 
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point. Berkeley would claim that the step behind ideas to something that is totally 
different from them (yet somehow manages to resemble them) is not warranted and 
should be resisted. Ideas represent indeed, but only other ideas, according to the principle 
‘nothing can be like an idea except for another idea’. A supreme example of the new 
nature of representation of ideas by ideas is to be found in NTV, where visual ideas are 
signs of (represent) the tactile ideas131. So Pitcher’s objection begs the question against 
Berkeley, for even with the help of representation we cannot get to extra-mental objects. 
 The same mistake, although in a different wording, is committed by Tipton132, 
who analyses the Master Argument with the help of the word ‘image’. He takes Berkeley 
to mean by ‘conceive’ framing a mental image and perceiving this mental image133. On 
such a reading, the Master Argument fails because Berkeley “confuses the object thought 
about with the mental image we may frame in thinking about it”134, and while the latter 
can be mind-dependent, the former most certainly is not. 
 But when we look at Berkeley’s actual usage of the word ‘image’ in PHK, for 
example, we will discover that all its occurrences are in negative contexts, i.e. an idea 
cannot be an ‘image’ of something without the mind, with the exception of PHK 33, 
where ideas excited by our imagination are called ‘ideas, or images of things’ as opposed 
to ideas imprinted on our minds by the Author of Nature. Both, however, are ideas. This 
should not surprise us, for the pair ‘object/image’ is another transmutation of the 
‘inside/outside’ metaphor, so handy to the dualist but relentlessly pursued and disclosed 
by the anti-dualist immaterialist. The following quote from PHK 56 expresses Berkeley’s 
sentiment towards the word most succinctly: “(It is a) mistake (to suppose) that there are 
certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from 
being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those 
objects on the mind.” My italics in the quote indicate that the same point applies to 
‘resemblance’ as well, for it is the same metaphor. Berkeley spends considerable time 
                                                 
131 I am indebted here to Atherton; see for example p. 15 of her Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1990. 
132 Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, pp. 158-178. 
133 Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 165. 
134 Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 166. 
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explaining that ideas do not ‘resemble’ anything extra-mental (PHK8): “an idea can be 
like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or 
figure…it (is) impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas.” 
And the very next sentence includes another crucial word in the forbidden image-
resemblance/object metaphor: “…I ask whether those supposed originals or external 
things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable 
or no?” (my italics) By depriving the dualist of the words in which to express his doctrine, 
Berkeley in effect precludes him from setting it up.  
 But let us confront Tipton in the very example that he gives as the most evident 
token of Berkeley’s failure to distinguish the image from the object: “But in the case of 
the sun the point is really quite evident. The sun I imagine is hot and huge; the image I 
frame is not. The object is, in fact, totally distinct from the image.”135 Our objection to 
this strict dichotomy is related to the one mentioned by Dennis Grey136. 
 In order to conceive the object and its relationship to its image in the mind, we 
have to, as it were, step outside of the mind and outside of the object, as well, to view 
them both from the side, a move that is contemplated and rejected by Berkeley in NTV 
116:  
“…what greatly contributes to make us mistake in this matter is that when we 
think of the pictures in the fund of the eye, we imagine ourselves looking on the 
fund of another’s eye, or another looking on the fund of our own eye, and 
beholding the pictures painted thereon. Suppose two eyes A and B: A from 
some distance looking on the pictures in B sees them inverted, and for that 
reason concludes they are inverted in B: But this is wrong. There are projected 
in little on the bottom of A the images of the pictures of, suppose, man, earth, 
etc., which are painted on B. And besides these the eye B it self, and the objects 
which environ it, together with another earth, are projected in a larger size on A. 
Now, by the eye A these larger images are deemed the true objects, and the 
lesser only pictures in miniature. And it is with respect to those greater images 
                                                 
135 Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 175. 
136 Grey, Denis: “The Solipsism of Bishop Berkeley”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 9. (Oct., 
1952), pp. 338-49. 
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that it determines the situation of the smaller images: So that comparing the little 
man with the great earth, A judges him inverted, or that the feet are farthest from 
and the head nearest to the great earth. Whereas, if A compare the little man 
with the little earth, then he will appear erect, i.e. his head shall seem farthest 
from, and his feet nearest to, the little earth. But we must consider that B does 
not see two earths as A does: It sees only what is represented by the little 
pictures in A, and consequently shall judge the man erect: For, in truth, the man 
in B is not inverted, for there the feet are next the earth; but it is the 
representation of it in A which is inverted, for there the head of the 
representation of the picture of the man in B is next the earth, and the feet 
farthest from the earth, meaning the earth which is without the representation of 
the pictures in B. For if you take the little images of the pictures in B, and 
consider them by themselves, and with respect only to one another, they are all 
erect and in their natural posture.” 
True, the passage quoted deals with the rather technical problem of inverted vision, but it 
ties in with another passage, this time from the DHP 209, which makes the same point: 
“PHILONOUS. I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis. 
You make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our ideas. 
Pray tell me, whether by the brain you mean any sensible thing. 
HYLAS. What else think you I could mean? 
PHILONOUS. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things 
which are immediately perceivable, are ideas; and these exist only in the mind. 
Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to. 
HYLAS. I do not deny it. 
PHILONOUS. The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists 
only in the mind. Now, I would fain know whether you think it reasonable to 
suppose, that one idea or thing existing in the mind, occasions all other ideas. 
And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin of that primary idea 
or brain itself? 
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HYLAS. I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is 
perceivable to sense, this being itself only a combination of sensible ideas, but 
by another which I imagine.  
PHILONOUS. But are not things imagined as truly in the mind as things 
perceived? 
HYLAS. I must confess they are. 
PHILONOUS. It comes therefore to the same thing; and you have been all this 
while accounting for ideas, by certain motions or impressions of the brain, that 
is, by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or imaginable it matters not.” 
 By now, the metaphysical importance of the position alluded to in the two 
quotations should be evident. There is no outside, absolute space from which we could 
compare our ideas and their supposedly causal originals, for there is no absolute 
Newtonian space.137 Therefore, there is no position from which to define the dichotomy 
idea (image)/thing, when all we are aware of are our ideas. This spatial objection 
combines with the semantic objection to the ‘image/original’ metaphor described earlier 
to yield a unique strict first-person perspective of Berkeley’s immaterialism, which is 
perhaps behind all the accusations of solipsism. 
 Tipton’s and Pitcher’s readings of the Master Argument are carried out from the 
dualistic position138 which has, however, been pre-empted by Berkeley in his rejection of 
the ‘image/original’ metaphor and which the immaterialist never needs to reach for the 
following reasons.  
 
 
2.5.1.6 The structure of immaterialism, the strict first person perspective, the lesson 
of NTV and the question of the a priori, immaterialism as a half of materialism 
 
 The strict first-person perspective of immaterialism is present from the very 
                                                 
137 Grey, Denis: “The Solipsism of Bishop Berkeley”, p. 347. 
138 Pappas’s complicated analysis of the Master Argument suffers from the same mistake, he finds a 
dualistic dichotomy between mind dependent ideas and “compages of external bodies” (PHK 22), failing to 
see the ironic use of this rare word by Berkeley. See Pappas, Berkeley’s Thought, p. 132. 
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beginning of the programme, the NTV being its primary application. By providing optics 
with its psychological part, Berkeley saw the successes of his theory in solving the 
problems of the discipline that were not soluble on the strictly dualist Cartesian basis. 
The main exposition of immaterialism in the PHK starts with the solitary thinker’s 
position, as well, and through a priori arguments139 a viable metaphysics is constructed in 
the first six paragraphs, which does not need the second Cartesian substance – the 
material one – and is thus lighter in comparison with its traditional Cartesian dualistic 
counterpart.  
 To be sure, such metaphysics sometimes appears revisionist and circumlocutory, 
for example the constancy of our perceptions is not explained by independently 
subsisting and persisting material substances, but by the love of an Omnipotent Spirit, 
and this explanation is considered advantageous over the classical dualistic one for its 
theological focus. Or the theory of other minds seems to be compromised in 
immaterialism, according to Bennett. We will have more to say about these traditional 
metaphysical concerns later, for the moment let it suffice to say that any objections to 
immaterialism from dualistic positions are begging the question against it, for both 
systems start with the strict first-person perspective (here Descartes’ Meditations 
represents a superb example), and while the dualist advances from here to hypothesize 
another substance, thus widening his position and opening the route to scepticism, the 
immaterialist is content to remain in the tight space of the mind, especially when such 
lighter metaphysics is deemed sufficient to account for perception, nay, it is even more 
suited than its adversary to account for our dominant sense, vision. 
 To illustrate the contrast between the two metaphysics once more, let us entertain 
the thought experiment which is, according to Berkeley, metaphysically forbidden but 
which he himself undoubtedly carried out many times scientifically, for he was very 
much aware of the anatomy of the eye. Let us imagine that we are looking at our own eye 
‘from the side’ and see it seeing the computer screen before it. Thus we have the ‘object’ 
and its ‘image’ on the retina. But which of these two does the eye see? We are tempted to 
say that the eye sees the object, but then if the eye moves a bit back, the image diminishes 
                                                 
139 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, Berkeley was the first writer to use the word ‘a priori’ in 
English. 
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while the object stays the same. If we say that the eye sees only the image (as most 
philosophers in the early modern period would say), then the eye sees something 
changeable and subjective while the ‘real’ thing is hidden. It seems we say something 
nonsensical either way, and Berkeley’s solution is simply to prevent the movement that 
enabled the dichotomy in the first place. The metaphysical position of the strict first-
person perspective is simpler and more basic as metaphysics, useful as science and does 
not violate language by redefining words like ‘real’, ‘know’ and ‘thing’. 
 Within the carefully wrought structure of PHK and DHP the Master Argument 
serves as a grand finale of the immaterialist position, summing it up in a psychologically 
persuasive way through a thought experiment which the reader (in DHP Hylas) is asked 
to carry out in his own mind. It highlights the impossibility of even mentioning anything 
extra-mental. In a way, it is the principle ‘esse is percipi’ in the form of a challenge, for it 
strives to identify the same two concepts – perception/conception and existence as that 
principle. Let us illustrate the mechanism of the argument with an analogy: if someone 
was to ask ‘what is the colour of flesh?’ I would feel justified to say ‘red’. But my 
interlocutor might object, ‘no, no, that is the colour of blood, because when you remove 
skin you necessarily cut through blood vessels and the spilt blood colours the flesh red. I 
want to know the colour of flesh, not that of blood. What colour is it before you remove 
the skin?’ To this I would have to say that there is no ‘before you remove the skin’, one 
cannot see through it and so the concept of ‘the colour of flesh beneath the skin’ makes 
no sense. Admittedly, the colour of flesh is the same as the colour of blood; the two 
colours are really the same, even though we usually do not realize this and treat them as 
separate. The case is analogous with perception and existence, we get to existence only 
through perception/conception, the two concepts are united on a deeper level, and though 
we do not usually realize the unity, the Master Argument attempts to elucidate it. 
 
 
2.5.2 Continuity – temporary summary 
 
We have tried to untangle the complicated solution to the objection of 
Intermittency through showing that the real answer to it is to be found in PHK 45 and 
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involves a reference back to PHK 3-4 (meaning of ‘exist’) plus a torso of a challenge 
referring back to PHK 22-3 to the Master Argument. It is our contention, that the crucial 
entries PC 472-3 contain instances of both, but in the final layout of the Principles, the 
Master Argument was moved forward to PHK 22-3 and in the Continuity discussion in 
PHK 45-8 is present only in a rudimentary form, albeit in a crucial place in PHK 45, 
where Berkeley refers back to the meaning of ‘exist’ as explained in PHK 3-4 and 
“desire(s) he (the reader) will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence 
of an idea distinct from its being perceived.”  
Another feature pointing to the common source of the Master Argument and the 
solution to the Intermittency objection is the burden shifting nature of the ‘smoke screen’ 
secondary solution of PHK 48. This second solution, however, represents a potential trap 
for interpreters, one that has been noticed by Grey who correctly sees that the actual 
solution to the Intermittency objection involves “the ‘strict’ interpretation of ‘esse is 
percipi’”140 which is to be found in PHK 4-6. But Grey still claims Berkeley is ‘muddled’ 
for letting God turn into a constant observer of things not observed by any finite mind141. 
We agree that the two solutions are mutually exclusive, but wish to contend that the 
second one is not Berkeley’s position in the end. We so attempt to be more charitable to 
Berkeley and to show how the Limerick interpretation of him is, though prevalent, by no 
means an obvious one. 
 
 
2.6 Continuity and God – the Limerick interpretation 
 
 When we quoted PHK 3 as giving the meaning of the verb ‘to exist’, we 
concentrated on the contrafactual analysis presented there and postponed the appended 
analysis in terms of actual perception until later: “The table I write on, I say, exists, that 
is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby 
that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does 
                                                 
140 Grey, Denis: “The Solipsism of Bishop Berkeley”, p. 342. 
141 Grey, Denis: “The Solipsism of Bishop Berkeley”, p. 349: “Berkeley makes a …mistake when he turns 
God into an Absolute Percipient.” 
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perceive it.” (my italics) Now is the time to treat the other part of the disjunction and the 
interpretations it gave rise to. 
 Many interpretations take this second part of the conjunct seriously and, though 
varying in detail, build upon it. The area overlapping between them is expressed in the 
famous limerick by Ronald Knox: 
 
There once was a man who said, “God 
Must think it exceedingly odd 
If He finds that this tree 
Continues to be 
When there’s no one about in the Quad.” 
 
“Dear Sir: 
Your astonishment’s odd: 
I am always about in the Quad 
And that’s why the tree 
Will continue to be, 




The solution presented here has become the orthodox solution to the Continuity problem 
and has been adopted by many commentators. For example, Warnock says: “…the role 
of God in Berkeley’s philosophy is...put forward as the only means of avoiding gross 
conflict with ordinary views…”142 In a similar vein, Grayling speaks of “…the standard 
interpretation (where) God continuously perceives sensible objects and thus holds the 
entire order of nature in being…”143 More recently Pappas finds that “…objects not 
perceived by finite spirits are nonetheless perceived by God, and this fact underwrites 
                                                 
142 Warnock, G. J.: Berkeley, London: Penguin, 1953, sec. ed.1982, p. 123-4. 
143 
Grayling, A. C.: Berkeley: Central Arguments, 1987, p. 117. 
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their existence”144 This standard account was criticized by Bennett145, and even though 
some of his criticisms were accepted by later commentators (notably Tipton), the general 
radical thrust of his challenge came to be rejected. 
 
  
2.6.1 The twisting of the texts 
 
Let us have a look at the discussion in a more detail. Warnock’s is a classical 
interpretation in the Limerick tradition. He gives this reading to the key section PHK 48: 
“Indeed, it is not only that there may be some other spirit that perceives them (the 
furniture in an unoccupied room); for ‘sensible things do really exist: and if they really 
exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite 
mind, or God.’ …though much is not perceived by men, there is nothing which God does 
not perceive.”146 And Berkeley was, according to Warnock, happy to use this argument 
to shore up the continuity of unperceived things, for this belief forms a part of common 
sense: “(Berkeley) knows that any plain man would insist that the furniture in an 
unoccupied room actually does exist, not merely would exist if the room were 
occupied.”147  
At one stroke, the nascent phenomenalistic account is rejected and superseded by 
one emphasizing actual perception. Let us analyse Warnock’s second claim first. If we 
compare it with what Berkeley actually says, for example in PHK 3: “The table I write 
on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it 
existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it…” we see that 
Warnock grossly oversimplifies the situation. For Berkeley does not say that the table in 
my study would exist only if there was somebody by to see it, but that it does exist 
                                                 
144 Pappas, George S.: Berkeley’s Thought, Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 108. 
145 Bennett, Jonathan: Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, pp. 163-
198. 
146 Warnock, Berkeley, pp. 113-4, the quote of Berkeley is from DHP 212, a similar view is present in Luce, 
Berkeley’s Immaterialism, pp. 124-5. 
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because if there was somebody in the room, he would see it. We do not need to insist on 
actual perception in order to secure existence, the verb ‘to exist’ is semantically more 
elastic than that and uses as its support possible perception as well as actual perception, 
as the continuation of PHK 3 makes clear: “…or that some other spirit actually does 
perceive it.” (my italics) Warnock’s ‘plain man’ need not worry at all about the existence 
of the table, but if he did worry, he could enter the room and see it, a procedure that is 
explicitly sanctioned by Berkeley. 
The first quote by Warnock discloses another disturbing feature of the standard 
account – the need to stretch the texts to make them mean what the Limerick 
commentators want them to mean. The actual wording of PHK 48 does not give 
Warnock the result he needs. In Berkeley’s words: “… we may not … conclude (the 
objects of sense) have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since 
there may be some other spirit that perceives them, though we do not.” (my italics) but, 
on Warnock’s reading Berkeley’s system here demands a ‘must’. Our interpretation, on 
the other hand, is on strong grounds here for it explains precisely why ‘may’ instead of 
‘must’ should be used here, and that is due to Berkeley’s use of Argument Economy148. 
Similarly, Luce, another proponent of the Limerick interpretation, is too hasty 
when he concludes that PHK 6 contains a proof of God’s existence in his index to the 
Works: “so long as (bodies) are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind 
or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist 
in the mind of some Eternal Spirit…” Tipton, on the rare occasion of accepting Bennett’s 
criticism of such an inaccurate reading, says: “…first, this is not the only possible 
interpretation of PHK 6, second (and this is a stronger claim) … it is not the most natural 
interpretation”149 
The last passage in the Principles, which was thought to contain the continuity 
argument, is PHK 90: “…when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it 
                                                 
148 A similar conclusion is reached by Thomas, George H.: “Berkeley’s God Does Not Perceive”, Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 14, 1976, pp. 163-168. On page 164 he puts it succinctly: “’we’ …refers …to 
himself and some other human beings…Berkeley would not use ‘may’ of God’s perceiving, but would say 
‘necessarily’ as in DHP, p. 212”. 
149 Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 324. 
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must be in another mind.” Once again, however, the words mean something different 
here and the usage of ‘may’ instead of ‘must’ ruins the Limerick interpretation. Berkeley 
is here basically saying: “I do not know whether the things I saw still exist now that my 
eyes are shut precisely because my eyes are shut, but if they are to exist, they must exist 
in another mind, so the fact that they no longer exist in my mind is no argument for them 
existing independently of any mind.” And such a minimalist approach is captured by our 
notion of Argument Economy without doing damage to the text itself. 
 
 
2.6.2 The new goal – why is there no Continuity Argument in the Principles? 
 
After Bennett’s criticism, these important textual points were accepted by 
Tipton150 and Pitcher151 (later writers sadly ignore them altogether), but commentators 
were still loath to part company with the traditional continuity argument! They merely 
changed priorities, for now it became necessary to explain why Berkeley chose to 
‘suppress’ the continuity argument in the Principles, when he had spent so much time on 
it in the Philosophical Commentaries and it actually occurs in the Dialogues. Such a 
strategy seems to be inherently weakened by the need to relegate the Principles from the 
position of the most important metaphysical book in Berkeley’s canon, which position is 
subsequently occupied by the Dialogues. Such realignment is explicitly contradicted by 
Berkeley’s Preface to the Three Dialogues, where he claims to place the content of the 
previous book, the Principles, in a new light. 
We will turn to the one occurrence of the continuity argument Bennett concedes 
in DHP 230-1 and calls ‘a momentary aberration’152 later (in Chapter 2.6.4), let us now 
                                                 
150 Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 323: “…I am inclined to accept 
(that)…contrary to what has often been supposed, Berkeley does not use (the continuity argument) on many 
occasions.” (Tipton’s italics) 
151 Pitcher, George: Berkeley, p. 174: “An extraordinary feature of these (PHK 6, 45-8, 90) statements is the 
studied refusal to make a firm commitment to the existence of unperceived objects.” 
152 Bennett, Jonathan: Locke, Berkeley, Hume Central Themes, p. 171. 
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concentrate on the valiant and futile efforts of the Limerick commentators to explain 
Berkeley’s silence on continuity in the Principles. 
Tipton believes that the embryonic solution to the Intermittency objection is to be 
found in PC 52 and it involves God and powers in him to cause our ideas153. But this 
raises another problem: “…he (Berkeley) cannot solve the continuity problem just by 
appealing to God’s present perception…this move leaves a discontinuity 
problem…because any idea God perceives now will be an idea he has always 
perceived.”154  But when the problem of Creation is raised in DHP 253-4, Philonous 
invokes the Relevancy Principle to show it is not a problem he needs to be concerned 
with. But according to Tipton “…B….could do himself justice on the continuity issue 
only with help from an appropriate theology, but saw that doing (so) would involve 
committing himself to a solution which he had decided not to reveal because he was 
aware of difficulties with the theology.”155 Is it not simpler to suppose that if Berkeley’s 
solution to continuity involved problems that were not easy to solve, then it was not a 
good solution after all? How do we explain the eventual publication of the solution in 
DHP 230-1, did Berkeley change his mind in the end about its usefulness? 
Pitcher’s explanation of Berkeley’s reticence on continuity in the Principles is 
categorical: “In the Principles ...Berkeley takes no definite stand on the question of 
whether unobserved objects exist or not, for he does not know what stand best to take.”156 
He sees Berkeley struggling in the Philosophical Commentaries, wavering in the 
Principles and finally hitting on the wrong solution in the Three Dialogues: “Rather than 
connecting the existence of unperceived objects to ideas in God’s understanding, 
Berkeley would do far better to tie their existence to God’s will...in Three Dialogues 
Berkeley flirts briefly with the idea ....when he suggests that the creation of the world 
might have consisted in God’s decreeing that objects ‘should become perceptible to 
intelligent creatures’...But this is just a brief interlude, unhappily…”157 The charitable 
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interpretation that Berkeley had solved his problems before he came to publish his books 
and that he actually published the solution in PHK 45 with reference back to PHK 3 is 
precluded for Pitcher, even though he comes tantalizingly close to it. For him PHK 3 with 
its crucial definition of ‘existence’ contains only ‘traces’ of the real solution!158 
Lately, Muehlmann has provided another explanation for Berkeley’s silence on 
continuity in his central metaphysical text. He acknowledges that in the notebooks 
Berkeley had been very concerned with finding a solution to the Intermittency objection, 
but “by the time Berkeley publishes the Principles his stance has hardened ... he here 
takes it to be a specious objection.” 159  One consequence of this ‘hardening’ is that 
Berkeley does not treat the objection seriously, and the vexed ‘may’ instead of the 
expected ‘must’ is simply an example of “Berkeley’s lackadaisical attitude towards the 
problem”160. Only later in the Dialogues does Berkeley again realize the gravity of the 
problem and he then offers a solution to it, namely in DHP 214, and this solution involves 
archetypes: “…archetypes are not bodies, but they provide an item, as enduring as God 
wishes, which Berkeley can plausibly insert into the analysis of bodies.”161 So the pair 
ectype-archetype saves the day, for ectypes are the intermittent objects in our minds 
while archetypes are enduring in God’s mind. Let us overlook the fact that this introduces 
dualism back into immaterialism, and the fickle attitude of Berkeley towards the whole 
problem (concerned in the Commentaries, dismissive in the Principles, concerned again 
in the Dialogues), as textual analysis of the key part of DHP 214 will suffice to show the 
implausibility of such an interpretation: “…ideas or things by me perceived, either 
themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not 
to be their author… they must therefore exist in some other mind…” This sentence 
appears in a summary of Philonous’ position introduced by: “Take here in brief my 
meaning.” and as such is unlikely to contain any new solution, especially as the 
discussion in which it functions sees Philonous defending himself against the charge that 
he is a cryptic Malebranchian, i.e. that we see external things through the essence of God, 
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a topic not related to the Continuity discussion in any way. Finally, the ‘or’ conjoining 
‘ideas’ and ‘archetypes’ here indicates contextual synonymy of the two terms, as is clear 
from the previous occurrence of the conjunction between ‘ideas’ and ‘things by me 
perceived’. The two terms consequently cannot be forced into any opposite dualistic 
partnership. 
Unfortunately, recent scholarship tends to ignore Bennett’s exegetical points and 
even the need to explain Berkeley’s ‘evasion’ of continuity in the Principles and 
contends itself with blunt statements: “…objects not perceived by finite spirits are 
nonetheless perceived by God, and this fact underwrites their existence.”162   
 
 
2.6.3 Bennett’s criticism 
 
Apart from raising the textual points, Bennett offers also some structural criticism 
of the Limerick account. He distinguishes between the Passivity Argument for God’s 
existence – I know that some of my ideas are not caused by me, and since all ideas are 
mind-dependent, there must be some other mind, that causes these ideas in me, and the 
Continuity Argument for God’s existence – things not perceived by humans are kept in 
their existence by God’s constant perception. Limerick commentators read the Continuity 
Argument163 into passages where in fact only the Passivity Argument is present, thus 
distorting the passages, as we have seen in section 2.6.1. 
If the Passivity as well as the Continuity Arguments were used by Berkeley to 
prove the existence of God, how come only the first one “is celebrated as ‘this great 
truth’ (PHK 149) and is saluted by Hylas (DHP 215) (?) The continuity argument, in both 
its occurrence and its pseudo-occurrence, slides by without the slightest fanfare.”164 Also, 
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the two arguments seem to be ideally designed to complement each other: While the 
Passivity Argument proves God when we perceive things, the Continuity Argument 
would seem to prove Him exactly when we do not perceive things. Both the existence of 
perceived and unperceived things would be secured, together with the existence of God. 
Why is Berkeley so strangely silent on this beautiful pattern, when his avowed goal is to 
“to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion”? 
Another of Bennett’s (and not only his, see for example Tipton, p. 322) criticism 
against the Continuity Argument is the charge that it is circular, but proponents of the 
Limerick account try to explain this by saying that Berkeley first proves God by the 
Passivity Argument and then uses God’s existence to shore up the continuity of 
unperceived bodies. But surely the Continuity Argument cannot then again be used to 
prove God? In other words, it cannot cut both ways; either it proves Continuity or God. 
We do not wish to become embroiled in this discussion, however, for there is a surer way 
of dispatching the Limerick interpretation, and that is by showing that the Continuity 
Argument does not occur even once in Berkeley’s writings, that it is purely the 
commentators’ fabrication. In order to accomplish this, we need to look at the one place 
where even Bennett concedes the Continuity Argument appears. 
 
 
2.6.4 Theological Interpretation of the Continuity Argument in DHP 230-1 (going 
beyond Bennett) 
 
The crucial passage which Bennett claims “is right out of line with everything 
else Berkeley says about the continuity of objects, and should be dismissed as a 
momentary aberration”165 runs as follows: 
“HYLAS. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible, that 
things perceivable by sense may still exist? 
PHILONOUS. I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible 
things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all 
minds. Now it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find 
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them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other Mind 
wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: 
as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed 
annihilation. (my italics) And as the same is true, with regard to all other finite 
created spirits; it necessarily follows, there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, 
which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such 
a manner, and according to such rules, as he himself hath ordained, and are by 
us termed the Laws of Nature.” 
My italics in the quote highlight what all commentators agree is an instance of the 
Continuity Argument. And Berkeley does say that things exist in God’s mind between the 
times when I, or other created spirits, do not perceive them. But he arrives at this 
conclusion through an interesting step, for he does not claim straight away that this other 
mind which perceives things while I do not and perceived them before my birth and will 
do so after my death is divine. On the contrary, fully in line with Argument Economy, 
this other mind, or minds, has properties that we cannot identify yet from the fact that it 
perceives things while we do not. We ascertain its divinity only after we have considered 
the case of all other finite minds. 
The context of the quote furthermore suggests that continuity of unperceived 
objects is not the theme of the discussion here. The whole passage is introduced by 
Hylas’s question: “…you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should exist 
without the mind. Do you not?” Now clearly this is a demand for a justification of the 
mind-dependent status of ideas, not a question on what happens to things we do not 
perceive at the present moment. And what immediately follows after the passage is a 
discussion of how we can know God’s mind. Only as a part of his theology, one that in 
this respect is quite orthodox, does Berkeley allow himself to say that things exist in God 
between the times of the finite spirits’ perception, immediately softening and diluting the 
claim by expanding it to include the periods before the individual’s birth and after his 
death. And these two periods are actually contained in Hylas’s question; the time between 
an individual’s perception of things occurs as an unnecessary aside, almost an 
embellishment of the position. What is more, the fact that God perceives all things is 
simply an explication of his omnipresence, an orthodox feature, and the new part that is 
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unique to Berkeley’s metaphysics, is his exhibiting them to us in a regular manner so that 
we can predict them through science. 
The theological twist makes this critical statement a part of Berkeley’s theology, 
not metaphysics, a new emphasis on which is evident in the Dialogues, but missing from 
the Principles. Hence the discussion of how we can know God if no idea can represent 
Him, and the later immaterialist account of the Creation. Furthermore, these seemingly 
new theological problems and their solutions cannot be made to represent a development 
in Berkeley’s thinking or a change of position. One of the first queries after the 
publication of the Principles in 1710 was put to Berkeley by Lady Percival and 
concerned the possibility of an immaterialist account of the Creation. Berkeley satisfied 
this query in a letter as early as September 1710166, and it probably only served to 
convince him that he should pay more attention to theological problems in later 
expositions of his immaterialism. 
God is ubiquitous in the Dialogues and Berkeley presents himself as an orthodox 
Christian: “HYLAS. What! this is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all 
others too who believe there is a God, and that he knows and comprehends all things.” 
(DHP 212) and enlists his immaterialism in the services of orthodoxy: “…to a Christian it 
cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree existing without his mind is truly known 
and comprehended by (that is, exists in) the infinite mind of God.” (DHP 235) The one 
thing that is not addressed in the Dialogues, though, is the metaphysical question of 
whether objects continue to exist when there is nobody by to perceive them. The view 
that objects not perceived by finite spirits are nevertheless perceived by the omniscient 
and omnipresent God is simply a part of the theological orthodoxy of the time.  
 
 
2.6.5 Continuity – summary 
 
We have tried to untangle the complicated solution to the objection of 
                                                 
166 Letter to Percival of 6th September 1710, where Berkeley even says: “I know not whether I express 
myself so clearly as to be understood by a lady that has not read my book.” clearly implying that the 
objection rests on a misunderstanding of the Principles and is not new. Works VIII, pp. 37-8. 
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Intermittency by showing that the main solution is located in PHK 45 and involves a 
reference back to the definition of existence in the early paragraphs of the Principles. 
With the ‘esse is percipi’ principle in mind, the Intermittency objection makes no sense 
and is specious. A remnant of a challenge helped to connect this solution with its original 
in PC 472-3, thus tying it with the Master Argument which we interpreted as the 
immaterialist principle in challenge form and consequently exploiting the synonymy of 
‘perceive’ and ‘conceive’. Then we criticized the standard, ‘Limerick’ interpretation 
based on PHK 48 which according to us does not constitute Berkeley’s reply to the 
Intermittency objection, but rather an occurrence of the rhetorical device of Argument 
Economy. God plays no role in securing the existence of unperceived objects, contrary to 
what has been maintained by almost all commentators, and the standard account suffers 
not only from internal inconsistencies, but it also twists the crucial texts. The only alleged 
appearance of the Continuity Argument in DHP 230-1 was explained as a part of the 
theological orthodoxy of Berkeley’s time and plays no metaphysical role in his 
immaterialism. 
In discussing secondary literature we have explored certain structural points of 
immaterialism, its interconnection with Berkeley’s optics, its rigorous order of exposition 




















3. How Does Berkeley Prove God Then? – The Passivity Argument and Beyond 
 
 We have tried to show the way Berkeley does not prove the existence of God – 
namely by giving Him the metaphysically useful role of a constant cosmic observer 
guaranteeing the existence of unperceived things in the so-called Continuity Argument. It 
is, however, certain that Berkeley is keen on proving God in his philosophy of 
immaterialism, even though he does not advertise this aim in the titles and subtitles of his 
books, unlike for example Descartes in the subtitle to his Meditations. The closest 
Berkeley comes to signalling his intentions in the titles of his books is the proclamation 
that he wishes to inquire into the grounds of “Atheism, and Irreligion” in PHK, to 
demonstrate “the immediate providence of a Deity” in DHP and again to show “the 
immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity” in TVV, goals which notably fall short of 
a full-scale metaphysical proof of God’s existence. Though not advertised explicitly, the 
goal to show that God is and what He is jumps at the reader from many lines of 
Berkeley’s writings. So for example in the Preface to PHK the author intends the book 
for those who “want a demonstration of the existence and the immateriality of God”, in 
DHP he claims that immaterialism supplies an “immediate demonstration ... of the being 
of a God” (DHP 212), etc. So how does Berkeley accomplish his goal? What role does 
God play in immaterialism, and what is the demonstration of His existence? 
 In answering these questions, we will have to venture into untrodden land, one 
that to modern commentators seems to be even a useless minefield. So Fogelin in his 
useful commentary on the Principles says: “Except for …noting the weaknesses in his 
proofs for the existence of God, I will say relatively little about the distinctively 
theological aspects of Berkeley’s position.”167 In a similar vein, Tipton apologizes for 
saying little about Berkeley’s views of God and admits: “we regard his views on the 
                                                 
167 Fogelin, Robert J.: Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, Routledge, 2001, p. 28. 
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nature of the sensible object as more worth discussing than his views on the nature and 
attributes of God.”168 The hesitation and respect is understandable, the centuries that 
separate us from Berkeley have brought enormous changes into the ways we conceive 
God, and the shifts in our expectations of what a viable theological doctrine should be 
able to explain threaten to distort any understanding of a theocentric philosophy, such as 
Berkeley’s immaterialism, which was formulated three centuries ago. However, we will 
take the risk in the hope of finding out more about Berkeley’s overall philosophical 
position. But before we get to Berkeley’s arguments for God’s existence, we will have a 
look at a closely related issue, namely his account of causality. 
 
 
3.1 Berkeley’s account of causality, connection with substance and common sense 
 
 The immaterialist account of causality belongs to the Philosophical Museum 
today; though in its day it was a natural and logical consummation of a trend in 
seventeenth century thinking169. Malebranche pointed the way for Berkeley on causation. 
The immaterialist agrees with the occasionalist in denying activity to all objects of sense 
and in granting true causality to spirit only. But he differs from him in reserving the 
power to move our limbs also to human agents, as evidenced in PC 548: “We move our 
Legs our selves. ‘tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch.” 
Also Locke deals with the issue in his Essay II, xxi. His position seems to be that 
the concept of power is essential to our idea of causality as opposed to simple succession, 
and we somehow come about this concept through our repeatedly perceiving connections 
of ideas. We are, however, not directly aware of power in our perceptions, we just 
                                                 
168  Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 299, cf. also pp. 320-1: “The 
considerations which lead (Berkeley) to suppose that we should recognize here the benevolent God of 
Christian monotheism are of less interest.” 
169 The trend carried over well into the next century: „So strong was the bias in favour of the view that all 
genuine causation requires a mind, that even after Hume’s revolution a philosopher as astute as Thomas 
Reid...was unwilling to abandon it.”, Cummins, Phillip D.: “Berkeley on Minds and Agency”, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 225. 
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attribute it to things around us. The closest we come to having a clear idea of power is 
actually from within, from reflection on the activity of our mind when, say, we decide to 
move our fingers. The section 4 of chapter II, xxi is even called “The clearest Idea of 
active Power had from Spirit”. To sum up, in Locke’s philosophy there seem to be two 
types of causality, a spiritual one and a material one, and the former is, at least on the 
epistemological level, primary. 
 In Berkeley’s hands the Lockean system changes in a way which is rather 
characteristic of him and which we have uncovered in his treatment of the outside/inside 
metaphor: one half, the causality in material objects, is rejected, and the other, the 
causality of spirit, is retained. But let us have a look at the text of the Principles itself. 
“25. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by 
whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive – there is 
nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of 
thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied of the 
truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. 
For, since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that 
there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his 
ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or 
activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention 
will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and 
inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, 
strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance 
or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8.” 
Berkeley here says that ideas are ‘visibly inactive’ and totally passive, that on 
introspection we will not perceive any trace of activity or power in them. Winkler here 
makes the useful suggestion that apart from the ‘phenomenological argument’ there 
seems to be also the ‘conceptual argument’ in PHK 25. Berkeley not only relies on 
introspection to prove his point, he also draws on the meaning of idea as explicated 
earlier, for example in PHK 2 “the existence of an idea consists in being perceived” and 
again PHK 6, where “the being of a sensible thing” is to be perceived170. True, but what 
                                                 
170 Winkler, Kenneth P.: Berkeley: An Interpretation, 1989, p. 116. 
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of the curious phrase “visibly inactive”? Luce’s comment on this place is, as usual, very 
perceptive. He contrasts Berkeley’s point here with that of Locke and other 
corpuscularians who “attributed mysterious powers and potencies to ‘every drop of water, 
every grain of sand’ (§101)”171. A more recent commentator, Cummins, sees Berkeley 
employing here the Manifest Qualities Thesis which is explained with the help of a 
difference between alteration and causation and existence in the mind. When for example 
I perceive fire and see its alterations, these cannot be deemed actions since the fire exists 
only as perceived in the mind and there is no perception of activity accompanying my 
perceptions of the fire172. Be it as it may, the most repeated complaint by commentators is 
that Berkeley’s account of causality is too brief. Cummins even laments that “[a]t this 
juncture Berkeley reveals his indifference to what might seem the important but purely 
philosophical task of spelling out exactly what his volitional theory of causes comprises. 
He proceeds, instead, to an argument for the existence of God...”173 This hits the nail on 
the head, Berkeley is really interested in causality only as far as it is necessary for his 
argument for God’s existence, perhaps deferring its full exposition to the second part of 
the Principles, which was to treat more fully of spirits but which never materialised. And 
since God is the topic of our present discussion as well, let us leave causality and 
concentrate on the next section: 
“26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others 
are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas, 
whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause 
cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the 
preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shewn that 
there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of 
ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.” 
This is a curious argument with many premises not explicit, in particular it draws 
on the contemporary assumption that only substances are active and on the conclusion of 
                                                 
171 Luce, A. A.: Berkeley’s Immaterialism, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1945, p. 93. 
172 Cummins, Phillip D.: “Berkeley on Minds and Agency”, in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. 
Kenneth P. Winkler, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 198. 
173 Cummins, Phillip D.: “Berkeley on Minds and Agency”, pp. 199-200. 
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PHK 7 that the only substance is spirit. It affirms the view prevalent among early modern 
philosophers that causation is the prerogative of a substance and adapts it to a specifically 
immaterialist context174 . It follows that the mind takes on itself all the other roles 
traditionally attributed to substances, and ides become equivalent to accidents. For 
example in PHK 135 Berkeley says that “a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance 
or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist” thereby affirming the old 
metaphor of support present in the very Latin word substancia. (This metaphor is, 
nevertheless, rejected for the material substance in DHP 197-8, presumably because on 
the metaphysical level of analysis the two completely different types of substances – 
material and spiritual – would somehow have to share the same accidents – ideas, whose 
mental nature was the great discovery of modern science.) The dependency of ideas on 
minds for their very existence is attested many times by their attribute “fleeting” and the 
whole parallel between substance/accident and mind/idea is explicitly affirmed at PHK 
98: “(Spirits) are active, indivisible substances: (ideas) are inert, fleeting, dependent 
beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or 
spiritual substances.” 
So the connection between Berkeley’s account of causality and his rejection of the 
material substance seems to be a very close one. But for a philosopher who takes pride in 
his rapport with common sense, the immaterialist restriction of causality to spirits 
harbours certain dangers. These, however, are anticipated by our author and PHK 51-2 
discuss the clash of the immaterialist account of causation with our linguistic intuition, 
because for an immaterialist the sentences “fire heats” and “water cools” are not true, 
because ideas cannot cause anything and so cannot heat or cool. What an immaterialist 
has to say is that spirit heats and spirit cools, which sounds weird. Berkeley 
                                                 
174 Berkeley’s commitment to the spirit being a substance has been questioned by Stephen Daniel in his 
“Berkeley, Suarez, and the Esse-Existere Distinction”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 
(2000), pp. 621-36, and by Robert Muehlmann in his Berkeley’s Ontology, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992. 
Both would like to see Berkeley adopting a ‘congeries’ account of the mind along Humean lines, the first 
likening Berkeley to Suarez and Gregory of Nyssa, the second accusing him of deflection and camouflage. 
The traditional view that for Berkeley spirit is a substance with all its customary functions and attributes 
has been ably defended by Marc Hight and Walter Ott in their joint “The New Berkeley”, Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, 34, 1 (2004). 
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acknowledges this and devises a little trick, summed in his slogan “think with the learned, 
and speak with the vulgar” – we should keep the old false phrases but keep in mind the 
metaphysical truth, which makes them false, in the same way that a Copernican does 
when he says that the sun sets, even though he knows that it is actually the earth that 
moves and the sun stays still. Here science/philosophy should correct our notions without 
disturbing the superficial level of language, much like in the Heterogeneity thesis in his 
optical programme, where we were allowed to say we see and touch the same thing even 
though science proved this assumption to be wrong. 
 Some readers and commentators, however, would rather stick to their uneducated 
vocabulary to the detriment of speculative truths. To these, Luce has tried to provide an 
answer in his commentary on the Principles. He contends that the ordinary man is 
actually much closer to Berkeley than we think; for he expects causality from the animate 
world around him while the inanimate world ‘stays put’. And this might well be true, if 
we remember that first of all we are interested in the activity of other people, what they 
say to us, what they do to us, whether they hate us or love us. This is also reflected in our 
vocabulary, where the majority of verbs describe social interaction. Then perhaps we 
expect activity from animals we keep and perhaps plants that we grow. Only then comes 
the activity of the inanimate world, and here we ascribe activity to “very big things, the 
minute parts of things, and very distant things.”175 Here Luce gives the cases of the Moon 
causing the tide and the apple being attracted to the centre of the Earth as examples of 
‘big and distant things’ acting, and the case of the magnetic needle being moved as an 
example of ‘minute things’ acting. “If we are asked how such ‘causes’ act, we must 
remain silent; we have no notion of activity other than that of animate beings; and when 
we scrutinize any case of physical causation, the alleged causality oozes out of it...”176 
                                                 
175 Luce, A. A.: Berkeley’s Immaterialism, p. 94. 
176 Luce, A. A.: Berkeley’s Immaterialism, pp. 94-5, Pitcher is also impressed by the introspective power of 
Berkeley’s account of causality: “It is regrettable that he does not work out and defend this position, so 
central to his whole philosophy, more fully in his published works...But his view is an immensely 
appealing one, even without an elaborate defence. There is something altogether special about the causality 
of our own actions; we can just feel ourselves making them happen. Thus, if I decide to raise my left arm 
now, and do it, there is no temptation for me to think that I have merely learned from experience that such 
acts of volition are generally followed by my left arm going up. One is irresistibly drawn to the idea that 
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 Perhaps only the scientist/philosopher would be interested in reducing causality to 
one materialistic principle that explains all change in nature, and to such a person 
immaterialism offers an alternative solution in an instrumentalist account of the scientific 
explanation based on the language analogy. Berkeley’s metaphysics strives to be 
anthropocentric and theocentric, as well as scientifically useful, as evidenced in PHK 156: 
“what deserves the first place in our studies is the consideration of God, and our duty”. 
 
 
3.2 The argument 
 
 Armed with his immaterialist account of causality, Berkeley then proceeds to lay 
out his proof of God’s existence in the next sections, PHK 28-29. Importantly, the whole 
section 28 is devoted to describing how we manipulate our ideas in our imagination. So 
Berkeley’s first premise in the argument is very minimalist, it is restricted to a single 
mind and its ideas of fancy in accordance with his Strict First-Person Perspective of his 
whole philosophy, so often mistaken for solipsism. In the very next section the scope is 
enlarged to include also the ideas of sense, that is the real world, whose existence is not 
questioned at all. Every idea needs a cause; my ideas of fancy are caused by my own 
mind, but what about my ideas of sense? They are not caused by me because I have no 
power over them and since the only true cause is a spiritual substance, it remains that 
they are caused by another spirit. “There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that 
produces them.” is the conclusion of the proof for God’s existence in Berkeley’s own 
words. 
 Commentators label this argument the Passivity Argument or the Causal 
Argument, in order to distinguish it from the other argument, the Continuity Argument. 
Since it is our contention that there is no such thing as a Continuity Argument in 
immaterialism, we can dispense with the qualifier ‘passivity’ and ‘causal’ and talk simply 
about the immaterialist argument for God’s existence. Thus we will not contradict 
Berkeley’s own words, for he always speaks about one argument and the division into 
                                                                                                                                                 
here, with volitions, and only here, we experience real causality, real agency. Berkeley doubtless thinks that 
a truth as obvious as this needs no extended defence.” Pitcher, George: Berkeley, Routledge, 1977, p. 133. 
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two arguments seems to be a commentators’ invention177. 
 
 
3.2.1 The Polytheistic Objection 
 
The best way to treat more fully of the argument seems to be the consideration of 
the most common objection levelled against it, namely that it entails not only that there is 
one mind causing our ideas of sense, but there is nothing in it that precludes there being 
two or more minds fulfilling the role of the providers of our sensory ideas. I will call this 
objection the Polytheistic Objection. 
 It occurs in many writers on Berkeley, there is none that does not at least mention 
it178. From the many versions we choose to discuss Grayling’s take on the objection 
because he devotes considerable space to it for it forms an integral part of his sympathetic 
interpretation of immaterialism as a well-argued system which is viable even without the 
role of God in it, and because his position is well argued and sufficiently representative of 
a modern interpretative trend: “If we consider only the bare existence of the sensible 
world, then...we have as much right to infer that there are two minds that cause our ideas 
of sense, or that there are sixteen...as we have that there is one infinite mind, namely 
God’s, causing our ideas of sense. Whatever plausibility there is in making God the cause 
of all our ideas of sense stems from the fact that the sensible world is so tremendously 
vast, complex and orderly: only a single mind possessing infinite powers, so the 
reasoning goes, can be responsible for such a world.”179 Grayling is even more exact in 
his overall analysis of the problem; he distinguishes two conclusions which follow from 
Berkeley’s argument, the weaker one being that the cause of my ideas of sense is indeed 
a spirit distinct from me, the stronger one being that this spirit is one, infinite and causes 
                                                 
177 In this way we can avoid, for example, the question which argument is more important or primary, as 
exemplified in Tipton: “Now the passivity argument is certainly Berkeley’s main argument for the 
existence of God. But he does have another argument...” (Tipton’s italics), Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The 
Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 321. 
178 Examples would be Tipton, Ian C.: Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 299, Pitcher, George, 
Berkeley, pp. 133-4, Grayling, A.C.: Berkeley: Central Arguments, pp. 194-6. 
179 Pitcher, George, Berkeley, pp. 133-4. 
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all my sensory ideas not caused by me. While the weaker conclusion is warranted by the 
argument and also, unfortunately for Berkeley, consistent with polytheism, the stronger 
conclusion, which apparently Berkeley attempted to reach because it identifies this 
external spirit with the God of the Christian tradition, does not follow from the argument 
provided and “is simply a result of (Berkeley’s) religious commitments, and is otherwise 
unsubstantiated.”180  That is a rather strong claim since it goes directly against what 
Berkeley himself says in many places.  
 How then did Berkeley, according to Grayling, jump from the weaker conclusion 
that our ideas of sense are caused by an external spirit or external spirits to the stronger 
conclusion that this spirit is one and has the attributes traditionally ascribed to the God of 
the Judeo-Christian tradition? Having established that some of our ideas are caused by 
another spirit, “from the character of these independently caused ideas Berkeley then 
proceeds to infer the nature of their source”181, that is in PHK 30 these ideas are stronger 
and more vivid than our ideas of fancy and so their cause is adequately stronger than us, 
and in PHK 32 this is even strengthened to include the wisdom of God inferred from the 
‘constant uniform working’ of the nature. But this is where Berkeley goes wrong in 
Grayling’s eyes, for it amounts to supplementing “the causal dependence argument with 
the argument from design, or ‘teleological’ argument...But the argument from design, 
familiarly, does not work, and a fortiori does not license a derivation of the stronger 
conclusion from the weaker.”182 So what is really entailed by Berkeley’s argument is at 
most that our ideas are caused by a mind, it does not follow that this mind is one, infinite, 
caring and loving us, its creatures. 
 Berkeley himself realizes that more needs to be said to squeeze the Christian God 
out of the metaphysical entity his system warrants, for in PHK 146 he seems to be doing 
just what Grayling accuses him of doing. After referring back to PHK 29, he fleshes out 
his God with the traditional attributes: 
“if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of 
                                                 
180 Grayling, A.C.: Berkeley: Central Arguments, p. 188, see also pp. 194-200. 
181 Grayling, A.C.: Berkeley: Central Arguments, p. 195. 
182 Grayling, A.C.: Berkeley: Central Arguments, p. 196, the ‘familiar’ failure of the argument from design 
is to be expected from an author claiming that Descartes was a Jesuit spy and that Kant was a crypto-atheist.  
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natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, 
and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the 
exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-
enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural 
inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we consider all these 
things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes 
One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly perceive that 
they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, ‘who works all in all,’ and ‘by whom all 
things consist.’” 
If Grayling is right and Berkeley needs the argument from design to arrive at his defence 
of God, and in fact uses the argument in this way, then Berkeley’s often proclaimed aim 
of defending religion and refuting atheism fails and what is left is a system which, 
contrary to its author’s wishes, functions on an idealistic and phenomenological basis and 
is still interesting in its own right for its well-wrought structure, but which sadly does not 
prove the existence of God. Now it is incumbent on us to explore the connection between 
Berkeley’s argument and the argument from design. 
 
 
3.2.2 The number of Berkeley’s arguments in the corpus 
 
 Numerous attempts have been made to classify Berkeley’s proof of the existence 
of God. But first we need to be certain what we are classifying, for many writers183 
contend there are as many as three different proofs of God’s existence in the Berkeleian 
corpus: the Continuity Argument occurring at least in DHP 230-1, the Passivity 
Argument occurring principally in PHK 28-29 and 145-8, and the Divine Language 
                                                 
183 Hooker, Michael: “Berkeley’s Argument from Design”, in Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative Essays, 
ed. by Turbayne, Colin, Manchester University Press, 1982, Klime, A. David: “Berkeley’s Divine 
Language Argument”, in George Berkeley – Alciphron in Focus, ed. by David Berman, Routledge, 1993: 
“The argument (of ALC IV, 4-14) is not the traditional design argument nor a version of the passivity or 
continuity arguments found in the Principles and Three Dialogues, respectively.” p. 185, Berman, David: 
“Cognitive theology and emotive mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron”, in George Berkeley Alciphron, or the 
Minute Philosopher in focus, ed. by David Berman, Routledge, 1993, p. 201. 
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Argument from the Fourth dialogue of Alciphron, namely ALC IV, 4-14. Since we have 
dealt with the first two, let us explain the third one. 
 When challenged by the mouthpiece of free-thinking atheism, Alciphron, to 
provide a proof of God’s existence that is not ontological or from authority, but based on 
sense-perception, Euphranor, Berkeley’s spokesman, first gets Alciphron to admit that 
men have souls, even though these are not perceived directly but rather inferred from 
sense-perception. And in the same manner we arrive at the knowledge of God, which we 
infer from the motions of nature, according to Euphranor. So far, we seem to be dealing 
with a version of the traditional argument from design, so disparaged by Grayling. But 
the next move is peculiar to Berkeley: when Alciphron admits that he sees no ready 
answer to this argument, but that the existence of a person is still more certain than he 
existence of God, because we see the person standing there in the flesh whereas we only 
infer the existence of God, Euphranor counters by pointing out the structure of inferring 
is the same in the case of a person as in the case of God. “Berkeley’s readers are forced to 
choose between God and solipsism: between having the company of other minds, 
including God, or being entirely alone (apart from one’s ideas) in the universe.”184 The 
novelty here is, of course, the enriching of the design argument with the dilemma of other 
minds. 
 After some consideration, this argument is not accepted by the picky Alciphron, 
on the grounds that a manifestation of movements does not guarantee a soul behind them. 
The only certain mark of a soul operating is the use of speech – I know that the body in 
front of me is not a robot but a real person when the person starts speaking to me. And so 
is the existence of other minds secured, because they speak to us, while the existence of 
God is still unproven, for He does not speak to us (baring the contentious ‘inner voices’ 
of prophets). Here Berkeley through Euphranor answers with the second phase of his 
argument that came to be called the Divine Language Argument in which he contends 
that God does speak to us through our visual ideas constituting a visual language – vision 
is literally a language, something that will be necessary to explore in more detail further 
on. 
                                                 
184  Berman, David: “Cognitive theology and emotive mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron”, in George 
Berkeley Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher in focus, ed. by David Berman, Routledge, 1993, p. 201. 
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 Despite being considered a separate argument for God’s existence in the 
Berkeleian corpus, both phases of the argument have their predecessors in earlier works, 
the first phase in PHK 145-8 and the second in NTV , especially sections 147 and 152185. 
Also the Principles insists on the same structure of the argument for other minds and for 
God, and the being of God is to be inferred more certainly than that of other people, as 
well, (PHK 147-8: “we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, 
with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures”). The second 
phase of Euphranor’s argument is taken from NTV where the arbitrary connection 
between out visible and tangible ideas is at the heart of Berkeley’s proposed doctrine, 
resulting in the Heterogeneity thesis. The fact that Berkeley appended NTV to all three 
editions of Alciphron in 1732, and with the role of God in speaking the language of 
nature explicit this time, testifies that considered it to be essential for his purpose of 
proving God. So it is our contention that the Divine Language Argument appearing in 
Alciphron is in fact a rehearsal of two earlier theses and their artful combination which 
was probably originally supposed to be made explicit in the second part of the Principles. 
 A different evaluation of the relationship between the argument in NTV and in 
Alciphron is presented by Cummins. He suggests that in NTV it was a ‘mere metaphor’ 
which later “became an element in a relatively complex argument” 186 . Such an 
interpretation, however, has several loose ends. The question is, was Berkeley aware of 
the usefulness of this ‘mere’ metaphor for the task of proving God when writing NTV? 
                                                 
185 It is true that the first two editions of NTV mention only an universal language of Nature without 
drawing the conclusion that it is God who speaks through it to man, the phrase ‘an universal language of 
the Author of Nature’ appearing only in the third edition of NTV which was appended to Alciphron in 1732. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the change is merely cosmetic, that Berkeley knew from the very beginning 
that his optics is theocentric, just like his metaphysics, and he would have drawn the conclusion in the 
second part of the Principles. Also, the conclusion that it is God who speaks to us through vision is drawn 
as early as the 1710 edition of the Principles. “It is...evident from what has been said ...in sect. 147 and 
elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas are the Language whereby the Governing 
Spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us... But for a fuller 
information in this point I refer to the Essay itself.” (PHK 44) 
186 Cummins, Phillip D.: “Berkeley on Minds and Agency”, in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, Ed. 
Kenneth P. Winkler, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 203. 
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The fact that he appended it to Alciphron in 1732 virtually unchanged and that in TVV 1 
he explicitly claims that it contains ‘a new and unanswerable proof’ lead us to believe 
that he considered the argument to be present already in his 1709 work but made it quite 
explicit and connected it with its metaphysical part only in his 1732 Alciphron. 
 Berman’s analysis is more on the mark. He suggests that the second phase of the 
Alciphron argument “is taken largely from the Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision”187, 
without, unfortunately, providing more detail or spelling out the exact relationship 
between NTV and Alciphron. 
 
 
3.2.3 Role of optics, and science in general, in proving God 
 
 So far we have considered Berkeley’s metaphysical arguments for the existence 
of God, but the previous chapter may have alerted us to the importance of his optical 
theory for the field of philosophical theology. It is now necessary to explore the role of 
Berkeley’s optics in his argument for God’s existence to round off the subject. Let us 
then start with the immaterialist account of the relationship between metaphysics and 
science (natural philosophy in Berkeley’s time). 
 Here the remarks from which we will attempt to reconstruct a whole picture are 
scattered through PHK 107-8, DM 34, 41-2, 71-2, TVV 1-2, 8, 43, 71, PC 207, and their 
perusal gives us the following picture: metaphysics is to be sharply distinguished from 
science (DM 34), the former is concerned with true causality, demonstration and ‘the 
existence of things’ (DM 71), the latter merely with signs that help us predict future 
events and discover laws which govern the course of nature (PHK 108), science uses 
experiments (DM 34, 41) whereas metaphysics is concerned with ‘the truth of things’ 
(DM 39, 71), science is limited to ‘experiments, laws of motions, mechanical principles’ 
and is clearly subservient to ‘superior science’ whose province is theology, metaphysics 
and morality (DM 42). In such an instrumentalist view of science the existence of God 
falls clearly into the domain of metaphysics and not science. 
                                                 
187  Berman, David: “Cognitive theology and emotive mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron”, in George 
Berkeley Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher in focus, ed. by David Berman, Routledge, 1993, p. 201. 
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 It is rather surprising, then, that at the very beginning of The Theory of Vision 
Vindicated and Explained we find this categorical proclamation: “...the Theory of Vision, 
annexed to the Minute Philosopher, affords to thinking men a new and unanswerable 
proof of the existence and immediate operation of God, and the constant condescending 
care of his providence...” (TVV 1) Berkeley is here in fact saying that his proof of God is 
to be found not in the Principles, his most important metaphysical statement, where 
commentators identify at least two different arguments for God’s existence, the 
Continuity Argument and the Passivity Argument, nor in Alciphron, where the Divine 
Language Argument is supposed to be located, but in his earliest work, An Essay 
Towards a New Theory of Vision from 1709, which is withal a scientific work, not a 
metaphysical one! How are we to reconcile this startling claim that the proof is scientific 
with Berkeley’s insistence that proofs of God fall into the province of metaphysics? 
 Certainly, Berkeley allows for metaphysical proofs of God: “...those good men 
who shall not care to employ their thoughts on this Theory of Vision have no reason to 
find fault. They are just where they were, being in full possession of all other arguments 
for a God, none of which are weakened by this.” (TVV 8) But once again, Berkeley 
insists that “…a new argument of a singular nature in proof...” (TVV 8, my italics) is to 
be found in his optical programme, if the reader has the will to comprehend it. Is the 
scientific nature of immaterialist optics compromised or is it the only exception where a 
scientific argument is put on the same level with metaphysical arguments? We believe 
that neither of these two extreme alternatives is correct and that a compromise between 
them can be devised which will be concerned with the status of immaterialist optics 
between science and metaphysics. 
 In section 43 of TVV Berkeley considers the relation between his optics and the 
geometrical optics and in the course of doing so discloses some important facts about 
how he himself saw his optical theory: 
“43. To explain how the mind or soul of a man simply sees is one thing, and 
belongs to philosophy. To consider particles as moving in certain lines, rays of 
light as refracted or reflected….is quite another thing, and appertaineth to 
geometry. To account for the sense of vision by the mechanism of the eye is a 
third thing, which appertaineth to anatomy and experiments. These two latter 
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speculations are of use in practice, to assist the defects and remedy the 
distempers of sight, agreeably to the natural laws obtaining in the mundane 
system. But the former theory is that which makes us understand the true nature 
of vision, considered as a faculty of the soul. Which theory…may be reduced to 
this simple question, to wit – how comes it to pass that a set of ideas, altogether 
different from tangible ideas, should nevertheless suggest them to us, there 
being no necessary connexion between them? To which the proper answer is, 
that it is done in virtue of an arbitrary connexion, instituted by the Author of 
Nature.” 
This rich section gives us many clues. First of all Berkeley’s optics explains how a man 
sees – a task in its simplicity on a par with the question of ‘the existence of things’ 
claimed for metaphysics, as opposed to all the geometrical apparatus of Descartes’ optics 
and the anatomy of the eye which are only ‘of use in practice’, read of instrumental value. 
Furthermore, only Berkeley’s optics discovers ‘the true nature of vision’ – a phrase with 
clear metaphysical aspirations, a part of the science of the soul – and the soul is a 
metaphysical topic par excellence (“…all the notion I have of God is obtained by 
reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections” DHP 
231-2). Still, it remains a theory (supposedly a scientific one?) albeit with a recourse to 
God – another metaphysical feature. So Berkeley’s optical discoveries are not on the 
same level as the earlier geometrical explanations, they are purposefully distanced from 
them and the psychology of vision does not replace the geometrical explanation, it merely 
puts it in its right place, that of a science subservient to metaphysics. The programme of 
NTV itself, however, remains a theory that is to be proved experimentally (cf. the last 
words of NTV “I should gladly see my notions either amended or confirmed by 
experience.” and TVV 71) but, being concerned with the soul, it is a half-way house to 
metaphysics. The hybrid nature Berkeley claims for his optics is apparent from the last 
two sentences of the quoted TVV 43, where a scientific question is solved through 
recourse to God, i.e. metaphysics suddenly bursts into science. 
 Berkeley drops hints pointing towards a special place for his optics in theology in 
other places as well. So in the Preface to the Three Dialogues we find the extraordinary 
statement that it is a desired goal that “the principles of natural religion (be) reduced into 
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regular sciences”, and in DM 42 we read: “…if anyone were to extend natural philosophy 
beyond the limits of experiments and mechanics, so as to cover a knowledge of 
incorporeal and inextended things, that broader interpretation of the term permits a 
discussion of the soul, mind, or vital principle. But it will be more convenient to follow 
the usage which is fairly well accepted…” Why does Berkeley bother mentioning this 
‘extension’ at all? Why does he not stick to his own definition of the role of science as 
opposed to the role and province of metaphysics? We suggest it is because he himself 
sees his optics doing just that: being a part of natural philosophy but treating of 
incorporeal things and the mind. And the most explicit pointer is to be found in DM 34: 
“34. … But to treat of the good and great God … and to show how all things 
depend on supreme and true being, although it is the most excellent part of 
human knowledge, is, however, rather the province of first philosophy or 
metaphysics and theology than of natural philosophy which today is almost 
entirely confined to experiments and mechanics. And so natural philosophy 
either presupposes the knowledge of God or borrows it from some superior 
science. Although it is most true that the investigation of nature every where 
supplies the higher sciences with notable arguments to illustrate and prove the 
wisdom, the goodness, and the power of God.” (my italics) 
Once again, Berkeley here laments the fact that natural philosophy underachieves by 
concentrating on experiments and mechanics and leads the reader to infer that such a state 
is not final nor necessary and that his natural philosophy (i.e. his optics) is not limited in 
this way. But even such limited natural philosophy is able to supply metaphysics, whose 
primary task it is to prove the existence of God, with arguments to prove his Christian 
attributes. And herein lies an answer to Grayling’s objection that, having proved God in 
his metaphysics, lazy Berkeley then turns to the traditional metaphysical argument from 
design to embellish Him with the traditional Christian attributes. For Berkeley, these 






3.3 God’s existence vs. His attributes 
 
 So Berkeley’s immaterialism succeeds, at least in the eyes of its author, in the 
dual task of proving the existence as well as the Christian attributes of God because of its 
dual and ambivalent nature of metaphysics cum science. And we, having taken the little 
optical detour, hopefully see more clearly the nature of Grayling’s complaint. When 
commenting on PHK 146, he thinks he finds a traditional metaphysical argument from 
design so easily dispatched later by Hume. Consequently, he misreads the two steps of 
the argument as the metaphysical God vs. the traditional personal God and tries to drive a 
wedge between the two, ignoring the special status of optics in the equation science-
metaphysics. The argument really starts in Berkeley’s science which is only then 
generalized into a metaphysics that is much lighter by contemporary standards. This 
unique perspective of a scientist-turned-metaphysician is attested already in the first 
quarter of Berkeley’s private notebooks, in PC 207: “My end is not to deliver 
Metaphysiques altogether in a General Scholastique way but in some measure to 
accommodate them to the Sciences, & shew how they may be useful in Optiques, 
Geometry &c.” What we witness in Berkeley’s case is something akin to Einstein finding 
out that the theory of relativity formula in fact reads YAH=WE and then having the 
leisure and inclination to work out this scientific discovery into a full-blooded 
metaphysics. 
 The effort to drive a wedge between the existence of God and his attributes is a 
serious challenge for it goes directly against what Berkeley says in many places. Unlike 
for example Descartes who aims to demonstrate the existence of God in his Meditations 
and then leave the question of his exact attributes to theology (and in fact presupposes 
God’s goodness from outside of philosophy altogether), Berkeley’s programme is very 
different and much more ambitious. In the subtitle to his Three Dialogues he aims to 
prove “the immediate providence of a Deity” (notice there is no mention of proving the 
existence of God), and also in the subtitle to The Theory of Vision Vindicated and 
Explained we find “the immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity”. So it seems 
Berkeley’s main aim, and one that he advertises often, is to elaborate on the topic of 
God’s love for His creatures and not to provide a simple metaphysical proof of His 
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existence188. 
 The elaboration is to be found primarily in PHK 30-2, 44, 57, 72, 107-8, 146-150 
which sections summarize the theological argument of NTV: the visible ideas are 
connected to tangible ideas only by a habitual connection (NTV 62), only the tangible 
ideas are relevant to the preservation of our bodies because only they can hurt them or 
benefit them (NTV 59), the only function of vision and visible ideas is to warn us in 
advance what tangible ideas we are about to encounter so that we can avoid the harmful 
ones and seek out the beneficial ones (NTV 59), this warning or foresight takes the form 
of a visual language that we learn when we grow up by connecting our tangible ideas 
with their visible relatives relying on our experience (NTV 147), we are literally in the 
position of a blind person who is told by a sighted person that if he advances ten more 
steps he will fall down a precipice and hurt himself, such a warning helps us avoid being 
hurt and is surely given by someone who cares for us (NTV 148), reflection on this whole 
mechanism provides us with intimations as to what lies in store for us once we are not 
confined to the senses (NTV 148). The conclusion that it is in fact God who speaks to us 
in this manner is not drawn in the pre-1732 NTV editions for it requires further steps in 
the argument that occur in PHK, namely the argument that the only causality can be 
spiritual and that therefore it is God who causes our ideas of sense, which we discussed 
above. 
 Nevertheless, even the Principles offers us additional illustrations of God’s 
providence. PHK 30-2 shows that God is so many times stronger than humans how many 
times the ideas of sense are stronger than the ideas of fancy and then it spells out that all 
our predictions are based on experience and on the habitual connections we make 
between certain ideas, without which we would in the position of a new-born baby. PHK 
57 and 72 ascribe the regularity and order of our ideas of sense to the goodness of God 
who does not want to confuse us and PHK 107-8 explicitly connects this to God’s good 
will towards His creatures and our supposition that the like actions will be followed by 
                                                 
188 Jessop hits the nail on the head: “A mere proof of the existence of God was not enough. His interest was 
in the kind of God, and in the kind of relation He stands in to the corporeal universe and us as humans, 
which his religious sensibility demanded.” Jessop, T. E.: “Berkeley as a Religious Apologist”, New Studies 
in Berkeley’s Philosophy, ed. Warren E. Steinkraus, 1966, p. 106. 
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like effects cannot be demonstrated189 because it rests on God’s will which is free to 
change. The alternative to this benevolent predictability is the situation where every our 
movement does not have its desired trajectory, every event in nature happens contrary to 
what we have come to expect – snow falling in August and destroying harvest, heavy 
things not falling to the ground but rather flying in all direction and injuring people, an 
individual screaming but nobody being able to hear him, total chaos of apocalyptic 
proportions. That this is not so is thanks to God’s good will towards us, according to 
Berkeley. We find a similar insistence on God’s unrestricted will in the main theme of the 
famous sermon Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God by Jonathan Edwards: “There is 
nothing that keeps wicked men at any one moment out of hell, but the mere pleasure of 
God. By the mere pleasure of God, I mean his sovereign pleasure, his arbitrary will, 
restrained by no obligation, hindered by no manner of difficulty, any more than if nothing 
else but God’s mere will had in the least degree, or in any respect whatsoever, any hand 
in the preservation of wicked men one moment.” The stress here is on wicked men, their 
sins and supposed unworthiness, while Berkeley’s goal is more positive and definitely 
more metaphysically subtle and sublime, but the basic idea is the same. 
 It is probably not surprising that this highly original contribution should be 
overlooked by many and misinterpreted by some. So Warnock190 says: “Strangely enough, 
Berkeley was more than usually confident that the correlations on which we rely are and 
always will be reliable, so long as we are reasonably careful in studying the ordinary 
course of events.”191 Berkeley was not at all sure about the reliability of our predictions, 
                                                 
189 This is rather similar to Hume’s contention that our expectation of causation is subjective and does not 
correspond to anything in nature. The atheist draws sceptical corollaries here while for the immaterialist 
this is evidence for God’s benevolence. 
190 Others, however, read Berkeley with more sympathy here: “We can never attain certain knowledge of 
(God’s) intentions, since there is no necessary connection between what God willed in the past and what he 
might will in the future…”, Olscamp, Paul J.: The Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley, Martinus Nijhoff, 
The Hague, 1970, p. 34. 
191 Warnock, G. J.: Berkeley, London: Penguin, 1953, sec. ed.1982, p. 44. One cannot but suspect that 
Warnock’s particular blindness towards the role of God in immaterialism stems from the fact that in his 
mind Berkeley’s God has already a different function – that of a cosmic observer guaranteeing the 
existence of unperceived objects. 
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on the contrary, he claimed we cannot demonstrate them but must trust to God here: “all 
deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates 
uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we 
cannot evidently know.” (PHK 107) 
 And with this perspective in mind should we approach the grand finale of the 
Principles, namely PHK 146-9 where Berkeley sums up his position on the existence of 
God and His benevolence and providence. PHK 146 begins by recapitulating the 
Principles argument that some other spirit must be the cause of our ideas of sense and 
then duly identifies this spirit as God in what Grayling considers the traditional argument 
from design. The text does indeed mention “the constant regularity, order, and 
concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the 
larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the 
exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired 
laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions 
of animals” but we must proceed warily here and postpone our judgement. The next two 
sections, PHK 147-8, contain the ‘other minds’ twist of the argument later used in 
Alciphron while PHK 149 comes clear on the nature of God – “a Spirit who is intimately 
present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which 
continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence” (my italics). 
In immaterialism, not only the existence of God is derived from the fact that He produces 
ideas of sense in us, but also from the manner in which He does it is arrived at His 
benevolence and providence. There is no need for unperceived objects to shore up the 
existence of God, nor for the traditional argument from design to prove His goodness. 
 The efforts to classify Berkeley’s argument as a version of the design argument192 
or an argument to the best explanation193 miss its unique nature of the scientific argument 
                                                 
192 Hooker, Michael: “Berkeley’s Argument from Design”, in Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative Essays, 
ed. by Turbayne, Colin, Manchester University Press, 1982, Grayling, A. C.: Berkeley: Central Arguments, 
1987. 
193 Fogelin, Robert J.: Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, Routledge, 2001, Klime, A. 
David: “Berkeley’s Divine Language Argument”, in George Berkeley – Alciphron in Focus, ed. by David 
Berman, Routledge, 1993. 
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that is peculiar to immaterialism. For the strength of the explanation lies in the fact that 
vision is literally a language – the connection between a word and the thing it signifies is 
arbitrary just like the connection between visible ideas and the tangible ideas they stand 
for, the system of such arbitrary signs can be used for expressing different meanings in 
different combinations of the signs just like one square visible idea can relate to a small 
square object close by or to a distant round object, for instance a tower, both systems of 
signs are governed by laws making up a grammar and syntax, grammarians and linguists 
study the first system while scientists attempt to uncover the second system, people must 
learn both languages, we are born with neither (a fact Berkeley believed could be 
established experimentally for vision, but one which is on display in small children and 
their initial erratic spatial behaviour), in both language systems we are more concerned 
with the things signified than with the mere signs (the exact grammatical classification of 
words in a sentence is usually overlooked and the attention is focused on their meaning in 
the same way that we disregard colours of trees when finding our way through a forest), 
in deciphering the language systems we sometimes make mistakes and misunderstand, in 
speech due to homonyms, irony etc., in vision we find illusions, mirror reflections etc., 
the aim of both systems is to direct and regulate our actions and produce emotions, the 
visual image of a cliff should serve as a warning as well as the sentence “Stop, you are 
going to fall!” which both in the same way should prevent our falling down, signs of the 
systems have to be considered in a context, a word can mean a different thing when 
uttered in a different situation as well as a visual clue can have its traditional role 
reversed (see NTV 73), and finally the aesthetic dimension of both sign systems should 
not be overlooked, here a poem and a beautiful sky during a sunset being the 
corresponding points of interest194. 
 Such an extensive correspondence in features between vision and speech can 
mean only one thing for Berkeley – vision is literally a language, and treating vision as a 
language is not only a useful explanatory scientific metaphor, it is a metaphysical fact. 
And since it is God who speaks it to us, we arrive at a theological perspective whose 
                                                 
194 I am indebted to Prof Berman for pointing out the similarities mentioned here and also to his useful 
summary of them in his “Cognitive theology and emotive mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron”, in George 
Berkeley Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher in focus, ed. by David Berman, Routledge, 1993, pp. 202-3. 
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radical nature surpasses even the Bible. Not only is God closer to an individual than any 
other individual, He also speaks to him every moment of his waking conscious life – 
these two features make Berkeley’s theological position unorthodox at best, and probably 
heretical. Recent textual criticism of the Old Testament195 reveals a worrying tendency in 
the relationship between God and man – God gradually disappears from human view. 
While in the Genesis He freely mingles with His creatures in the Garden and chats with 
them, He wrestles with Jacob only in absentia, the last He speaks to is Moses and is last 
seen by Solomon. After that, He reveals His will only in prophets’ visions. He becomes 
distant and humanity is largely left to its own devices, thus achieving maturity. But 
Berkeley’s theology makes the closeness of God its main theme, his target is other 
theistic philosophers who make God into a distant cause. For him, the Pauline quote 
about a Spirit “in whom we live, move, and have our being” is not a metaphor but an 
adequate expression of his metaphysics. Again and again Berkeley insists on God’s 
closeness to man: “Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute 
some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) ‘He be 
not far from every one of us.’ ” (PHK 150) taking the Biblical metaphors literally. “When 
I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things...” (DHP 257) 
Also, the motivation is theological-moralist: “...the apprehension of a distant Deity 
naturally disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more 
cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their minds...” 
(DHP 258). 
 Some commentators approve the emphasis on closeness of God and contrast it 
favourably with other philosophical theologies. So Pitcher talks about “the danger of 
atheism lurking in Locke’s system”196. The traditional view acknowledges independent 
mental and material substances which somehow interact, but then God is needed only to 
create the whole mechanism and set it into motion at the beginning, and it will sustain 
                                                 
195 Friedman, Richard Elliott: The Disappearance of God: A Divine Mystery, Little, Brown and Co., 1995. 
196 Pitcher, George: Berkeley, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 92, see also p. 135: “Perhaps the 
most striking advantage that Berkeley sees in his view that it is God who causes all our ideas of sense is 
that it moves God into the very centre of our lives. The intimate concern that God thus demonstrates for our 
individual welfares can only make us love and trust Him. Atheism is thereby crushed.” 
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itself according to the laws of motion discovered at that very time by Newton. At best, 
the traditional view of natural philosophy removes God from everyday concerns of the 
ordinary man. At worst, the road is open to the material substances existing permanently 
without any creation and being the sole causal power in the universe. Luce’s commentary 
also diagnoses this danger and sees matter as an anti-God with a pedigree stretching back 
to the secularised Greeks: “The ancient Greeks worked out the notion of matter because 
they had no usable notion of deity.”197 Jessop is also on the mark when he says: “Quite 
clearly (Berkeley’s) most general antipathy was towards the conception of God as First 
Cause…the deistic conception was too thin to ground anything that deserves to be called 
religion, too unrelated to man’s circumstances and inner needs to supply any strong 
stimulus to worshipful and virtuous living. For religion, God must be close to His 




3.4 Summary of Berkeley on God 
 
 While Berkeley is very serious about God in his system, he does not advertise that 
he is going to prove His existence in the subtitles to his main works. He does, however, 
claim in the subtitle to the Three Dialogues that immaterialism demonstrates “the 
immediate providence of a Deity”. Thus, the traditional interpreters’ reticence, when 
confronted with Berkeley’s philosophical theology, seems to be in danger of mistaking 
his priorities at best, and distorting the whole tightly-knit system at worst. 
 Berkeley’s explanatory strategy has two stages – the logically first is the proof 
that God exists, and the second is the logically subsequent demonstration of His attributes. 
We contend that their chronological order was in fact reversed, NTV of 1709 contains 
largely an illustration of God’s goodness to his creatures and the main metaphysical work, 
the 1710 Principles has the immaterialist proof of God’s existence. 
                                                 
197 Luce, A. A.: Berkeley’s Immaterialism, 1945, p. 71. 
198 Jessop, T. E.: “Berkeley as a Religious Apologist”, New Studies in Berkeley’s Philosophy, ed. Warren E. 
Steinkraus, 1966, p. 106. 
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 The proof itself has been traditionally called the Passivity Argument or the Causal 
Proof and it has rightly been diagnosed as a corollary of Berkeley’s conception of 
substance and his original, for some extreme, doctrine of causality. The second stage – 
that of proving that the external spirit causing our ideas of sense is in fact God with all 
the traditional Christian attributes of love, providence etc. has been either ignored or 
identified as resting on the traditional metaphysical design argument, and consequently of 
not much philosophical interest. Especially Grayling is very active in voicing his doubts 
about Berkeley’s identification of the external spirit as God and so tries to drive a wedge 
between the two phases of Berkeley’s theological programme. 
 The two phases correspond, in our view, to two arguments: the first is the 
Passivity Argument, while some flesh is put on the metaphysical God by the Divine 
Language Argument which occurs already in NTV. However, it is in Alciphron that we 
find the two phases connected explicitly for the first time, probably because Berkeley 
planned to connect them only in a second part of the Principles that never occurred. 
Berkeley states explicitly in TVV that his early optical work NTV contains a proof of 
God’s existence and he even appends the work to his editions of Alciphron in 1732. After 
examining Berkeley’s optics we found that he claims a special place for it in between 
science and metaphysics, it is concerned with vision as a faculty of the soul but it is still 
subjected to experimental testing. As such, it is uniquely suited to provide a 















 So what is the final picture of Berkeley’s thought? Berkeley as the first writer in 
the history of philosophy devotes a whole book to explaining his position on common 
sense. By a careful reinterpretation of key words which for him define common sense – 
‘know’, ‘certain’, ‘real’ – he attempts to show that his immaterialism does actually less 
damage to the views of the man in the street than its adversary materialism. Two aspects 
are worth stressing: Berkeley never claims he agrees with the plain man in everything, he 
just claims that he agrees with him more than the materialist, the immaterialist 
disagreements being necessitated by science. Secondly, immaterialism is possible thanks 
to, and should always be viewed only against a backdrop of, materialism. 
 However, Berkeley was not successful in his attempt to redefine common sense; 
his contemporaries and commentators insisted on viewing it as dealing somehow with 
‘material objects’ or ‘external objects’ (things without, objective things, absolute things, 
the thing in itself, etc.) and consequently tended to see his system as somehow depriving 
these ‘physical’ things of their reality. Our author saw this as a failure which in fact 
precluded the publication of the rest of his philosophical system. After 1713 we get only 
bits and pieces and the literary activity of the early 1730s is directed towards a different 
goal, that of defending the Christian religion. But what of the bone of contention here, the 
term ‘material object’ itself? How could Berkeley do without it? We suggest the answer 
to this question is to be found in his optical programme – having successfully explained 
everything there was to be explained in the science of vision purely by psychological 
entities, he proclaimed them the new metaphysical building blocks of the world. They 
alone fulfil the two roles expected of metaphysical entities in the early modern period: 
they explain how and what we perceive (they are in fact better at this job than 
psychological entities plus material objects, as exemplified in NTV), and provide a more 
robust ontology, of which what we perceive is actually only a fraction. Berkeley’s whole 
optical programme consists in tearing asunder ideas which by constant repetition have 
become blended together and are in fact perceived as one. Plenty of space for the 
attentive natural philosopher to dive into and fish out new discoveries! So it is not true 
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that Berkeley limits the world to what we perceive, on the contrary, he enlarges our 
perception into an exciting possibility for scientists, philosophers and even divines. 
 Still, the nagging question remains: can such light metaphysics account for 
everything we need? If the being of a thing consists in its being perceived, what about the 
books in a closed closet? Do they not exist until someone opens the door? Here Berkeley 
says, despite generations of commentators, that the books do not exist when they are not 
perceived, and even more radically, there is not anything that could not exist there. The 
books are just visible (or tangible) ideas and when we do not see (feel) them we do not 
have the ideas. When we open the closet again we are again provided with the visible 
ideas. True, we somehow expect that the books will be there, but that is because we have 
learnt the appropriate connections between ideas. So we can say that the books are in the 
closet even though the closet is now shut and we do not see them, meaning thereby 
merely that when we open the closet we will see them again, not that they exist in the 
dark unperceived. With the supposition that ideas are private and subjective and that there 
are many more ideas than we are aware of (the more robust ontology) the problem of 
continuity of unperceived objects disappears. It is also the supposition from which a 
psychologist of vision departs when building his immaterialist optical theory. 
 There is no need to bring in God to guarantee the existence of unperceived things, 
for it is a contradiction that there should be unperceived things in the first place. God’s 
existence is evident from the fact that we have no power over some of our ideas and since 
only a spirit can cause ideas, the ideas of sense are caused in us by God who thereby 
instructs us how to conduct our lives. Therefore He is not a distant cause but a loving 
father of the tradition. And this is once again revealed through the science of vision 
which provides the best example of our ideas of sense forming a language through which 
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 The aim of the dissertation is to provide a sympathetic interpretation of 
Berkeley’s immaterialism that does not proceed on the assumption that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with the system itself. Careful close reading uncovers new semantic 
relationships between important philosophical concepts in immaterialism. 
 Although traditionally viewed as anti common-sense, Berkeley devotes one whole 
book to explaining his position on common sense. He claims that his system is closer to it 
than materialism because it does not distort the meanings of such key words as “know”, 
“certain” and “real”. Furthermore, he empties words “external object”, “absolute 
existence” etc. of their meaning, thus precluding the very semantic framework within 
which the traditional debate about realism, idealism, phenomenalism and solipsism takes 
place. 
 Berkeley’s own definition of the object of perception is to be found primarily in 
his scientific theory of vision, from which it is generalized into a metaphysics. And since 
his optical programme provides a psychology of vision, also the immaterialist 
metaphysical underpinning limits itself to connecting ideas as psychological entities 
private to each perceiver and construing objects of perception out of them. 
 But if things are just collections of ideas and ideas are mind-dependent entities, 
what happens to things when the ideas are not in the mind, when they are not perceived? 
The orthodox interpretation has Berkeley bring in God, the never-sleeping cosmic 
observer who sees everything, thus keeping everything in existence. But this 
interpretation has little support in the texts and in some places goes against them, so it has 
to be rejected. Berkeley in fact takes the hard line and claims that unperceived things do 
not exist at all. His ontology is still strong enough for all scientific purposes since there 
are many more ideas than we are actually aware of in sense perception, due to constant 
repetition many ideas have been run together and it takes great skill and patience to 
disconnect them again. 
 God plays another vital role in immaterialism – that of exciting ideas of sense in 
our mind and putting them into a regular pattern that we can learn to decipher. In fact, 




 Cílem práce je vstřícná interpretace Berkeleyho imaterialismu, která nevychází z 
předpokladu, že celý systém je v zásadním smyslu chybný. Čtení základních textů 
odkrývá nové sémantické vztahy mezi důležitými filozofickými pojmy v imaterialismu. 
 Tradiční interpretace vnímá rozpor imaterialismu a common sense (zdravý rozum), 
přestože Berkeley věnuje celou jednu knihu vysvětlování své pozice v tomto směru. 
Tvrdí, že jeho systém je bližší common sense než materialismus, protože nepřekrucuje 
významy klíčových slov “vědět”, “jistý” a “skutečný”. Zároveň poukazuje na 
nesmyslnost slov “vnější předmět”, “absolutní existence” atd., čímž zamítá už samotný 
sémantický rámec, ve kterém se odehrává tradiční diskuse o realismu, idealismu, 
fenomenalismu a solipsismu. 
 Berkeleyho vlastní definice předmětu vnímání se primárně nachází v jeho 
vědecké teorii vidění, ze které je zobecněna na metafyzickou úroveň. A jelikož jeho 
optický program se v podstatě skládá z psychologie vidění, je i jeho metafyzické ukotvení 
omezeno na spojování idejí jakožto psychologických entit, které jsou privátní každému 
vnímajícímu, z nichž tento konstruuje předměty vnímání. 
 Pokud jsou ale věci pouhými soubory idejí a ideje závisejí na vnímající mysli co 
do své existence, co se s věcmi stane, když ideje nejsou v mysli, když nejsou vnímány?  
Ortodoxní interpretace tvrdí, že se Berkeley v tento okamžik odvolá na Boha, 
všudypřítomného věčného pozorovatele, který všechno vidí a tím i všechno udržuje v 
existenci. Tato interpretace má však v textech minimální oporu a na několika místech jim 
explicitně odporuje, a musí být proto odmítnuta. Berkeley ve skutečnosti zastává 
extrémní pozici a tvrdí, že nevnímané věci vůbec neexistují. Jeho ontologie je přesto dost 
silná i pro vědecké účely, protože existuje daleko více idejí, než jsme si vědomi při 
vnímání – díky stálému opakování totiž už jednotlivé ideje nevnímáme, ale spojujeme si 
je automaticky do souborů. 
 Bůh má v imaterialismu jinou důležitou roli – vyvolává v naší mysli smyslové 
ideje v pravidelném sledu, abychom je byli schopni dekódovat a řídit se jimi. Tento 
pravidelný sled idejí tvoří vlastně visuální jazyk, kterým k nám Bůh promlouvá, když 
otevřeme oči. 
